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Chapter 1: Introduction 
As Karl Polanyi explained in his famous book, The Great Transformation, 
freeing economic life from social and political controls was tried and promoted firstly 
in England in the mid-nineteenth century by constructing the free market that operated 
independently of social needs. This new type of economy allowed prices of all goods, 
including money, land and labour, to be changeable without regard to their effects on 
society. The creation of the free market was achieved by demolishing previous 
markets, which were embedded in society with many kinds of regulations. Today, 
what transnational organisations, including the World Trade Organisation, the 
International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, are trying to achieve seems to have many similarities with the great 
transformation in the mid-nineteenth century.  
In the early 20th century the laissez-faire economy was challenged by a series 
of world incidents, including World War I, the Great Depression and World War II. In 
the post-war period, the Western world adopted the so-called Keynesian compromise, 
in which the foreign currency exchange rate was fixed to the US dollar, and the state 
intervened to keep a clear division of domestic and international economy and to 
maintain the welfare of society, while international trade, especially financial trade, 
was limited.1 The situation gradually changed from the mid 1970s when the fixed 
currency exchange was lifted, and the velocity of change accelerated during the 1980s. 
Known as neoliberalisation, various markets, including the financial market, had been 
liberalized, and post-war Keynesian welfare states were dismantled in a number of 
nation-states. In the 1990s, neoliberalisation became a global phenomenon with the 
emergence of international and regional institutions, including the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the World Bank, the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
and the European Union (EU), playing an important role in neoliberal economic 
reforms and structural adjustments in not only developed countries, but also in 
undeveloped and developing countries. Almost all nation-states in the world became 
part of the process of neoliberalisation, and therefore neoliberalisation is often used 
interchangeably with globalisation. 
Similar to the laissez-faire economy in the period of 19th century, current 
ongoing neoliberalisation transformed our society by causing a number of social 
issues and problems. The unprecedented volume of global financial trade created 
great uncertainty in a highly interdependent international economy, and made our 
domestic daily life more and more volatile through the connection to the international 
economy. Unequal development in the global north and south became increasingly 
                                                  
1 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (New Jersey, 1987), pp. 131-2.   
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noticeable, and inside nation-states the social gap has been increasing. Moreover, the 
erosion of other social spheres by expanding the sphere of economy prompts ordinary 
people into the world of mass consumption and induces consumerism and atomism 
while excluding them from the important political and economic decision-making 
processes. The same period saw a revival of nationalism. Nationalism can be seen as a 
countermovement against current ongoing globalisation, like Islamic fundamentalism, 
but the revitalisation of nationalism also can be seen in the developed north during the 
process of neoliberalisation, like cultural nationalism in the US under Reagan 
administration.  
Encountering and seeing neoliberalisation and the revival of nationalism 
simultaneously, we face to a theoretical paradox that neoliberalism and nationalism 
appear to be in conflict with each other, in the sense that while neoliberalism’s 
ideology is methodologically and normatively individualist, nationalism is premised 
on collectivist interests and sentiments. Yet politically, and particular in recent 
Japanese politics, they seem to be compatible and even mutually reinforcing. To 
explore and elucidate this apparently contradictory relationship, this thesis presents an 
analysis of neoliberalisation and the roles of nationalism in neoliberalisation in the 
developing north, using the case of Japan. 
 
1.1. Theoretical Framework  
Neoliberalisation has been discussed and studied among national and 
international scholars, including its ideology, origins and reforms. For instance, David 
Harvey examines the ideological background and historical aspects of neoliberalism 
reforms originating in the US.2 Tickell and Peck argue for two different aspects of 
neoliberalisation by providing the framework of roll-back and roll-out 
neoliberalisation.3 Although these analyses provide useful frameworks and insights 
to understand neoliberalism and neoliberalisation, these analyses do not clearly focus 
on what the main driving force of neoliberalisation is. Therefore, first of all, this 
thesis explores a possible answer for driving force of neoliberalisation that will be 
helpful to understand a whole picture of neoliberalisation.  
Scholars in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) and nationalism 
have provided various theories about the role of nationalism in neoliberalisation. In 
the arguments among the scholars of IPE, there are realist, liberal and Marxist 
approaches to explain the relationship between nationalism and neoliberalisation. 
However, their approaches tend to statist arguments, in which nationalism is always 
                                                  
2 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford, 2005). 
3 Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck, Making global rules: globalization or neoliberalization?, in Peck and 
Wai-chung Yeung ed., Remaking the Global Economy (London, 2003). 
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treated as protectionism or mercantilism. Due to this limitation, their theories cannot 
explain the current revival of economic liberalisation and nationalism among 
nation-states in the 1980s and 1990s. Alternatively, in order to explain why 
nation-state might use neoliberal policies as a means of seeking national interests and 
why neoliberalisation can be supported by the people in a nation, Crane,  Shulman, 
Goff and Desai provide new theories. These new theories together are helpful to 
explain two different nationalisms that work to promote and legitimize 
neoliberalisation. Therefore, this thesis is grounded on literature in the area of 
nationalism and neoliberalisation to provide a possible answer for the roles of 
nationalism in neoliberalisation.  
 
1.2. Basic arguments of the thesis 
From the analysis of neoliberalism and neoliberalisation, it is argued that the 
emergence of the global financial market is a main driving force of neoliberalisation, 
and neoliberalisation is the process of financialisation. Moreover, neoliberalisation 
increases social insecurity as the expansion of neoliberal financial markets causes 
instability and volatility. Neoliberalisation also increases social inequality 
internationally and domestically, because neoliberalisation in various markets creates 
high competition. In general, transnationalized interests group achieve the financial 
benefit of neoliberalisation, and non-transnationalized interest groups tend to lose the 
positions that they occupied in the former Keynesian type of economy. Therefore, 
neoliberal reforms do not serve the particular interests of non-transnationalized 
interests groups. However, in a democratic country, there is a necessity to legitimize 
the implementation of neoliberal reforms as political and economic policies, if 
neoliberalisation is to be practiced.  
Regarding the relationship of nationalism and neoliberalisation, it is argued 
here that in the process of neoliberalisation there are two stages of nationalism, 
namely economic and cultural nationalism. Economic nationalism is used to provide a 
legitimacy of implementation of neoliberal reforms by representing neoliberal reforms 
as in the nation’s economic interest. Once neoliberal reforms are implemented, social 
insecurity and inequality tend to emerge in a nation-state, and therefore a state 
implements cultural nationalism to ‘mask’ or ‘glue’ the social insecurity and 
inequality to maintain national unity for maintenance of neoliberal space or further 
implementation of neoliberal policy. Nationalism can provide the legitimizing goal 
and “glue” that can counteract the increase in social insecurity and inequality 
generated by neoliberalisation, because the sentiments generated by economic and 
cultural nationalism are strongly connected with the will of the people. 
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1.3. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Approach 
Strengths  
Firstly, this thesis can provide a clear picture for the relationship between 
financialisation and neoliberalisation. Previous arguments over neoliberalism and 
neoliberalisation mainly focused on ideologies, historical aspects, reforms and results 
of neoliberalisation even though some scholars pay attention to its connection to 
global finance and argue that the global finance is a part of neoliberalisation. This 
thesis shows how the emergence of the global financial market is influential to 
neoliberalisation, and provides deeper insights into the neoliberal financial market by 
evaluating the nature and structure of the financial market and the results from its 
expansion.  
Secondly, this thesis clearly analyses four aspects of nationalism that makes it 
possible to evaluate new theories of the relationship between neoliberalisation and 
nationalism and to understand the possibility that two different types of nationalism 
would occur in the process of neoliberalisation. Through the evaluation, this thesis 
provides an explanation for the different nationalisms in the process of 
neoliberalisation in a nation-state. 
 Thirdly and finally, this thesis provides a detailed scope of neoliberalisation 
and nationalism in recent Japan. Most Western literature about Japan’s economy 
focuses on its ‘non-liberal’ economic system, and only a few books and articles 
analyse Japan’s neoliberal reforms. Moreover, the recent revival of nationalism 
among the Japanese has not been paid great attention by Western scholars. Therefore, 
this thesis can contribute to knowledge on recent Japanese political economy, and 
brings some of the Japanese-language scholarly debates into the English-language 
literature on Japan. 
 
Weaknesses 
 This thesis does not provide an analysis of the relationship between 
neoliberalisation and nationalism in developing and non-democratic countries. 
Moreover, this thesis explored only Japan as its case study. Therefore, it is not 
demonstrated here whether the argument of the thesis is applicable to other countries, 
including non-democratic and developing countries.    
 Because this thesis was written in New Zealand, I have relied on secondary 
sources. To analyse nationalism in the 1980s and the 1990s I rely on previously 
published research. To evaluate more recent nationalism under the Koizumi 
administration, I also rely on previous research and newspapers’ opinion polls rather 
than, for example, conducting surveys or analysing cultural products such as 
television programmes and advertisements.        
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1.4. Method  
This thesis is constructed by the combination of a review and analysis of the 
theoretical literature with a detailed case study to derive a potentially generalisable 
argument about the relationship between nationalism and neoliberalisation. In order to 
elucidate the relationship between neoliberalism and nationalism more generally as 
well as in relation to Japanese politics, the literature on neoliberalisation is reviewed, 
identifying key dynamics shaping its political impacts in Japan. Then, relevant 
segments of the large and diverse literature on nationalism are discussed in order to 
exact analytical elements that can be used to understand the dynamics of nationalism 
in Japan. The literature that attempts to account for the relationship between 
nationalism and neoliberalism is also reviewed and evaluated. Then, the insights 
derived from the literature review are applied to the case study of Japan. 
English-language as well as Japanese-language scholarship is drawn on to identify 
key features of the post-war Japanese political-economic system as well as the pattern 
and impacts of neoliberalisation in Japan. Literature on recent social, cultural and 
political developments in Japan is then used to substantiate this thesis’s argument 
about the relationship between nationalism and neoliberalisation.  
 
1.5. Structure  
The structure of the reminder of the thesis is presented below. 
 
Chapter Two introduces literature on neoliberalism and argues that changes to the 
finance sector and the process known as “financialisation” have been the driving 
forces behind neoliberal reforms in other sectors. In order to grasp the development of 
neoliberalisation (including financialisation) in detail, Tickell and Peck’s framework 
for neoliberal reforms is applied.  
 
Chapter Three discusses and analyses theories of nationalism with regard to how they 
might pertain to the role of nationalism in economic liberalisation. While all agree 
that nationalism seeks to unify “the people” in a nation-state, it is not clear how 
nationalism can unify the people. In order to make the effects of nationalism 
observable, four aspects of nationalism are discussed. A hypothesis concerning the 
role of nationalism in Japan’s neoliberalisation is presented. 
 
Chapter Four explores the case of Japanese neoliberalisation. Here I analyse the 
post-war Japanese economic system and research why neoliberal reforms became to 
be implemented in Japan, what roll-back and roll-out neoliberalisation in Japan look 
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like, how the post-war Japanese economic system changed in neoliberalisation and 
what the outcomes of neoliberalisation have been.  
 
Chapter Five is the case study of Japanese nationalism in neoliberalisation. Here I 
analyse the economic interests groups under the post-war Japanese economic system 
and transformation of economic interests in neoliberalisation. Moreover, different 
types of nationalism in the roll-back and roll-out neoliberal era are explored and 
observed. 
 
Chapter Six concludes the thesis with a discussion of the findings from the case study 
of Japan.  
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Chapter 2: What is Neoliberalism? 
2.1. Theoretical aspects of neoliberalism  
The origins of the theory of neoliberalism can be traced back to the 
anti-communist scholar, Friedrich Hayek, and the Mont Pelerin Society, which was 
created by Hayek and included among others Milton Friedman and Karl Popper. 1  
 They opposed the social and economic liberalism promoted by Keynes and 
his followers since the New Deal was introduced and adhered to a far more 
conservative liberalism than pre-eighteenth century liberalism, which was based on 
property rights and the sanctity of the market. 2 
However, the classical liberalism of earlier thinkers to whom they refer, 
including Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, deviates in a number of respects from 
neoliberal “orthodoxy”. 3 Smith, for instance, acknowledged the important role the 
state plays in regulating the market, whereas “Mill advocated worker cooperatives and 
argued that individual satisfaction was not the universal metric of human welfare”. 4 
On the other hand, in the neoliberal view individuals are defined as rational agents in 
the market, while the market is supposed to be free from any restrictions and 
interventions (by the state); market failure is regarded as the result of interventions 
from outside the market. 5 For neoliberals, freedom is a property of individuals and is 
interpreted as freedom of choice, especially in the market.6  
Since the early 1980s, neoliberal approaches have been applied in economic 
and non-economic sectors, including market and governmental reforms. After the 
collapse of the Eastern Block in 1990, neoliberal reform and democracy have been 
treated as a legitimized force, but current neoliberal policies or reforms are not exactly 
an embodiment of its aforementioned philosophical principles. Instead, these reforms 
and policies have in fact emerged from different bodies of theory developed for 
various purposes. Harvey points out that ongoing neoliberalisation in practice is:  
a complex fusion of monetarism (Friedman), rational expectations (Robert Lucas), public 
choice (James Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock), and the less respectable but by no means 
uninfluential ‘supply-side’ ideas of Arthur Laffer, who went so far as to suggest that the 
                                                  
1 Harvey 2005, p. 20. Nail Smith, The Endgame of Global Capitalism, New York, Public Affairs, 1998, 
p. 4.   
2 Harvey 2005, p.20.  
3 Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Knowledge at Work: Someneoliberal Anachronisms, Review of Social 
Economy, Vol. LXIII, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 548-9. Richard Robinson,neoliberalism and the 
Future World, Critical Asian Studies, 36:3, 2004, p.407, Amy Freeman, Commentary: In the shadow of 
liberalism? Comments on Neil Smith’s The Endgame of Globalization, Political Geography 25, 2006, 
pp. 28-9.  
4 Hodgson, pp. 584-9.  
5 Robinson, p.407, Freeman pp. 28-9.  
6 Robinson, p. 407, Freeman pp. 28-9.  
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incentive effects of tax cuts would so increase economic activity as to automatically increase 
tax revenues (Regan was enamoured of this idea). 7   
Contrary to neoliberal theoretical principles, which consider the state as an 
unwelcome regulator of the market, nation-states themselves have implemented 
neoliberal reforms and policies as a reaction and adjustment to economic 
globalisation.8  However, there are differences between theoretical neoliberalism and 
the actual practices of neoliberalism. What is happening now in the world is very 
different from the world suggested by theoretical neoliberalism. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine what the current attributes of neoliberalisation are.  
2.2. The Creation of the Global Financial Market as Main Force of 
Neoliberalisation   
From Bretton Woods to neoliberal financial market  
Neoliberal approaches to the global financial market emerged from the crash 
of the Bretton Woods system in 1976. During the period between 1944 and 1976 
when the international monetary system was the Bretton Woods system, there was no 
actual global financial market. As Campbell describes, “there were strong capital 
controls and regulations on international capital activity throughout the capitalist 
world, not only in the advanced capitalist countries but also in the Third World”.9  
During that time, an attempt was being made to force a compromise between 
domestic autonomy and international norms. This was because not only the great 
powers, but also most of the industrial sector acknowledged the disastrous 
consequences brought about by the Great Depression (the result of a liberalised 
international financial market under the classical gold-standard), which also gave rise 
to national protectionism (fascism, Nazism, and the New Deal all valued domestic 
autonomy).10 In terms of international liquidity, the Bretton Woods system firstly 
adopted the US dollar as its reserve currency, then fixed the exchange rate 
(maintaining each currency’s fixed exchange rates against the U.S. dollar by Central 
banks and their governments) and created an indirect gold standard (US$35 per fine 
once of gold).11 This action was mainly taken as the United States had accumulated 
an exorbitant amount of gold (over four-fifths of the gold outside the Soviet Union 
was in the US) and also because of its great competitiveness in production capital, 
                                                  
7 Harvey 2005, p.54, also see Robinson, p. 407. 
8 Gilpin Robert, Global Political Economy (New Jersey, 2001), ch. 15, Al Campbell, The Birth of 
Neoliberalism in the United States: A Reorganisation of Capitalism, in Saad-Filho and Johnston ed., 
Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (London, 2005). 
9 Campbell, p. 189.  
10 Campbell, p. 189. 
11 Jan Toporowski, A Haven of Familiar Monetary Practice: Theneoliberal Dream in International 
Money and Finance, in Saad-Filho and Johnston ed., Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (London, 2005) 
p. 107.  
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including the manufacturing sector.12            
That is to say, the Bretton Woods system tried to guarantee a state’s domestic 
economic independence and a stable exchange rate by sacrificing the international 
mobility of their capital, but the distinctive exception was the United States, “which 
had very few restrictions on international capital movements”.13 The U.S. was given 
a special privilege of ‘seigniorage’: “its residents could pay for their excess imports 
with dollars conveniently printed for them by the Federal Reserve System”. 14 
Technically, all other countries were required to keep their imports under control by 
“deflationary demand management, in order not to run out of foreign currency to pay 
for imports”.15  
However, this tight control over international money flow under the Bretton 
Woods system had seriously deteriorated by the end of 1950s. By 1958, European 
countries perceived that they had accumulated enough international reserves (mainly 
US dollars) to “restore currency convertibility”.16 This turn of events proved to be 
satisfactory to both the New York banking circle, which was striving to play a more 
autonomous role as lender to the world, and the British government, which was 
“experiencing problems in its sterling balances”. 17  Eventually, the British 
government lifted its regulations over dealing in dollar deposits in 1959, and the 
market was allowed to locate itself in London. The Eurocurrency market then 
emerged and in 1963 the issue of bonds in the market was allowed by the British 
government.18 
Although the Eurocurrency market was still not fully liberalised, the creation 
of a largely unregulated international capital market had eroded the nation-states’ 
capital control under the Bretton Woods system.19 The United States, in particular, 
faced severe difficulty in its balance-of-payments, because US banks expanded their 
lending in the Eurocurrency market.20 The United States tried to resolve the problem 
by implementing capital controls starting in 1963, but these regulations only resulted 
in the further expansion of Eurocurrency transactions. As a result, it led to an increase 
in the threat to replace the New York market with the Eurocurrency market as the 
centre of international transactions.21           
During the Vietnam War, “the outflow of the US dollar reached record 
                                                  
12 Toporowski, p.107, Gilpin 1986, pp. 310-4. 
13 Campbell, p.189. 
14 Toporowski, p. 108.  
15 Toporowski, p. 108. 
16 Campbell, p. 189. 
17 Campbell, p. 189. 
18 Campbell, p. 189, Gilpin 1987, pp. 314-7. 
19 Campbell, p. 189, Gilpin 1987, pp. 314-7. 
20 Campbell, p. 189, Gilpin 1987, pp. 314-7. 
21 Campbell, p. 191.  
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levels”22, and the pressure on the dollar kept increasing. Eventually the Bretton 
Woods exchange system crashed in 1971.23 Europe and Japan argued for a return to a 
fixed exchange rate backed by “significantly strengthened capital controls based on 
international co-operation” as a post-Bretton Woods international monetary system, 
which would maintain their interests over exports to the US.24 However, the United 
States refused this approach, and declared its intentional implementation of a 
liberalised approach (to remove all capital controls, and let the exchange rate float) to 
maintain its privileged position as the hegemonic issuer of reserve currency. The 
competitiveness of the US’s productive capital had deteriorated, and the expanded 
U.S.-owned productive capital overseas “came to strongly oppose all international 
capital controls, both domestic and foreign, for its own operational reasons”. 25 
Eventually “faced with a currency crisis in February 1973, the United States 
announced it would end all capital controls by December 1974, and in fact eliminated 
them by January 1974”.26 The current neoliberal international monetary system had 
begun to emerge.  
2.3. Two Aspects of Neoliberalisation: Roll-Back (reaction) and 
Roll-Out (proaction) Neoliberalisation 
Since Underhill described the ongoing financialization as one of the great 
and ‘unplanned’ transformations of the twentieth century, it is also vital to fully 
understand and grasp the development of neoliberalisation (including financialisation) 
over time.27 There are certain differences between neoliberalisation at an early stage 
and recent neoliberal reforms. Tickell and Peck’s framework of roll-back and roll-out 
neoliberalisation can be used for explication purposes 28, and actual reforms in 
Western countries (mainly the United States and the United Kingdom) can be used as 
an example of these reforms.    
2.3.1. The Roll-Back (reaction) Neoliberal Reforms  
The early reform and liberalisation of government and the market in the 
1980s is described as the roll-back (reaction) neoliberalisation.29 The roll-back refers 
to ‘rolling back the state’. It was not simply a shift in the distribution of wealth or cost 
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cutting, was an adjustment of the whole society to acquire new ‘benefits’ from 
international financial markets while shifting the costs, like the effects of inflation, to 
a relatively lower stratum of society. As Tickell and Peck describe, a number of 
neoliberal principles were used to implement the roll-back face of neoliberalisation:  
minimize the size of government, make space for competitive forces, enlarge the scope 
and reach of the private sector, (re)distribute wealth on the basis of market principles, 
breaking down labour unions and other ‘anti-market’ or ‘anti-competitive’ institutions 
and so forth.30 
A great number of reforms occurred in the name of neoliberal goals; Keynesian 
welfare-states were attacked to cut ‘costly’ public services; corporate and middle-class 
taxes were cut significantly; and labor unions were weakened, which consequently led 
to a decline in workers’ share of the profit.31Here, I discuss, first, the roll-back of the 
state and privatization in the public sector, followed by reforms in other sectors.   
In the United States, the attack on and the dismantling of the welfare state took 
place in the name of institutional reform and construction. 32  Businesses were 
employed to minimize public services and improve their ‘efficiency’. The first model 
of the reform was the reform of the New York City Council.33 In 1975, the reform of 
a bankrupted New York City began. 34 The indirect cause of New York City’s 
bankruptcy was the cut in federal aid by President Nixon. Faced with a decrease in 
revenues during the recession, the New York City Council faced a severe budget 
deficit by the mid 1970s.35 Their initial resolution plan was to bridge the gap between 
revenues and outlays by borrowing from financial institutions, but the plan was 
rejected by investment bankers. Therefore, it was decided to adopt a neoliberal 
financial plan, in which financial institutions’ and bondholders’ returns were 
prioritized over the well-being of the city’s citizens.36  
These investment bankers claimed that in order to rescue a bankrupted New 
York City, it was necessary to give bondholders preferential treatment by paying them 
off first and after that whatever city tax revenue was left should go towards welfare 
services.37 Consequently, a number of reforms took place, for example the pension 
funds of the city’s municipal unions were required to be invested in city bonds; and 
wage freezes and cutbacks were executed in public employment and social services, 
including public health, education, and transport services. 38  User fees were 
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implemented in the city’s various social provisions. For instance, tuition fees were 
introduced at the City University of New York for the first time.39 City government 
was converted from a social democratic entity to an entrepreneurial one with urban 
governance through pubic-private ‘partnerships’. According to Harvey, this New York 
City model came to be used in government reform domestically under the Regan 
administration and internationally through the IMF in the 1980s.40            
Since the trade in financial capital exceeded the trade in manufacturing 
capital and commodities, it was understood that it was necessary to benefit from the 
global financial market to survive in a global economy. The roll-back phase of 
neoliberal reforms in the UK was wholesale privatisation, but it was undertaken to 
protect British interests in international finance, specifically by the City of London.41 
When the UK yielded to IMF control in 1975-6, the IMF provided two alternatives, 
either “submitting to IMF-mandated budgetary restraint and austerity or declaring 
bankruptcy and sacrificing the integrity of sterling, thus mortally wounding the 
financial interests of the City of London”.42 The UK took the first alternative. The 
Thatcher administration privatised state-run enterprises to strengthen the national 
treasury and eliminate “burdensome future obligations towards losing enterprises”.43 
These privatisations were aimed at introducing a corporate culture in government 
bureaucracy, and promoting greater efficiency, individual/corporate initiatives, and 
innovation.44 Under the early phase of the Thatcher administration, British Telecom, 
British Aerospace, British Airways, steel, electricity and gas, oil, coal, water, bus 
services, railway, and also smaller state enterprises were privatised.45     
 
Liberalisation in other markets and Restructuring Income Distribution for 
Neoliberal Society 
  Adopting neoliberal reforms for the state requires the adoption of other 
neoliberal reforms in the economic and social spheres. These include deregulation of 
markets, weakening of labour unions, and the tax reforms favoring the wealthy. Firstly, 
the Reagan administration launched the Economic Recovery Act (ERA), and one of 
its three main objects was the deregulation of industries, such as the oil, banking, 
telecommunications and air travel industries in order to free up competition.46 As a 
result, each market became more oligopolistic through ‘free’ competition between 
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large conglomerates and small and medium firms.47 In the mean time, the UK was 
opened up to international competition and investment. 48  Traditional British 
industries, including the steel industry of Sheffield and shipbuilding of Glasgow, were 
demolished by foreign competition during the 1980s.49  
Second, the labor market was liberalized. In the process of liberalising the 
labour market, labour unions, obstacles to the reform, were attacked.50 In the US the 
National Labour Relations Board, originally founded to supervise capital-labour 
relations, was transformed so as to undermine the rights of labourers.51 Reagan also 
made a severe attack on PATCO, the air traffic controller’s union in 1981.52 The 
Reagan administration, with their iconic assault against the white collar labour union, 
succeeded in weakening the labour unions, and eventually created an ‘individualistic 
and competitive’ labour market reflecting the interests of industry. 53 Moreover, 
although the Reagan neoliberal reforms in the labour market did create 18 million 
jobs, most of them were in the low-paid service industry not in manufacturing, “and 
many were little better than odd jobs, with few prospects, in restaurants, shops, and 
most noticeably in security and protection firms”.54 In the meantime, over 2 million 
jobs disappeared from productive industries, and trade deficits accumulated until they 
reached an amount of historic proportions.55   In the UK, Thatcher undermined 
mining and automobile industries, with their strong unions and militant labour 
traditions.56 The overall effect of destroying labour unions was “to transform the UK 
into a country of relatively low wages and a largely compliant labour force (relative to 
the rest of Europe) within ten years”.57  
Finally, there were historic cuts in corporate and top personal tax rates.58 For 
instance, income tax was “considerably simplified by abolishing a large number of 
deductions and reducing the tax rates, especially in the higher bands”.59 According to 
Harvey, the top personal tax rate in the US was cut by 42 percent from 70 to 28 
percent by the end of 1980s.60 The trend in tax cuts has continued in recent years 
under the Bush junior administration. Estate tax (a tax on wealth), taxation on income 
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from investments and capital gains tax were removed, while in the meantime 
“taxation on wages and salaries was maintained”.61 Eventually, the share of the top 1 
percent of income earners in the US reached 15 percent of the total income in the US 
by the end of the century, and among them the top 0.1 percent of income earners 
tripled from 2 percent to just over 6 percent between 1978 and 1999.62 Moreover, in 
the same period “the ratio for the median compensation of workers to salaries of 
CEOs increased from just over 30 to 1 in 1970 to nearly 500 to 1 by 2000”.63  
2.3.2. Roll-Out Neoliberalisation  
Tickell and Peck describe some of the neoliberal reforms that have taken place 
since the end of 1980s as roll-out (proaction) neoliberalism.64 While the focus of 
roll-back and the roll-out neoliberalisation is “the roll-back of Keynesian welfarist 
institutions and various experiments in market-making”, on the other hand the focus 
of roll-out neoliberalisation since the early 1990s has been on deepening and 
normalizing neoliberal reforms and on neoliberal state-building on a global scale.65   
In the roll-out face of neoliberal reforms, according to Tickell and Peck, neoliberalism 
became “a truly hegemonic ideology” in political and economic discourses in the 
developed and developing capitalism countries, and neoliberalism also became the 
central ideology for the formations of multinational and regional institutions, 
including NAFTA and the EU.66 While the ordinary people become more and more 
excluded from the decision-making process for key economic policies, states, which 
previously worked as a redistributive agency and provided at least a certain level of 
democratic accountability for political and economic policies, are transformed to an 
agent representing interests of a transnationalized class.67 Moreover, for the processes 
of roll-out neoliberalisation, the US type of economy is often taken as a model.68 For 
instance, a market-oriented entrepreneurial society is encouraged.69 Free competition 
is encouraged in a number of markets, including labour market, and therefore “a 
Darwinian order of market distribution” and its unequal result are legitimized.70   
Radical neoliberal reforms were implemented for the financial markets. Since 
the 1980s domestic markets have been ‘forced’ to open and the roles of states have 
been modified to be compatible with the philosophy of international finance. 
International organizations, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
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International Monetary Fund IMF and the World Bank, now play a surveillance role 
in maintaining the global market and its rules. There are a number of important 
factors which continue to drive the world towards roll-out neoliberalism. For instance, 
trade in financial capital has exceeded trade in productive capital globally; the number 
and influence of MBA graduates in academia, the mass media, and international and 
domestic institutions have also increased. However, the most influential factors are 
the industrial shift from production to finance in the US and its use of its competitive 
financial sector to maintain its dominant position in international society.71           
 
The origin of roll-out neoliberal financial reform 
The origin of roll-out neoliberalism can be traced back to the deregulation 
and liberalisation of the financial sector under the Reagan administration. This policy 
of liberalisation and deregulation fuelled an upsurge in stocks and other derivative 
markets, and consequently the “Dow-Jones index tripled, while the futures and 
options markets grew twice or three times greater than that recorded on Wall Street”.72 
This prolonged boom created new financial services, including leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs)73, and the boom itself was supported by these new activities.74 Not only 
financial institutions, but also manufacturing companies became the participants in 
the financial markets, and they made easy money at the expense of their long term 
interests. 75 The best example was the expansion of the volume of merger and 
acquisitions (M&As) on the stock market. M&As were actually very common in the 
US stock market before the neoliberal era. Traditionally M&As were used for 
strengthening competitiveness, and gaining tax benefits, and were regulated by 
different laws in different states.76 However, once such laws were lifted (when the 
US Supreme Court struck down one such law, the Illinois Business Takeover Act, in 
June 1982 – simultaneously invalidating many others), the situation changed 
dramatically.77 Hostile takeovers dominated the market, and the total volume of 
M&As jumped up from $ 20 billion annually in the 1968-70 period, to $90 billion 
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annually between 1980 and 1985, finally reaching $247 billion in 1988.78           
M&As were often used by dealers (like investment banks) to increase a 
targeted company’s quoted market value by, for example, asset-stripping (dividing a 
targeted company into several different companies and issuing new stocks to sell them 
on the market after taking over the company). The expansion of hostile takeovers 
brought unwelcome costs and heavy financial burdens to companies. In order to 
prevent hostile M&As, every manager working in a company had to pay significant 
attention to their companies’ stock price. Moreover, in order to maintain the relatively 
high stock price, managers and companies had to adapt “strategies and behaviour 
patterns which simply did not make good industrial and economic sense”. 79 
Companies began to cut spending in advertising, research and development, while 
they were hiring high salaried lawyers and experts to protect their companies from 
‘guerrilla’ attacks from financial dealers.80 Furthermore, the participants in the stock 
market and the stock market itself provoked companies into carrying out unwise 
activities, that is, maximising short-term profits for higher dividends. Stock market 
regulations worsened this situation in that Wall Street began to require listed 
companies to show their profit every three months, called the tyranny of the quarterly 
report. The dominant force of institutional investors (pension funds and insurance 
companies, for the most part) in the market worsened the tendencies.81                  
As a result, “financial markets have assumed almost dictatorial powers over 
the economy in general”, and faced with massive exports from Europe and Japan 
(despite the fact that the devaluation of the US dollar was supposed to provide 
competitive advantages to US manufacturers), the US kept losing its competitive 
advantage in large numbers of industries, except for agribusiness and defense.82 
Eventually, as Harvey describes: 
Threatened in the realm of production, the US had countered by asserting its hegemony 
through finance. But for this system to work effectively, markets in general and capital 
markets in particular had to be forced open to international trade (a slow process that 
required fierce US pressure backed by use of international levers such as the IMF and an 
equally fierce commitment to neoliberalism as the new economic orthodoxy).83   
The US has been the largest export destination for many countries, and the 
US dollar has been the reserve currency that is used in most international transactions 
of commodities, including oil and metals. Therefore the US’s industrial shift to 
finance and the creation of its hegemonic position through international finance 
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became the main driving force of the implementations of neoliberal reforms in the rest 
of the world.      
In order to explain the creation and maintenance of the US’s hegemonic 
position through international finance, it has to be firstly pointed out how the world 
was caught up in the US money cycle. In today’s post-Bretton Woods system, the US 
enjoys the seigniorage position as long as other countries are willing to hold the US 
dollar as their reserve, and the US could adjust its foreign debts by revaluing or 
devaluing the dollar.84 The US is also free from the demands and requirements of 
structural adjustment which the IMF or the World Bank requires of other countries 
(especially poor, debtor nations since 1980s) over their balance (imports/exports) of 
payments.85 Since the US is the largest export destination for many countries and the 
US dollar is the reserve currency, supporting the US dollar is the only alternative for 
these countries, especially for developing countries, like Asian countries, although 
supporting the US dollar became costly, especially from the late 1980s. These 
countries’ exports are paid for in US dollars, but they are obliged to keep the US 
dollar in reserve to pay their debts and patents fees, and provide hard currency for 
multinational corporations (MNCs) to remit their profit.86 Thus, their small amounts 
of export earnings are rarely invested to improve their domestic economy.    
In addition, the US has continued to maintain its hegemonic position in two 
ways; as a debtor and as a creditor in the global financial market. As a debtor, to 
compensate for their current account deficit and maintain their seigniorage position, 
the US has required supportive countries to buy its Treasury bonds, securities, and 
other assets.87 To attract investment, the interest rates were kept high throughout the 
1980s and 1990s.88 West Germany and Japan bought US Treasury bonds in the early 
period (between 1971 and 1985), then Japan became the largest creditor of the US 
after West Germany refused to support them (since 1985), and from the 1990s 
Southeast Asian countries, China and India, have begun to support the US dollar.89 
As a creditor, the United States reinvests these received investments into domestic and 
global financial markets. Consequently, domestic financial markets are now thriving, 
and the profitability of the financial sector has kept rising. The funds (total assets 
minus debt) of financial corporations nearly doubled from 18 percent in the 1970s to 
nearly 30 per cent of that of non-financial corporations by 2000.90 Non-financial 
                                                  
84 Pettifor Ann, The Coming First World Debts Crisis (New York, 2006), pp. 40-50.  
85 Pettifor, p. 42.  
86 Pettifor, p. 50.  
87 Mototada Kikkawa, Mane haisen (Lost in Money Policy) (Tokyo, 1998), pp. 27-34, Strange, ch. 3, 
Gilpin 1987, pp. 331-6, Pettifor, pp. 98-100.   
88 Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, The Neoliberal (Counter-)Revolution, in Saad-Filho and 
Johnston ed., Neoliberalism A Critical Reader (London, 2005), pp. 13-4.  
89 Kikkawa, ch. 2, Petifor, pp. 98-100.  
90 Duménil and Lévy, p. 14.  
 23 
sectors also have become involved in financial activities directly and through 
affiliates.91 Internationally, US based financial institutions have steadily expanded 
their business. For instance, “Citigroup comprises more than 3,000 corporations 
located in many countries, and its total assets amounted to 400 billion dollars in 
2000”.92 
Moreover, other developed countries, like the UK and Australia, which have 
been suffering from a current account deficit, also rely strongly on the financial sector 
to compensate for their deficit. For example, in Australia, one of only seven countries 
which are free from government debts, foreign liabilities in the private sector have 
grown to 130% of GDP from 70% 15 years ago (Reserve Bank of Australia, April 
2006), and the UK has had a trade deficit for 30 years now. These countries have 
“become used to living well beyond their means, as a nation”. 93  Since other 
developed countries have followed and supported the US’s neoliberal financial policy, 
the US has maintained its hegemonic position.     
According to Sassen, in order to retain mobile international capital and create 
a good investment climate, states in developed and developing countries have 
transformed themselves into the “ultimate guarantor of the rights of global capital” by 
sacrificing their role in public welfare. 94  In their transformation, international 
organisations have played an important role. In order to limit states’ activities (either 
developed or developing states), the IMF has imposed structural adjustments on 
developing countries, and developed countries have been required to follow the rules 
and regulations of the WTO (because they are members of the WTO) as a ‘global 
standard’.95 In most cases, this type of state guarantees the autonomy of financial 
institutions and MNCs.96  
Another important international movement, which has worked in a way to 
preserve the US’s hegemonic position, is that as American economists expected, in 
recent years different national systems of political economies seem to have converged 
into one single model, or at least they have turned into a variety of a political 
economic systems under one single rule.97 Although there are still certain differences 
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between national economies, in many countries American business rules, like the 
importance of the stock market and the priority of shareholder interests, have been 
increasing.98 For instance, the 1990s saw an international boom in M&As, and a 
number of countries, like Japan, adopted market value accounting and more flexible 
labour market policies. 99  This is partly because the ‘penetration’ of American 
investment banks, which swept through the City of London, has moved onto Frankfurt 
and Paris and has already taken over 20 percent of the Tokyo stock market.100 The 
American economic culture also has strengthened America’s financial hegemony.101 
The number of people who have been educated in US business schools has increased 
in every industry coupled with the activities of American-based think-tanks promoted 
through the mass media. This legitimises shareholder capitalism, from M&A activities 
and high dividends to stock options.102 Moreover, in European cases the European 
Union has pushed predominantly towards marketist reforms, and a decade-long 
recession has also finally convinced Japan to adapt a marketist reform.103 
To sum up, roll-out neoliberalisation aims not to adjust ‘settings’, but to 
change every aspect of society for the global market, particularly for the global 
financial market. Domestic markets were ‘forced’ to open and the roles of states were 
modified to fit the philosophy of international finance. International organizations, 
including the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, now play a surveillance role in 
maintaining the global market and its rules. The most influential factors driving the 
world towards roll-out neoliberalism seem to be the industrial shift from production to 
finance of the US and its global policy aimed at using its competitive financial sector 
to maintain a dominant position in the international economy. Other developed 
countries, also participate in the global financial market to maintain their positions.  
2.4. Neoliberal-International Monetary System  
Theoretically, after the Bretton Woods system was eliminated, the floating 
exchange rate system was expected to provide a resolution to the dispute between 
domestic and international finance by “leaving the determination of their exchange 
rates up to the market”, but soon this ‘wishful expectation’ was hindered by the 
Eurocurrency market.104 First, the Eurocurrency market made it possible for a state’s 
macroeconomic policies to influence another’s. For instance, states could intervene in 
currency exchange to improve a state’s trade competitiveness, or to solve inflation in 
                                                  
98 Dore, p. 15. 
99 Gilpin 2001, p. 302, Mototada Kikkawa, En ga doru ni nomikomareruhi (The Coming Dollarization 
of Japan) (Tokyo, 2005), pp. 99-108.  
100 Dore 2002, p. 15.  
101 Dore 2002, p. 15. 
102 Dore 2002, p. 16. 
103 Dore 2002, p. 16. 
104 Gilpin 1987, p. 143. 
 25 
their domestic market.105 In particular, the US fiscal and monetary policies had a 
significant influence on the exchange rate of the US dollar and international capital 
flow.106 Since the US dollar remained as an international reserve currency, the erratic 
fluctuations in the dollar’s exchange rate (for instance, at the time of the first and 
second oil shocks) volatised not only the international trade of goods and services, but 
also undermined the stability of a contemporary society based on money.107   
A volatile exchange rate, as Strange argues, causes uncertainty in the market 
and society as a whole, and this volatile exchange rate leads to the increase in the 
numbers of participants who engage in speculative activities, including futures, 
forwards and swaps, and more specifically finance-related speculations 
(derivatives).108 Among the participants in speculative markets, most view their aims 
as risk-averse rather than gambling. In the market, they try to avoid uncertainty by 
hedging against it. However, the speculative market also involves other participants, 
like foreign exchange dealers and financial futures operators who prefer to “risk a 
little for a slim chance of making a great gain” rather than “risk large amounts to 
make a much more likely gain”.109 Speculative markets and their expansion are the 
result of the direct interaction between those two different types of people who are 
“averse to bearing the risks attendant on capricious change” and who are keen to gain 
large amounts of wealth by using “a widespread demand for greater certainty”.110 
This means that speculative markets themselves require uncertainty to exist, and their 
expansion is another factor which can create a vicious circle of uncertainty in the 
market. Thus, a fluctuating exchange rate is likely to make speculative activities 
intense, and this leads to uncertainty in the market and society as a whole.  
Moreover, finance is fundamentally different from other industries. While 
manufacturing (i.e. inventing and selling) and trade (i.e. buy and selling) industries 
are required to add some extra value or services for their business, finance is 
“virtually alone among trades in allowing the dealer to make a profit by selling his or 
her goods (securities and commodities)” without adding any new values.111 The 
productivity of the financial sector depends on the volume of trade, so inherently the 
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financial sector seeks deregulation and liberalisation.112 Moreover, as Pettifor argues, 
since financial trade does not add any new value to goods, an increase in the volume 
of financial trade fundamentally hurts and exploits not only other industries, but also 
society as a whole, at least in the long term.113  
Since the contemporary economy is based on credit (including paper money, 
credit card, bank loan and account), the total pie of an economy (total purchasing 
power) is decided through the banks’ (including central bank and other banks) credit 
creation.114 Therefore, banks’ credit creation can control nominal growth of an 
economy. 115  Although an increase of bank’s credit creation generates nominal 
economic growth of a country, the nominal growth can be in the form of inflation, and 
whether the nominal growth is real or not is determined by an economy’s potential 
growth rate.116 Therefore, as long as newly created credit (new purchasing power) is 
used to improve the potential growth rate, which is an economy’s productivity, “it is 
possible to increase nominal growth (by increasing credit creation) without creating 
any inflation”.117 However, if the newly created credit is used for unproductive 
activities, like speculation it causes merely inflation and no real growth in its 
economy.118 Therefore, when newly created credit is used to increase the volume of 
trade in the financial market (including speculations and derivatives), this expansion 
of financial trade fundamentally hurts other industries, and society as a whole because 
the newly created credit does not work to increase a country’s potential growth rate, 
but works to create inflation. We should bear these characteristics of financial capital 
in mind when we look at the industrial shift in the US and the expansion of its 
financial industry.  
Faced with a fundamentally volatile financial system created by a free 
floating exchange rate and the massive expansion of speculation activities, 
international society, notably the US and major financial authorities, have hesitated to 
show strong initiative to implement any workable regulations or restrictions.119 This 
is partly because these countries have national interests that might be eroded by 
international regulations, and partly because rapid technological developments, 
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including those in the field of computers, have made it possible for different financial 
centres to connect to each other and escape domestic regulation before these countries 
create international regulations or cooperation. 120  The existence of unregulated 
financial markets outside national borders has provided financial institutions with a 
way to escape domestic regulations, therefore states were required to deregulate and 
modify their domestic financial system to fit the international environment to promote 
their interest.121 The deregulation and liberalisation of the domestic financial market 
started in the US and was followed by other developed countries like the UK.122 For 
instance, by the end of 1980s US officials lifted a number of regulations limiting 
competition in financial sectors, including “the separation of financial and 
non-financial firms (no universal banking), and the separation of commercial banking 
from investment banking”.123     
When domestic financial markets are deregulated and liberalized, banks 
succeed in passing risks onto others by changing their traditional position from 
intermediary (taking in deposits and making loans) to brokerage and proprietary 
trading (dealing in bonds, securities, and derivatives), like investment banks and 
securities companies. 124 The connection between the domestic and international 
financial market had increased uncertainty and so, it became difficult for commercial 
banks to continue their traditional business, especially in developing countries. This is 
because in such a situation, the past economic performance of developing countries 
no longer became a safe or reliable guide to their present or future performance.125 
Instead of bank loans based on long-term investment, banks and other financial 
companies and agencies engaged in rapidly expanding derivative trades and dealing 
securities. Relatively unregulated and untaxed dealings of derivatives, for instance, 
provided them with not only comparatively low business costs, but also an 
opportunity to lay off their “liabilities to clients” by increasing their converse bets 
when the movement of markets shows one obvious direction, either up or down.126 
Increased uncertainty and risks made banks change their business. 
Securitization has also provided an opportunity for banks and other financial 
institutions to avoid taking risks in investments. The origin of securitization can be 
traced back to the issue of mortgage-backed bonds to address the rising demand in 
house mortgage rates in the mid and late 1970s in the US.127 Again under volatile 
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exchange and interest rates for financial institutions and companies, it became 
unrealistic to “engage in fundraising over the short term and in fund management over 
the long term”. 128  In developed countries, securitization became a common 
fundraising process. For instance, by the early 1990s more than 80% of major 
businesses had raised their funds through securities in developed countries.129 In 
developing and undeveloped countries, the Mexican debt crisis in the early 1980s 
emphasised the fact that the past economic performance of developing countries was 
no longer a safe guide to their present or future performance. Thus, securitization was 
used as its rescue package, and the Brady Plan deal was launched in 1989. In the 
Brady Plan deal, banks were prevailed upon to cut their losses (about one-third of 
their interests), and in return they obtained Brady bonds backed by the US 
government, the World Bank, the IMF, and Japan’s Export-Import Banks.130 During 
the following seven years, twenty-six countries signed up for Brady deals.131 Then, 
securitization eventually came to be used on a large scale for not only lending in 
developed countries, but also lending in developing countries.  
After the first Mexican crisis banks began to engage more and more in the 
brokering business (portfolio investment) rather than providing bank loans, therefore 
“when Mexico blew again in late 1994, it was almost a non-event to the banks which 
had suffered similarly in 1982. They had brokered customers’ money into Mexican 
securities at the customers’ own risks, but had made few direct new loans to Mexican 
borrowers”. 132  Mexico was not the only country that experienced a shift to 
securitized investment. About $450 billion was invested in the emerging markets of 
Asia and Latin America by the managers of British and American insurance and 
pension funds between 1990 and 1993.133   
To sum up, as far as the above argument is concerned, current ongoing 
neoliberalisation is typified by financialization on a global scale. The crash of the 
Bretton Woods system, which was nationally controlled and which segmented the 
international monetary system, resulted in the emergence of a global financial market, 
and neoliberal reforms have been carried out to deal with this newly emerged global 
financial market. The restricted international monetary system was transformed to a 
neoliberal international monetary system, in which denationalised capital has begun to 
flow transnationally. For developed countries, neoliberal reforms have been 
unavoidable in their ‘battle’ to improve their position when faced with global 
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competition in the financial market, and for developing and undeveloped countries, 
there has been no alternative but to adhere to the ‘rules of globalisation’. International 
society has not been willing to restrict and regulate a fundamentally volatile financial 
system, which was mainly caused by free floating exchange rates and the massive 
expansion of speculative activities, because of their national interests. Moreover, 
passing on the risks of investments to others, banks also have changed their traditional 
position from taking in deposits and making loans to dealing in bonds, securities and 
derivatives like other financial institutions, such as investment banks and securities 
companies. In this regard, powerful private interests (and states as their agents) can be 
seen as promoting themselves by imposing substantial costs and risks on other sectors 
in society.  
2.4.1. Fallibity & Reflexivity 
The factor that generates insecurity is the nature of the market, especially the 
financial market, because markets are fundamentally shaped by human expectations, 
and human expectations prevent a rational prediction of a market’s behaviour.134 The 
main forces that drive markets are not “mechanical processes of cause and effect”135 
but what George Soros has termed “reflexive interaction”.136 Markets comprise 
highly sensitive and inflammable interactions among beliefs which cannot be 
self-regulated.137 Especially in financial markets, the participants’ predictions and 
expectations about the future affect each other and create booms and downturns.138 
Financial markets are unlikely to attain equilibrium, and overestimating future 
benefits is the norm in financial markets.139 The unstable and changeable nature of 
financial markets makes the present world economy, which is organized as a system 
of free markets, fundamentally volatile.140 The volatile nature of financial markets 
and their increasing presence in the economy require non-financial corporations to 
spend more costs on evading the negative effects of financial markets, and the costs 
are likely to be shifted to labours and ordinary consumers.    
Moreover, the integration of the global financial market has created a 
situation in which the spread of a financial market’s collapse or crisis to another can 
easily occur.141 For instance, in 1990s there were two financial crises that showed a 
typical ripple effect. The so-called peso crisis and tequila hangover, which hit Mexico 
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in 1995, infected immediately Brazil and Argentina with devastating effects. 142 
Another example is the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. The event started in 1997 in 
Thailand, and its contagion spread to elsewhere in Asia, including Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea. 143 Furthermore, this volatile nature of the 
financial market is vital for hedge-funds to run their business, and often they cause 
collapse and crisis of the financial market by themselves.144  
Moreover, finance is fundamentally different from other industries, because 
while manufacturing and trade industries are required to produce new value and add 
some extra value or services for their business, financial trade does not add any new 
value to goods; profit is different from arbitrage. Although the conventional role of 
financial sector was the supply of investment capital for the production sector, the role 
has been shifting more and more to earn arbitrage profit from portfolio investments 
and the domain of speculation. Therefore, in the neoliberal financial markets the 
productivity of the financial sector depends on the volume of trade in the financial 
markets, including currency exchange, trading derivatives and speculations. An 
increase in the volume of trade in such financial markets does not work to improve 
actual life for people in the world. Rather it will result in inflation on the global scale.  
2.5. Conclusion  
The emergence of the global financial market, the industrial shift from 
production to finance in the United States and its use of its competitive financial 
sector to maintain its dominant position, especially seigniorage position, in 
international society are the fundamental factors that urge neoliberal reforms and 
continue to drive the world towards neoliberalism. In order to make neoliberal 
reforms for the financial market practicable, domestic markets have been ‘forced’ to 
open and the roles of states have been modified to be compatible with the philosophy 
of international finance. International organizations, including the WTO, the IMF and 
the World Bank, play a surveillance role in maintaining the global market and its rules. 
Economically oriented institutions and organisations, including the WTO and NAFTA 
have significant influence on a nation-state’s autonomy over their domestic economic 
affairs. Members of the WTO are required to adhere to WTO’s rules and regulations 
as part of their membership, and most regional corporations start from regional 
political organizations and economic unification is prioritized. Therefore, 
neoliberalisation is largely driven by the process of financialisation. In the process of 
financialisation, it was necessary to adjust the roles of states and international 
organizations. These international changes caused by the neoliberal reforms for the 
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financial market affected not only the economic sphere, but also political and social 
spheres in many countries. A great number of reforms occurred in the name of 
neoliberalism; Keynesian welfare-states were attacked to cut ‘costly’ public services; 
significant corporate and middle-class taxes were cut specifically; and labour unions 
were weakened. Market oriented free competition is encouraged, in a number of 
markets, including labour market, and therefore “a Darwinian order of market 
distribution” and its unequal result are legitimized.  
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Chapter 3: The Roles of Nationalism in Neoliberalisation 
3.1. Problems of Neoliberalisation  
3.1.1. Deterritorialisation and Glocalisation   
As a result of neoliberalisation, there has been concern raised about the current 
trend of deterritorialisation, which has caused a shift in the traditional role the state.1 
Deterritorialisation is the geo-economic integration in which sub and super national 
economic spaces, such as “global cities, industrial districts, technopoles and offshore 
financial centers”, play an important role.2 MNCs’ global strategies, including key 
factions of industrial, financial and service capital, coupled with global financial 
restructuring, have caused this deterritorialisation as well as the fact that the previous 
Keynesian welfare-state framework could not secure the MNCs’ competitive 
advantages.3  In other words, as Jessop argues, there has been a shift in power from 
the national state to a post-national order, although the state remains a pivotal 
institutional site and the main framework for political struggles.4 Robinson terms the 
internationalization of states as transnational states (TNSs). TNSs no longer play the 
role of previous states, which worked simply as a bargaining place for domestic 
interests or as a mediator adjusting domestic interests to the international environment. 
TNSs reorganize such traditional functions of the state by becoming involved in 
“supranational economic and political institutions”.5 The supranational economic and 
political institutions are both formal and informal institutions, including the IMF, the 
WTO, the Group of Eight (G-8) and the EU.6  
Brenner calls this deterritorialisation glocalisation. In contrast to the national 
projects of the Keynesian welfare state in which industry, population and 
infrastructure were distributed equally inside a national boundary, glocalised states 
attempt to distinguish strategic urban and regional growth centres from others in terms 
of a political economy inside their national territory.7 This promotes not only uneven 
development in a nation-state, but also inequality or unfairness between 
transnationalized and non-transnationalized interest groups and regions. States more 
and more behave like the ‘agent’ of these supranational institutions and 
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transnationalized interests. However, interests among companies locating their 
production inside a nation-state are less represented by the state and are often hit by 
the effect of volatility fluctuation and required to spend a large amount of time and 
money to avoid the risks of fluctuating international financial market, specifically 
fluctuation of currency exchange.  
3.1.2. Financialisation  
The international free flow of capital after the 1970s has generated 
competition internationally and domestically between states, regions and cities, at 
least in OECD countries.8 In competition, neoliberalism plays a pivotal and principle 
role in creating rules by providing measurements for regional competitiveness, public 
policy, corporate performance and social productivity.9 These neoliberal rules are 
based on “value for money, the bottom line, flexibility, shareholder value, 
performance rating” and so forth.10  
As a consequence of neoliberal reform, uneven geographical developments 
and social inequality have accelerated and widened between ‘global competitors’ and 
uncompetitive ones.11 For instance, in the US and the UK, while the standard of 
living of manufacturing labour has sharply declined due to low economic growth in 
this sector and the cutback in the social expenditure of states since the 1980s, those in 
the financial sector and investors have gained a large fortune under the new wave of 
entrepreneurial financiers.12 Moreover, the 90s economic booms in both countries did 
nothing to minimize the gap. On the contrary, the inequality was further widened.13 
Under a high interest rate in these developed countries, the number of people in debt, 
especially in the lower strata of society, increases, while the upper section of society 
whose income and wealth is written in securities, such as shares, bonds or bills, enjoy 
high interest rates and exceptional growth in financial markets.14 
Moreover, developed countries’ heavy reliance on financial capital 
(specifically the US) has aggravated the world debt problem. 15  Internationally, 
developed countries which face a current account deficit, such as the US, UK and 
Australia, have piled up their national deficit in a form of either public or private 
deficit.16 In the international financial market, developing and undeveloped countries 
need to compete with these developed countries when raising funds. Therefore, 
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developing and undeveloped countries are required to borrow money from global 
financial markets at a much higher interest rate than developed countries do, and they 
are not able to wipe out their foreign debts with their exports, because of the 
fluctuating downturn of the prices of commodities. 17  Eventually, this uneven 
development and social inequality has produced a volatile life among the majority of 
the population in developed and developing countries, including a high 
unemployment rate, a high suicide rate, and a widening income gap between urban 
and rural areas.18  
These problems caused by neoliberalisation bring two related political 
questions. There are not only transnationalized societal actors in a nation-state, nor are 
transnationalized societal actors the majority. Why then are the implementation of 
neoliberal reforms legitimized and practiced in a nation-state? The second question is 
how can neoliberal reforms be continued when they bring about inequality or 
unfairness between transnationalized and non-transnationalized interest groups and 
regions as well as insecurity and problems? To answer these questions, we look to 
theories and arguments over the political role of nationalism.  
3.2 The Role of Nationalism in Neoliberalisation 
3.2.1. IPE and Economic Nationalism  
According to Crane, analysis of the relationship between neoliberalisation and 
nationalism has been argued in terms of particular understandings of economic 
nationalism, using realist, liberal and Marxist approaches, provokes. In the realist 
approach, represented by Robert Gilpin, the central idea of economic nationalism is 
that “economic activities are and should be subordinate to the goal of state-building 
and the interests of the state”.19 In the realist view, states are placed in the situation of 
“the near-war of all against all” in international competition among states in terms of 
politics and economics. 20  Therefore, for leaders of states, the maximization of 
national wealth is an important “means of securing relative gains against 
competitors”.21 Placed in the state of a near-war of all against all, what economic 
nationalism is aimed at maximizing national wealth, because economic activities 
should contribute to achieving the goal of state-building and the interests of the states.    
                                                  
17 Pettifor, p. 111. Although in recent years the price of commodities, specifically oil prices, have been 
increasing in record pace, their increases are experienced as inflation in world scale. Therefore, for 
developing countries the situation fundamentally unchanged.   
18 Harvey 2005, Peck and Tickell, Radhika Desai, Neoliberalism and cultural nationalism, in Plehwe, 
Walpen and Neunhöffer ed., Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique (London and New York, 2006), 
pp. 230-5. 
19 George T. Crane, Economic Nationalism: Bringing the Nation Back In, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, 1998, pp. 56-8, Gilpin 1987, p. 31. 
20 Crane 1998, p. 57. 
21 Crane 1998, p. 56. 
 35 
Although liberals agree with realists over the definition of economic 
nationalism, they do not see the maximization of national wealth as its aim and 
result.22 For example, according to Harry Johnson, economic nationalism led by 
states provides strong national identities, but in the meantime economic nationalism 
ruins ‘true’ national interests by wasteful, unjust and useless policies, like 
protectionism.23     
Thirdly and finally, Marxists argue economic nationalism in a quite different 
way from realists and liberals. Marxists regard economic nationalism as a part of the 
history of capital accumulation. Certain stages of capital accumulation may “tolerate, 
even encourage” state interventions.24 According to Cox, different “forms of state” 
have been required in each stage of the historical development of capitalism, and he 
sees capitalism not as a release of the pure power of the market, but as one of the 
various forms of historical arrangements created by the interactions between political 
and economic phenomena.25 Therefore, in Marxist arguments, economic nationalism 
is “neither an anomaly, as liberals would have it, nor a necessity, as in the realist view. 
It is a historically conditioned expression of capital”.26      
These arguments have two fundamental problems or limitations. Firstly, their 
theories treat state interests as almost a synonym for the interests of societal actors in 
general in a nation.27 The concepts and criteria of a nation are closely interrelated 
with other concepts, namely ethnic groups and states in its definition. For instance, 
ethnic groups can share a number of important features with nations and ethnic groups 
have the potential to become a nation. Furthermore, a nation’s self-government 
apparatus is equivalent to a state’s, and “the state is likely to characterize their body 
politic as being a nation, for this implies political identity”.28 In order to make these 
complex characteristics of a nation better understood, it is important to distinguish 
nations from states and ethnic groups. The main feature of a state is that it is an 
institutional entity and so, a possible definition of a state is “a set of autonomous 
institutions, differentiated from other institutions, possessing a legitimate monopoly 
of coercion and extraction in a given territory”.29 On the other hand, nations are 
identified by subjective and objective features. Nations are “felt and lived in 
communities whose members share a homeland and culture”.30 The concept of a 
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nation converges on a type of community, thus a nation is different from a state. In 
addition, a nation is different from an ethnic community as well, although both share 
several of the same phenomena, including collective cultural identities.31 Therefore, a 
nation is not the same as a state and so, the interests of a nation can be different from 
state’s interests, and inside the nation, interests are contested among different societal 
actors, including businesses and labour. Their definitions of economic nationalism 
ignore the differences between state and nation, consider nation and its societal actors 
synonymous with state and limit state’s interests to governing production, exchange, 
consumption and investment. This is a problem, because they cannot capture and 
grasp how and what kind of nationalism occurs when the interests of societal actors 
change in neoliberalisation. Moreover, they cannot capture what the function of 
nationalism is in a nation-state where interests are contested, that is, they cannot 
explain how nationalism is used to deal with the different interests among societal 
actors and state.  
The second limitation of their theories of economic nationalism is that 
economic nationalism is used interchangeably with mercantilism or protectionism.32 
For example, Gilpin uses the term mercantilism as a synonym for economic 
nationalism and scholars of East Asian developmental states, like Stephan Haggard, 
also use economic nationalism interchangeably with mercantilism. 33  Moreover, 
Marxists, including Cox, also link economic nationalism to “neo-mercantilism, 
autarky, and other such ‘inward-looking’ manifestations of the imperative to 
accumulate capital”.34 Their usage is problematic because as we will discuss later, 
nationalism is not like other isms, in terms of the fact that there is no fixed core idea 
to nationalism compared to other ideologies, therefore, it is inadequate to limit the 
term economic nationalism to certain ideologies such as mercantilism, protectionism 
or neo-mercantilism and autarky.  
As a result of these limitations, the theories cannot explain role of nationalism 
in the current revival of economic liberalization among nation-states in the 1980s and 
1990s.  
3.2.2. Neoliberalisation as Economic Nationalism 
Some scholars, like Helleiner, argue that nationalism and economic 
liberalization are not in conflict with each other. According to Helleiner, although 
Friedrich Hayek, who was “the central intellectual figure behind the current revival of 
economic liberalism”, is associated with individualistic and cosmopolitan ideologies 
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like his 19th century predecessors, his followers have mainly argued and suggested 
that neoliberal economic policies can contribute to the maximization of national 
interests, like a nation’s GDP, its trade balance, employment rate and productive 
advantage. 35  As a result, neoliberal economic policies have been adopted in 
numerous countries as ‘nationalist policies’.  
In the contemporary nation-state, some societal actors and the state are 
transnationalized. For example, the emergence of the global financial market 
promoted internationalization of the flow of finance, and therefore banks, financial 
companies and institutions also have created global networks of their business. The 
production sector is no longer based in one country. Their production bases are 
globalised, and they cannot be treated as societal actors of a nation-state. Moreover, 
Robinson terms the internationalization of states as transnational states (TNSs), and 
TNSs no longer play the role of previous states, but instead become increasingly 
involved in “supranational economic and political institutions”, such as the IMF, the 
WTO, the Group of Eight (G-8) and the EU, and increasingly acting like an ‘agent’ of 
these supranational institutions.36 In this situation, a nation-state can take a neoliberal 
stance to secure their relative gains in global competition. Neoliberal theories can be 
used by transnational societal actors and states to provide a vision of an economic 
future of a nation-state.37 Therefore, economic nationalism can be associated with a 
national consensus for neoliberal economic and structural reforms especially when a 
nation-state is in recession or economic crisis. Moreover, once neoliberal policies are 
adopted by a state, nationalism works in quite a different way from the theories of 
economic nationalism discussed above. As Goff and Desai argue, another type of 
nationalism, namely cultural nationalism, is implemented and used by states to 
maintain a state’s social and political unity after neoliberalisation, because 
neoliberalisation often ruins the political and social unity of a nation.   
3.2.3. New Theories and Their Evaluation  
First group of new theories  
New theories and arguments can be categorized into two groups. The theories 
and arguments in the first group resolve the problems seen in the traditional theories 
of economic nationalism and provide an explanation as to why a nation-state might 
use neoliberal policies as a means of defining and seeking the national interest and 
why this neoliberalisation can be supported by the people in a nation. Here I will 
discuss two arguments that neoliberalisation could be espoused as economic 
nationalism: these of Crane and Shulman. They argue that neoliberalisation can help 
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promote the interests and goals of a nation, not only through improvements in the 
economy, but also by promoting the unity of a nation.  
The first example is Crane’s concept of the Imagined Economy. Inspired by 
Benedict Anderson’s well known concept of Imagined Communities, 38  Crane 
identifies three different economic phases for the formation of a national identity, 
namely historical economic tribulations, economic successes and economic images. 
The first and second phases, economic tribulations, like the Great Depression in 1930s 
in the US and the Great Famine of the mid-nineteenth century in Ireland, and 
economic success, like Britain as ‘the workshop of the world’ and Japan’s post-World 
War II economic ‘miracle’, are shared as a nation’s memory of a common economic 
experience.39 For economic images, Crane applied Anderson’s community-centered 
view of the nation: “it [nation] is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the 
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”.40 According to Crane, whatever the 
actual experience, the narrative of economic life creates the unity of a nation, “We are 
united because we toil together in the same field, even if we are doing different jobs 
and earning different wages”.41 Thus, nationalists often create their own narrative of 
economic life to unite people as a nation, and narratives are created from various 
ideologies, including tradition, liberalism and Marxism. 42  As an example of a 
narrative created from liberalism, Crane mentions post-Maoist China, in which Deng 
Xiaoping “blamed Chinese weakness on specific Maoist policies and certain facets of 
Maoist ideology and went on to articulate new national possibilities: a ‘reformed’ 
China, one that gains from openness to global economic forces, from technologically 
sophisticated industry, and from rising standards of living”.43  
When the relationship between nationalism and neoliberalisation is observed, 
Crane’s explanation that historical economic tribulations, economic successes and 
economic images contribute to the formation of a national identity is very useful. As 
Crane explained, the narrative of economic life creates the unity of a nation and thus, 
nationalists often create their own narrative of economic life to unite people as a 
nation, using their favourite ideologies. His explanation can capture the mechanism of 
how neoliberal reform becomes national consensus by creating economic narrative of 
whole nation.    
Stephen Shulman argues that in an age of increasing economic integration, 
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neoliberalisation can be considered as one of the possible alternatives for nationalists 
to use as a policy to reach their fundamental goals, which are (in his view) promoting 
the autonomy of the state and the unity and identity of the nation.44 Shulman adopts 
Smith’s definition of nationalism as “an ideology seeking to establish or promote the 
unity, identity, and autonomy of a nation or potential nation”, and argues that 
nationalists seek a way to promote economic autonomy while preserving and 
sometimes enhancing national unity and identity.45 Shulman divides nations into two 
categories, namely a dominant nation (large or small possessing their own state) and a 
minority nation (nation without its own state), and shows how neoliberalisation can 
promote nationalists’ interests in both dominant and minority nations in the current 
economic climate of globalization.46 For instance, nationalists of dominant nations 
might seek the autonomy of their nations in two ways. First, nationalists of a nation 
with a strong economy will seek their nations’ influence over other nations through 
neoliberalisation—the US is an example.47 On the other hand, nationalists of a 
nation-state with a weaker economy will try to lessen the influence of the nation with 
a strong economy by promoting economic ties with other nation-states— an example 
is the EU.48 For a minority nation in a nation-state, neoliberalisation also sometime 
can promote nationalists’ interests. For example, neoliberalisation, by rolling back the 
state, possibly weakens the influence of the dominant nation over their economy, and 
also weakens the dominant nation’s cultural assimilation policies of creating unity and 
identity through the state (one of the important purposes of economic protectionism is 
to protect the national culture).49  
One of the problems in Shulman’s explanations is that he does not consider 
differences in interests within a nation, including dominant and minority nations. 
Another problem is Shulman uses Smith’s definition to define nationalism, and so he 
limits nationalism to nationalists’ ideological movement. Moreover, Shulman uses the 
term of nationalists unclearly; therefore, it is unclear to see who nationalists are, 
whether or not they are intermediate associations, specifically politicians. In 
Shulman’s explanation adopting neoliberal policies is treated as the will of the people 
in a nation represented by nationalists. However, he ignores the possibility that 
neoliberalisation is often adopted by non-nationalists as a result of bargaining among 
societal actors whose interests are contested in a nation-state.    
 
Second group of new Theories  
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Goff and Desai provide a different approach to neoliberalisation and 
nationalism. They argue that a different form of nationalism emerged in a context of 
globalization. These arguments provide an explanation for the movements of 
reinforcement of national unity. They explain that when states face a need for 
economic liberalization (whether inevitable or not) and they actually liberalize their 
economy, a form of cultural nationalism is used or implemented by state actors to 
maintain their sovereignty and political power. According to Patricia Goff, in the age 
of globalisation, states are required to reinforce their national identity to maintain 
their political community, because “permeable territorial borders” are no longer able 
to keep out the flows from outside, including goods, people, ideas and capital, and the 
flows tend to work to deteriorate the social and political unity of a nation.50 Although 
not all states perfectly fit this model, Goff uses Biersteker and Weber’s framework for 
a state, and argues that the sovereignty of a state is based not only on a specific 
territory that is governed, but also the invisible borders of “a political community or a 
nation, the members of which share a common national identity” which “has the 
effect of demarcating ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ at the conceptual level”.51 Thus, in the 
process of neoliberalisation, in order to assert its sovereignty, a state needs to 
reconstruct an ‘invisible border’, and collective identity, like sharing a common 
culture and idioms.52 In her case studies, Goff shows how Canada and France in their 
negotiations with NAFTA and GATT strongly insisted on the exclusion of culture and 
audiovisual industries, such as film, television, radio and books, from 
neoliberalisation to retain their ‘invisible border’.  
Unlike those scholars mentioned above who argue about liberalisation in 
general, Desai provides a direct argument for the relationship between nationalism 
and neoliberalism. Desai focuses on internal class divisions and the volatility of life in 
a state characterised by neoliberalisation and the free flow of international capital, and 
argues that cultural nationalism is used by the state to compensate for these class 
divisions and volatility of life. According to Desai, the volatility and uncertainty of 
life yield a space where cultural nationalism comes in, and only cultural nationalism 
can provide the “mask and bridge” for the divides between ordinary people and 
government or economically dominant classes inside neoliberal nation-states. 53 
Cultural nationalism promotes cultural importance and the independent spirit of a 
nation, but in fact, states use it to mask the fact that “its civic-egalitarian welfare state 
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policies are abandoned” and also to accelerate the adoption of neoliberal economic 
policies in the developmentalist manner.54 Cultural nationalism can also work to 
legitimize the activities of neoliberal nation-states and to further the privileged access 
of the economically dominant classes to the benefits of neoliberal reforms. This form 
of nationalism is sold to the nation as absolutely essential if the nation is to survive 
economically in the prevailing global market.55 The ideology of neoliberalism itself 
cannot play the role of providing the “mask and bridge” for the divides in society, 
because it destabilizes life at the lower strata and its outcomes are also a potential 
political threat to the upper strata.56  
These new theories and arguments are useful and helpful to understand and 
explain a whole process of neoliberalisation. That is, to implement neoliberal reforms, 
economic nationalism would be used, and to keep neoliberalisation going, cultural 
nationalism would be used; therefore, one would expect that in neoliberalisation, the 
two different types of nationalism can be seen.  
 
3.3. Defining Nationalism  
From the new theories and arguments over nationalism in neoliberalisation, 
there are some key points. 
1. The narrative of economic life creates the unity of a nation and thus, 
nationalists often create their own narrative of economic life to unite people as 
a nation, using their favourite ideologies. 
a. Nationalists seek a way to promote economic ‘autonomy’ while 
preserving and sometimes enhancing national unity and identity 
2. The movements of reinforcement of national unity can be seen in 
neoliberalisation. 
a. In the process ofneoliberalisation, in order to assert its sovereignty, a 
state needs to reconstruct an ‘invisible border’ and collective identity, 
because “permeable territorial borders” are no longer able to keep out 
the flows from outside and the flows tend to work to deteriorate the 
social and political unity of a nation.  
3. Cultural nationalism can be seen in neoliberalisation.  
a. Only cultural nationalism can provide the “mask and bridge” for the 
divides between ordinary people and government or economically 
dominant classes insideneoliberal nation-states. 
b. Cultural nationalism promotes cultural importance and the independent 
spirit of a nation.  
All of these key points focus on the unity of a nation. However, it is not clear how 
nationalism provides unity to the people of a nation. To understand what nationalism 
is more clearly, let us discuss aspects of nationalism that provide unity of the people. 
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3.3.1. Sentiment Underpins Nationalism  
Guibernau argues that the national identity, that is, the individual’s emotional 
attachment to a nation, provides the sentiment, which enables the people of a nation to 
unite. National identity provides individuals the framework to interact with others 
inside and outside their nation, their self-identification with their nation and its 
members and separation from others.57 National identity of the members of a nation 
is constructed and experienced through “community of culture and unity of 
meaning”. 58  Rituals, including civil ceremonies, play an important role in the 
creation of national identity.59 Common features of a nation, including culture, 
history and collective memories, like war and economic success of a nation, work as 
important elements to provide individuals’ meanings of the world.60 Therefore, unlike 
the other forms of ideology, including liberalism and Marxism, which “require the 
indoctrination of their followers”, nationalism rests on individuals’ “emotional 
attachment to one’s land and culture,” and makes it possible to unite the people of a 
nation. 61  In other words, individuals’ emotional attachment to a nation is underlaid 
as the fundamental element that gives rise to nationalism and helps unification of the 
people in a nation. Moreover, as Crane argues, to recall the emotional sentiments 
attached to the nation among the people so that the people are united, a narrative is 
created and plays an important role in the unification of the people.62 
 
3.3.2. Ideology of Nationalism 
If, as Crane explains, a unifying narrative is created with particular ideologies, 
ideologies play an important role in nationalism. Nationalism includes ideology, and 
this is the second important aspect of nationalism. The traditional arguments over the 
ideology of nationalism focused on the comparisons between ‘Western’ civic or 
political nationalism and ‘Eastern’ cultural or ethnic nationalism.63 The ideology of 
‘Western’ nationalism is said to be characterized by its aspiration of ‘liberalism’ in 
which people should not be loyal to king and emperors, but to their nation for 
civic-oriented self determination, “both in the sense of democratic self-rule (or at least 
republican constitution-making) and in the sense of autonomy from the domination of 
other nations”.64 On the other hand the ‘Eastern’ nationalism is often described as a 
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‘populist’ movement, based on the ideology that some cultural or ethnic criteria, 
including language and history, are strongly emphasized and given priority, rather 
than giving priority to political citizenship of ‘Western’ nationalism.65 France as an 
example of ‘Western’ nationalism and Germany as an example of ‘Eastern’ 
nationalism are often cited in scholars’ arguments over nationalism.66   
However, as Calhoun shows by demonstrating the recent ‘Eastern’ type of 
nationalism in France, and ‘Western’ type of nationalism in Germany, the framework 
of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ nationalisms is no longer useful to characterise the 
ideology of nationalism at least in developed countries.67 Moreover, today it is a 
common understanding among the scholars of nationalism that contemporary 
nationalism is not like other -isms in terms of the fact that there is no fixed core idea 
to nationalism compared to other ideologies, like socialism and liberalism. For 
example, A. D. Smith points to the wide variety of ideologies associated with 
nationalism. Not only has nationalist ideology (separatists and integrationist) applied 
to creation of an independent nation, but it has also been associated with a variety of 
ideologies, from liberal, fascist, even communist, to cultural and religious based 
ideologies (like conservative and Islamic) and political and economic based 
ideologies (like protectionist).68 Therefore, it is clear that one must observe the 
ideology of nationalism case by case when nationalism is observed, because there is 
no fixed core idea to nationalism and the framework of Western and Eastern 
nationalism has become less and less sufficient in the contemporary era. In the case of 
economic nationalism discussed among the new theories and arguments, the ideology 
is neoliberalism and for cultural nationalism, the ideology is one of cultural 
importance and the importance of preservation of its own culture and identity. This 
ideology is used to create a narrative to unite the people. 
3.3.3. Nationalism as the Will of the People  
The third aspect of nationalism discussed here is the notion that the will of 
the people legitimizes a state. Nationalism works to express the will of the people. 
When the ideology in nationalism stimulates and reinforces the sentiments attached to 
the nation among the people, the ideology is expressed as the will of the people. The 
emergence of popular sovereignty in the American Revolution in 1776 and the French 
                                                  
65 Calhoun, p. 89.  
66 Calhoun, p. 89. 
67 Calhoun, pp. 89-91, p. 139 In the Japanese case the origins of a ‘civic’ type of ideology can be seen 
in the democracy movement in the Taisho era (Taisho democracy), and especially after the WWII 
liberal democracy was introduced by the US and the civic idea became part of Japan’s national 
identity.67 Therefore it is possible to say that the ideological difference between ‘Western’ and 
‘Eastern’ nationalism is getting closer in developed countries, including Japan. See, Shōichi Watanabe, 
The Great Meiji, and the Paradox, (meijitaiteitoiu ikita paradocusu), in Meijitenō to sonojidai (Tokyo, 
2002). 
68 John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith D., Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), p. 14.  
 44 
Revolution in 1789 brought radical changes in the legitimacy of political rule, which 
was previously dominated by reasons such as “God’s will, royal blood or superior 
physical strength”.69 The idea that the ideal legitimacy does not come from above, 
but comes from the ‘ruled’ was spread through the Napoleonic invasions.70 “It is 
precisely from this period [eighteenth century] onwards that the nation-state becomes 
recognized as the unit of political power par excellence, its form being taken as a 
model not only in Western Europe, but also in the rest of the world.”71  
One of the main features of the present nation-state system is that states are 
(at least regarded as) an apparatus to express the people’s will.72 Nowadays not only 
governments who come to power through free elections claim their legitimacy as so, 
but also “government elected by more dubious means and dictatorships also claim to 
be the expression of the will of the people they rule”.73 Therefore, in present 
nation-states it is important for states to create unification or congruence with the 
people. Nationalism plays an important role in this.  
3.3.4. Nationalism as Movement  
Nationalism can be observed as national movements. National movements 
are often argued in terms of political and cultural autonomy. For instance, Melucci 
points out national movements raise two fundamental questions of contemporary 
complex societies:  
They raise questions about the need for new rights for all members of the 
community, particularly the right to be different; and they claim the right to 
autonomy, to control a specific living space (which in this case is also 
geographic territory).74  
As Andreas Pickel shows, national movements in terms of politics, culture and 
economy are generated by various people and groups of a nation through expressing 
ideas, taking political actions, and forming a national consensus around economic and 
political policies to build the future of a nation.75  
3.3.5. Definition of Nationalism 
The working definition of nationalism used in this thesis modifies Guibernau’s 
definition76 to produce the followings:  
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Nationalism is an ideology and movement generated with the sentiment of belonging to a 
nation, in which members identify with the nation’s peculiar features, including a set of 
symbols, beliefs, way of life and its economy, and the will of the people to decide upon 
their common political, economic and cultural destiny.  
 
From this definition of nationalism and the arguments of new theories of 
economic nationalism presented above, the following working conceptualisations of 
economic and cultural nationalism under neoliberalisation emerge.  
 
Economic Nationalism  
Economic nationalism is an ideology and movement, which is strongly coherent with 
ideologies of neoliberalism, including market liberalisation, deregulation and 
individual responsibility. Economic nationalism recalls and reinforces the sentiment 
of belonging to a nation by providing a way for members to identify with the nation’s 
peculiar economic features and situation. Economic nationalism also creates a 
narrative of a future of the nation, and promotes implementing neoliberal reforms as 
the will of the people.  
 
Cultural Nationalism  
Cultural nationalism is an ideology and movement, which reinforces the sentiment of 
belonging to a nation, in which members identify with the nation’s peculiar culture, 
set of symbols, beliefs and history, and the will of the people to decide upon their 
common cultural and political destiny. In the process of neoliberalisation, cultural 
nationalism works to maintain the invisible borders, while the role of the actual 
territorial borders is receding. Cultural nationalism is also used to legitimize the 
activities of neoliberal nation-states. It works to mask the social problems created by 
the implementation of neoliberal reforms, and to ‘glue’ social differences created by 
the implementation of neoliberal reforms.    
 
3.4. Conclusion and Hypothesis 
3.4.1. Conclusion  
As discussed above, contemporary nationalism is not like other -isms in terms 
of the fact that there is no fixed core idea to nationalism, therefore different types of 
nationalism that have different ideologies can co-exist. In neoliberalisation, there can 
be two types of nationalism, namely economic nationalism and cultural nationalism, 
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which work to unite the people. The important reason why nationalism can unite the 
people is that there are sentiments attached to a nation among the people, and when 
the ideology/idea of nationalism stimulates and encourages the sentiments attached to 
a nation, nationalism appears as the expression of the will of the people. In this regard, 
economic nationalism can unite the people in a nation-state in a way that people feel 
neoliberal reforms are necessary for the future of the nation, and cultural nationalism 
can unite the people by reinforcing and emphasizing the importance of their own 
culture and self-responsibility. Since nationalism is expressed as the will of the people, 
nationalism can provide the legitimizing goal and “glue” that can counteract the 
increase in social insecurity and inequality generated by neoliberalisation, because the 
sentiments brought about by economic and cultural nationalism are strongly 
connected with the will of the people. 
 
3.4.2. Hypothesis  
The emergence of the global financial market promoted internationalization of the 
flow of finance that led banks, financial companies and institutions to create global 
networks of their business, and led the production sector to be internationalized. This 
creates a situation, in which neoliberal reforms are strongly in the interests of these 
transnationalized societal actors. However, in order to legitimize the implementation 
of neoliberal reforms as political and economic policies, the will of the people should 
correspond with neoliberal reforms. In other words, a national consensus for 
neoliberal economic and structural reforms should be formed. For this necessity, 
economic and cultural nationalism will be used. Through economic nationalism, 
individuals will be persuaded that neoliberal reforms should be taken for their national 
economic growth, while cultural nationalism will “mask and bridge” the divides 
between ordinary people and government or economically dominant classes inside 
neoliberal nation-states to maintain a state’s social and political unity after 
neoliberalisation, because neoliberalisation erodes the former bases of political and 
social unity of a nation. 
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Chapter 4: Case Study of Japan: Its Neoliberal Reform 
4.1. Roll-Back Neoliberalisation in Relation to Pre-neoliberal Economic 
System 
4.1.1. The Performance of the 1940 system up to the Neoliberal Reform in 
the 1980s 
 The term post-war in this thesis indicates the period of time from 1945 until the 
1980s when the neoliberal reforms started. In this period, Japan experienced rapid 
economic growth, which was largely due to the role played by a rather unique Japanese 
economic system. How strong the system was can be seen in history. The overall 
performance of the post-war Japanese economic system was impressive average of 6 % 
annual GNP growth from 1949 to the late 1980s, while over the same period in both 
Britain and the US their GNP growth averaged less than 3 %.1 
 Although Japan was suffering from a deficit in its balance of payments in 1960, 
Japan’s GNP was already the fifth largest in the world. Its balance of payments turned 
into a surplus in 1965. Japan’s GNP became the second largest in the world by the end 
of the decade, second only to the US.2 However, in the 1970s, the so-called ‘Nixon 
shock’ (the end of Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate), the revaluation of the yen-dollar 
exchange rate, and the following two oil-shocks hit Japan’s exports hard.3 As a result, 
Japan’s production levels did not recover to the same level they were in 1973 until 1978, 
and also in 1979 Japan experienced a deficit in its balance of payments for the first time 
since Japan recorded its surplus in 1965.4 The price of the yen increased continuously 
from 308 yen to one US dollar in 1971 to 120 to one US dollar in early 1988.5 Despite 
this fact, Japan’s economic growth rate was still higher than those of other developed 
countries in the world, and “Japan’s onward march to economic superpower status 
seemed unstoppable”.6 
 Japan’s post-war economic performance is often described as a ‘miracle’. 
Although the economic system was the single most important reason for Japan’s rapid 
economic growth, a number of scholars point out other important features, including 
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quality control (QC) introduced by General Headquarters (GHQ),7 massive US aid, 
Japan’s developmental aid to Southeast Asia to promote market relations8 and the US’s 
procurements and expenditure during both the Korean and the Vietnam War. 9 
Membership in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are also possibly key reasons for 
Japan’s post-war economic success, because its membership in both organizations 
assured Japan of access to the most advanced markets.10 Without the backing of the US, 
Japan could not gain membership, because GATT, for instance, excluded countries that 
might sell their products in a way perceived as dumping while at the same time 
protecting their own markets, and post-war Japan was exactly such a country that 
should have been excluded from its membership.11 European countries, especially 
France, opposed Japanese membership; however, because of the Cold War the US 
placed a priority on politics, and the US supported Japan’s membership by using its 
dominant position in GATT.12   
Through its membership in GATT and the OECD, the world market was now 
open for Japan and its “kamikaze-like market share expansion behaviour”. 13 
Domestically Japanese bureaucrats and association leaders prevented Japanese 
companies from over-competition, but in the world market unfortunately there was not 
such a system that prevented companies from over-competition in terms of price.14 
Washington was frightened of piling up a trade imbalance with Japan (the US trade 
deficit with Japan increased from $1.69 billion in 1974 to nearly $10.5 billion by the 
end of the 1970s) and so implemented import restrictions and duties on several Japanese 
products, including light trucks and colour television sets, but it was too late to prevent 
a further ‘invasion’ of Japanese exports.15 Due to the absence of a system that could 
prevent companies from over-competition in the world market, Japan’s economy 
ignored profits and sought only the expansion of its market share. As a consequence, 
profit oriented Western companies were soon eliminated from the market.16 Japan’s 
“militarized and mobilized” exports soon wiped out the consumer electronic industry in 
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both Europe and the U.S., and in these countries the unemployment rate increased.17 By 
the end of the 1980s Japan’s global account surplus reached over $80 billion, while in 
the mean time the U.S. became the world’s largest debtor, and the U.S.’s global deficit 
reached just over $160 billion ($59 billion from trade with Japan).18 Moreover, Japan’s 
GNP per capita also surpassed the US’s, and reached $19,600 in 1987.19 
While Japanese exports were dominating the world market, U.S. economists 
were very much confused by Japan’s behaviour, because Japan did not seek to 
maximize profit even though it achieved a monopoly in a number of products.20 
“Analysts still failed to see its intrinsically different organizational structure and 
dynamics as a scale-maximization machine. Profits were irrelevant for management”.21 
This is because, although Japan was categorised as a capitalist country, the post-war 
system was very much different from either the liberal or social-democratic capitalism 
seen in the US and the European countries. Thus, before evaluating Japan’sneoliberal 
reforms, it is important to discuss the post-war Japanese economic system. 
4.1.2. Post-War Japanese Economic System and its Origin  
The post-war Japanese economic system can be explained in various ways using 
different frameworks. For example, it has been explained as a developmental state, a 
catching up economy or Japan Inc. In many studies of the post-war Japanese economic 
system, a number of scholars have argued that the characteristic features of this system 
emerged from Japan’s ‘unique’ culture and history, however, in recent studies this 
theory has been disputed by other scholars, including Noguchi, Sakakibara and Werner. 
They maintain that the Japanese economic system was actually created during the war 
and survived in the post-war period without any fundamental reforms until the end of 
1990s. Therefore, it is necessary for this thesis to clarify the connection between the 
wartime and the post-war Japanese economic system in order to have a clearer picture 
of what the post-war Japanese economic system was. This will be important in 
understanding how the Japanese economic system changed because of neoliberalisation. 
It will also be important when we consider possible reasons as to why Japan reacted 
differently from other countries towards economic globalization, especially financial 
globalisation. In the following section, first of all, the pre-war Japanese economic 
system, the origin of the post-war Japanese system and the reasons why it emerged are 
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briefly discussed, and secondly how the war-time system was modified or strengthened 
in the post-war period is evaluated.  
Recently, a number of scholars have found that the pre-war Japanese economic 
system was similar to the present day American liberal economic system. 22 For 
example, in the pre-war Japanese economic system, more than fifty percent of 
corporations’ financial needs were met directly through the stock market, and 
consequently the ratio of the total value of listed stocks to GNP was much higher than 
the ratio during the ‘economic miracle’ in the post-war period. As well as this, the 
influence of shareholders was strong, and corporations were required to pay high 
dividends, therefore, management tended to seek more short-term profits. For instance, 
in the 1920s and the early 1930s, according to Werner, among the leading Japanese 
corporations, two-thirds of their profit went to pay dividends, 6 percent of the profit was 
paid to their directors as bonuses, and only 25 percent of the profit was kept in reserve.  
Japan’s pre-war economy was first changed by Japanese reform bureaucrats   
during the 1930s, and then this modified economic system was strengthened by the 
same bureaucrats during the war in the 1940s.23 The original aim of the system’s 
modification was to overcome the recession which followed the Great Depression, but 
after the Manchurian incident (Japan’s invasion into Manchuria in 1931) the system was 
strengthened for military purposes to precede the war. Then, although the war ended in 
1945 with Japan’s heavy defeat, the wartime economic system continued to exist.  
One of the most important reasons for the survival of the wartime Japanese 
economic system was the change in US political policy. The main goal of U.S. 
occupation shifted from its original demilitarisation and democratisation of Japan to 
Japanese economic recovery and rearmament.24 After the original market oriented 
liberal economic reform was reversed, the US’s anti-communist containment policy was 
implemented to strengthen Japan’s economy as quickly as possible. As a result, the US 
implemented Japan’s wartime planned economy, because they thought the ‘visible hand’ 
of the government would be useful to accelerate Japanese economic growth.25 As a 
result of the change in US policy, people who played essential roles in the wartime 
Japanese economic system gained positions that could control the economic system in 
the post-war period. Furthermore, there is a strong structural connection between the 
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wartime and the post-war Japanese economic system.26 Central wartime legislation was 
also maintained in the post war era by especially the MITI (Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry) and the MoF (Ministry of Finance).27 The wartime Temporary 
Funds Adjustment Law of 1937 and the Ordinance of Funds Operation of Banks of 
1940 continued to exist. More importantly, the Bank of Japan Law of 1942 did not 
fundamentally change until April 1998.28 The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law of 1949 was a renamed version of the Capital Flight Prevention Law of 
1932.29 In this regard, it is clear to see the structural connections, including laws, 
between the wartime and the post-war Japanese economic system. Thus, Noguchi 
named the post-war Japanese economic system “the 1940 System” as it was regarded as 
growth oriented rather than a system to maximise profits.30 In the system, every 
economic activity, including governmental regulation, financial system, industrial 
structures and labour relations inside firms, was organized to maximise growth. 31   
4.1.3. The five distinctive features of the post-war economy in Japan  
The basic features of the post-war Japanese economic system were:  
1. The financial system: under the corporation of governmental authorities controlling 
credit creation through bank loans, and the selecting and organization of priority 
industries;  
2. The influence of the shareholders: the influence of shareholders on corporate 
decisions were weak; In the post-war Japanese economic system, 43 percent of the 
profits were paid out as dividends, only 2 percent were for directors’ bonuses, and 
over 55 percent of profits were used for reinvestment between 1966 and 1970.32  
3. Business culture: an exclusive business culture and a tripartite (business, politician 
and bureaucrats) corporation in the economy;  
4. Its employment practices: specifically lifetime-employment, the seniority wage, and 
in-house labour unions, which were typically observed in large organizations;  
5. The taxation system: income and corporate tax were the main sources of revenue, 
and a strong central government allocated and distributed the tax revenues. These 
are the typical features of the post-war Japanese economic system, which was 
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strongly connected with the wartime economic system.  
 
The Financial System 
The central and single most important feature of the post-war Japanese 
economic system is the peculiar financial system which was set up by Japanese wartime 
bureaucrats. In Japan, reform bureaucrats learned the Reichsbank’s methods of 
controlling creation of credit and allocating purchasing power to maximise economic 
recovery.33  
In order for the Japanese economy to recover from the devastation caused by the 
war, a fundamental problem that Japan faced was the shortage of money in the country. 
In 1953, 8 years after the end of World War II, the total financial assets among the 
Japanese non-financial sectors were only 3 percent of “the corresponding figure for the 
United States”.34 Although the ratio of the total financial assets recovered to 50 percent, 
existing commercial banks did not have strength to provide long-term credits, therefore, 
special financial structure and institutions were necessary to aid economic recovery.35 
To solve this problem, the same financial strategies used during the war, that is, credit 
control and allocation with strong governmental intervention and high savings, were 
implemented to encourage investment for recovery.36 
Until the late 1990s the wartime financial system, namely credit controls and 
banks’ lending, remained a central feature of Japanese post-war economic system. 
Firstly, wartime financial legislations backing up the wartime financial system remained 
up to the 1990s. The 1942 Bank of Japan Law remained until 1997 without any 
fundamental amendment; Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law remained 
until the Big Bang reform in the late 1990s and it prevented international capital flow 
into Japanese markets. 37  The post-war legislation also strengthened the wartime 
financial system. For instance, the Banking Law “established powerful surveillance 
machinery and leadership power over financial institutions”, and the establishment of 
strategic financial organisations, like the Industrial Bank of Japan and the Japanese 
Development Bank, strengthened the bank-centred financial system in the post-war 
period.38          
Moreover, although the wartime mobilization laws, which were strong legal 
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requirements for the private sector to follow the bureaucracy “with extremely heavy 
penalties for non-compliance”, were eliminated after the war, thanks to the vagueness of 
the wartime legislations mentioned above, bureaucracy still had strong influence over 
the private sector through issuing “administrative orders or notifications (tsutatsu), 
similar to the wartime imperial decrees issued by the bureaucracy”.39 There was no 
chance for the private sector to resist or argue with the government. Through the credit 
control and allocation, banks were totally dependent on the bureaucracy in the same 
way that companies relied on bank loans for their fundraising.40  
The newly created purchasing power was allocated in the same way as in 
wartime by the Bank of Japan (BoJ).41 The BoJ first decided by how much they would 
increase the total amount of loans, and then the increase was allocated to “individual 
banks as loan quotas” from large city banks to smaller ones.42 In the mean time, banks 
were asked to hand in their lending plans, and every month banks were obliged to report 
their lending in details, showing the names of large borrowers (their reports were 
handed in to headquarters or their closest branches of BoJ).43 “The BoJ then ‘adjusted’ 
the lending plans to fit its credit allocation plans”.44 Finally, bank officials visited the 
BoJ to ask by how much they should increase their loan quota.45 Since BoJ used the 
teller window for this procedure it was called ‘window guidance’ (madoguchi shido).46  
During the post-war period the categories of A, B and C for industries were 
maintained; instead of munitions industry, producers of export goods (including 
industrial and consumer goods) were categorised as group A.47 Although the difference 
between group A and group B was blurred by 1955, the categories of industry 
fundamentally remained throughout the post-war era.48 Industry of category A was 
decided by MITI’s suggestion, and the industry was shifted from “first, textiles, then 
shipbuilding and steel, and later automobiles and electronics”, and these industries had 
benefits from allocation of the purchasing power.49 Moreover, “thanks to the continued 
foreign exchange controls, foreign currency could then be allocated for obtaining 
necessary imports – raw material and other inputs”.50  
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The Ministry of Finance regulated and maintained artificially the low interest 
rate and the hierarchically organized banking sector. The low interest rate of deposits 
and lending stimulated the demand of bank loans, and simultaneously by doing so it was 
important for banks “to ration the credit market and select among potential loan 
applicants those they prefer”.51 In order to maintain the low deposit interest rate, other 
financial institutions were strictly regulated. For instance, interest rates of other 
financial market were kept low and only large corporations were allowed to raise funds 
from issuing corporate bonds.52 Moreover, under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign 
Trade Control Law, the domestic financial market was closed from the world, and there 
was no possibility of outward capital flight from Japan and corporations’ fundraising in 
overseas markets.53           
Since under the weak influence of shareholders, banks were run by managers to 
compete in the market-share expansion with dumping of their products, banks were 
organized in the hierarchical manner in order to prevent excess competition. The 
ranking of banks was not changed except in the cases of mergers.54 The top of the 
hierarchy of banks was dominated by long-term-credit banks, which were allowed to 
“issue corporate bonds to raise low-cost long-term sources of funds, while other banks 
could not”.55 City banks were also located at the top of the hierarchy, and they were the 
first priority of the BoJ’s allocation of the loan quotas.56 Smaller banks, including local 
banks, mutual savings, loan banks and credit associations, were located in the lower 
strata of the hierarchy and they did not play any central roles in credit allocation of the 
BoJ, but they usually supplied their surplus funds to city banks “via the inter-bank 
market, such as call loan market”.57 Then inside banks quota was allocated their 
nationwide branches, in which “they were further divided and allocated to thousands of 
individual loan officers”.58  
Moreover, in order to maintain the hierarchical financial ‘cartel’, the Ministry of 
Finance played the central role of supervision. No banks were allowed to fail (a bank 
was often merged with other bank instead) and large banks were required to cooperate 
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with each other “in time of need to rise and fall together”. Furthermore, new entry into 
the hierarchy was prevented by heavy barriers of regulations, and the position of the 
banks was also reinforced by “the long-term lending relationship between the banks and 
corporations”.59      
 
Weak Influence of the Shareholders  
The second distinctive feature of the post-war Japanese economic system is the 
weak influence of the shareholders on corporate decisions. During the war, managers 
were free from the influence of shareholders and accountable to only the planning 
bureaucrats (who did not have to promote shareholders’ profits). Managers’ 
responsibility was to achieve two goals: to promote the quantity and quality of their 
production. 60  During the war, reform bureaucrats took away the power of the 
shareholders, including their influence over profit allocations, fund-raising matters and 
the appointment of managers.61 Most of the profits were to be used for reinvestment, 
the promotion of managers and for workers’ incentives by giving them special 
bonuses.62  
After the war, the weak status of shareholders remained, and it further 
deteriorated under US occupation. For example, there was the degradation of the 
“Zaibatsu families”. The Zaibatsu families held almost 40 percent of the total shares in 
Japan (167 million shares out of 443 million).63 Although the official reason for 
weakening the influence of the Zaibatsu families was because these families contributed 
to setting up the military regime during the war, the actual reason was because if the 
influence of the shareholders on corporate decisions was strong, their strong influence 
might become an impediment to the US’s anticommunist containment policy. 64 
Therefore, General MacArthur was willing to use the US’s occupation power to help 
weaken the influences of the Zaibatsu families by purging them.65 Consequently, the 
Zaibatsu owners’ shares were sold to the public, and holding companies were not 
allowed to become established until 1998.66 Moreover, “an Anti-Monopoly Law and a 
Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power were enacted 
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in 1947”.67 Thus, the weak influence of shareholders on corporate decisions became 
recognized as a distinctive feature of the post-war Japanese economic system. 
 
Exclusive Business Culture (keiretsu)   
As a third feature of the post-war Japanese economic system, the exclusive 
business culture and tripartite (business, politician and bureaucrats) cooperation are 
mentioned. In the wartime economic system, alongside providing quantitative output 
targets, resources were allocated directly from the top by the ‘visible hand’ of 
bureaucrats, and control associations were also created in each industry or trade so that 
each industry was organized to maximize their efficiency with the resources allocated.68 
Moreover, to improve efficiency in production, “firms and factories were amalgamated 
into fewer, larger units that could enjoy economies of scale”.69 Eventually a highly 
concentrated economic structure emerged, and in the meantime, “the large firms found 
it efficient to subcontract production of certain components to smaller firms, who were 
dependent on them – virtual external subsidiaries”. 70  
The wartime trade and business associations survived in the post-war era, and 
were strengthened even after the purge of the Zaibatsu families. By the end of the US 
occupation, “restrictions on stock retention, interlocking directorships, and mergers 
were relaxed”, and cartels were allowed.71 Between 1950 and 1970 for a variety of 
industries, the Japanese government implemented 30 laws, granting immunity from 
anti-monopoly provisions, including the Export-Import Law, the Insurance Industry 
Law, the Aviation Industry Law, the Securities Investment Trust Law and the Fruit 
Industry Promotion Special Measures Laws. 72  Strong governmental intervention 
allowed huge numbers of official cartels (the number increased remarkably from 162 in 
1955 to 1,079 in 1966).73 
In addition to the official cartels, the wartime relationships of small companies 
as subcontractors or suppliers to the large corporations remained in the post-war era. 
The role of small companies was important for the post-war Japanese economy in a 
number of ways. For example, up to the 1990s nearly two-thirds of the labour force was 
employed by small enterprises (those with less than 100 workers), and these companies 
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produced over half of the total output of the Japanese economy.74 Furthermore, the 
flexible role of those small producers, according to Friedman, contributed to the 
high-speed growth in the 1960s and 1970s. Small manufacturers chose flexible 
strategies based not upon price competition, but upon the modification of products and 
the upgrading of their quality.75 A number of scholars recognize the role of small 
companies as an important part of the dual structure of the Japanese post-war economic 
system, with small and medium-sized companies squeezing labour and acting as a cheap 
parts provider to large corporations who were competing with foreign companies in the 
global market.76   
In the meantime, in order for companies, including former Zaibatsu and 
non-Zaibatsu, to strengthen their businesses and make the economic system more 
efficient and workable, they created their own business group called Keiretsu.77 Since 
central holding companies were not allowed, their regrouping tactic involved the 
adoption of cross shareholdings, in which each company issued more shares and 
swapped them amongst each other so as to strengthen their group and keiretsu 
relationships and to prevent foreign takeovers.78 Widespread cross shareholding created 
capitalism without capitalists. Japanese companies became much more independent 
from the influence of shareholders and foreign investors.79 Therefore, the exclusive 
business culture and tripartite (business, politician and bureaucrats) cooperation are 
understood as a distinctive feature of the post-war Japanese economic system. 
Furthermore, the main bank system was strengthened by cross shareholding. 
Banks were only allowed to hold up to 10 percent of the stock of any industrial 
corporation, but “by arranging the purchase of stock by related keiretsu firms –each 
buying a small percentage of stock from each other’s firm –they could cumulatively 
control over two-thirds of all shares”.80 Eventually, keiretsu business groups were 
organized around central banks. They possessed the same structure as the pre-war 
conglomerates that were organized under holding companies, but in the post-war period, 
managers, not the capitalist shareholders, controlled the keiretsu business groups.81 
Ultimately, in managerial capitalism, banks and bureaucrats could be stakeholders to 
allocate resources, thus strong connections were created among bureaucrats, banks and 
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industrial firms.82 
In each industry, companies were involved in growth oriented competition 
against each other, specifically competition for the expansion of their market-share.83 
To prevent ‘excess competition’ (katō kyosō) bureaucrats created “explicit or implicit 
cartels usually administered by the trade associations (the former wartime control 
associations)” (over 1000 such cartels existed in Japan by 1970s). 84  However, 
excessive competition remained until the 1990s, and it produced several social problems, 
notably karoshi (death from overwork).85  
 
Employment Practices 
The fourth of the five distinctive features of the post-war Japanese economic 
system is its employment practices. Lifetime employment and the seniority wage were 
adopted by large corporations after World War I.86 In the late 1930s the Wage Control 
Ordinance and other government initiatives were introduced to strengthen both lifetime 
employment and the seniority wage.87 The present in-house labour unions were also 
created during the war. The former industry-based unions were dismantled and 
“replaced under government initiatives by corporate in-house unions called Sangyo 
Hokokukai”. 88  Having gone through these processes, lifetime-employment, the 
seniority wage and in-house labour unions remained as distinctive employment 
practices in the post-war Japanese economic system.  
Companies were organised in a family manner, and loyalty among the workers 
and managers to their company was encouraged.89 In-house labour unions strengthened 
the connections inside companies rather than unifying all workers in the same 
industry. 90  Moreover, lifetime employment was promoted by providing material 
benefits, like seniority promotion, higher incomes and pension plans. 91 
 
Taxation  
The fifth and final distinctive feature of the post-war Japanese economic system 
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is its taxation system. The post-war Japanese government’s taxation system and its 
allocation of revenue also originated in wartime. The main source of national revenue in 
post-war Japan is from income and corporate tax, and the taxation system was born out 
of the tax reforms of 1940 in which “a source withholding tax on wage income was 
introduced, and the corporate income tax was newly established”.92 It was a significant 
change from pre-war taxation, which relied heavily on “traditional taxes such as land 
tax, liquor tax, sugar tax and customs duty”. 93  The post-war allocation and 
redistribution of revenue also originated in wartime. There were two distinctive features 
of the post-war tax allocation and redistribution system in Japan. Firstly, the government 
allocated part of its budget to fostering national industrial sectors. Since the budget of 
central government was “designed to balance the overall fiscal expenditures and 
revenues” up to the 1970s, The Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP), which was 
based on postal saving and insurance, was used for public spending, such as 
construction of national highways. 94  Secondly, budget allocation was used to 
compensate uneven growth rather than minimising inequality of the social classes.95 
There are two routes of subsidisation, namely regional base and industrial base 
allocation of government subsidy. For allocation and redistribution purposes, “a subsidy 
system from the central to the local governments was established in the 1940 reform”.96 
Eventually, in terms of the relationship between the central and local government, the 
position of the central government was strengthened, but local government autonomy 
was undermined, and this strong central government system has remained in place 
throughout the post-war period.97 The industrial base subsidy was mainly focused on 
less competitive sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries and small retailers.98 The 
most typical example is the subsidies to rice farming, such as the rice-pricing policy 
under the food control system.99  
 
Outcomes of the five features  
The competition for market-share took place especially in the overseas market 
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where such explicit or implicit cartels did not exist.100 The fundamental difference 
between the Japanese wartime economy and the post-war economy is that the former 
was organized for military purposes, but the later system was organized in a export 
oriented way.101 The military products, including weapons, were produced in order to 
be used or consumed, not produced to gain profits, like trades. Therefore, producing 
military products was fundamentally wasteful in terms of the economy. However, the 
production of export goods can earn foreign currency, so in the post war period money 
was used to strengthen exports by importing other production factors and investing in 
the expansion of production capacity.102 Eventually, the dumping-like competition for 
more of the market-share by Japanese companies ‘assaulted’ the markets in the world by 
the massive amount of exports. Consequently, developed countries in particular were 
severely hurt.103    
 
4.2. Neoliberal Reform in Japan  
Peter Gourevitch explains the following factors affect for the policy-making: 
interest groups (societal actors), intermediate associations, economic ideology and 
international environment.104 These elements affect each other and the political and 
economic policies and regulations come up in the relation to the elements. Therefore, in 
order to see clearly how neoliberal reforms as political and economic policies appeared 
and were implemented, it is important to pay attention to the societal actors, 
international environment and how they influenced into the political decisions. 
4.2.1. Roll-Back Neoliberalisation in Japan 
During the roll-back neoliberal reforms, the post-war Japanese economy system 
remained without any fundamental changes. However, this raises several interesting 
questions; what reasons were behind Japan adopting such neoliberal reforms and how 
were these neoliberal reforms implemented without changing the 1940 system? To 
answer these questions, it is vital to observe what the situation was like in Japan before 
the roll-back neoliberalisation period. 
 
The end of rapid economic growth  
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Although in the 1970s Japan experienced an oil crisis twice, it managed to keep 
a relatively higher than average economic growth, compared to the other OECD 
countries (3.6 % from 1974 to 1979).105 However, when the annual GDP growth rate 
recorded zero in 1974, it was obvious that the potential growth rate for the Japanese 
post-war economic system had declined. As a number of scholars point out, the 
post-war Japanese economic system faced fundamental limitations associated with its 
capital accumulation process by the late 1970s.106 There were at least three important 
limitations. First, the growth-centric economic structure was not able to adapt to the 
situation that Japan was facing, and it desperately needed to develop its own 
technological knowledge and skills. By the end of the 1970s the technological gap 
between the West and Japan had narrowed, Japan’s industrial structure had already 
developed from light manufacturing to heavy industry and had begun to focus its 
attention on high-tech industries. During this period of rapid development, the Japanese 
government established key industries such as machinery, metals and chemicals, but 
Japan relied heavily on Western knowledge of technology, especially from the US, to 
foster these sectors.107 “Between 1957 and 1969 Japan imported 6,326 individual items 
of technological knowledge, most of them from the United States, and 80 per cent of 
them related to the three key industries: machinery, metals and chemicals”.108 However, 
once the technological gap narrowed in the early 1980s, the West began to become more 
careful when showing or sharing their technical know-how (the friction between the US 
and Japan over the IC chip in the 1980s is the prominent example). 109  Therefore, 
Japan was required to modify its economy to one that possessed a more 
technology-development-oriented economic structure, which invested more money in 
research and development (R&D) rather than in the maintenance of its growth-centric 
structure.   
Secondly, Japan’s rapidly aging society made it difficult to keep its lifetime 
employment system, especially in terms of the seniority based wage. The working 
mechanism of the seniority based wage was to raise a worker’s wage based on the 
length of their service to the company while setting the start point of the wage at quite a 
low level.110 During Japan’s period of rapid economic growth, the seniority based wage 
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worked well, because it was supported by high economic growth, and so companies 
could afford to pay higher wages to senior workers.111 However, the Japanese rapid 
economic growth peaked and eventually its growth rate became lower than in the past. 
Consequently, these factors coupled with a rapidly aging society meant that the cost of 
older workers became a burden for firms.112 Thirdly, during the period of rapid 
economic growth, Japan utilized its excess population in the agrarian countryside as 
cheap labour for its growing manufacturing sector.113 Large cities as the production 
centres absorbed huge numbers from the people-rich countryside, so there was no 
shortage of cheap labour in the production sector. However, by the early 1970s most of 
Japan’s population had become heavily concentrated in urban areas (for instance, over 
40 percent of the population was concentrated in three major cities), therefore this 
demographic fact coupled with the rapidly aging society meant that Japan faced a 
fundamental labour-shortage, especially in the production sector.114  
By the late 1960s, a number of politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders 
recognized the limitations of this growth-oriented economic system, and they began to 
search for “new directions for economic expansion and new ideologies, which would 
endow those directions with political content and credibility”.115 Three main possible 
approaches to reform the economic system were considered, but none called for 
liberalisation. One plan called for economic development through the expansion of the 
construction industry, which aimed to create networks of highways and express rail 
routes as well as the construction of new industrial areas and cities throughout the 
Japanese archipelago.116 The second approach was to shift Japan’s growth-oriented 
economy towards a welfare-oriented economy, and was aimed at transforming Japan 
into a ‘welfare state’ similar to “other industrialised democracies such as the 
Scandinavian countries”.117 The third approach was to shift Japan’s key industries from 
heavy and chemical manufacturing to information-oriented technologies.118   
Although by the end of 1970s there were some “international minded officials 
and intellectuals”, who recognized that Japan needed to liberalize and deregulate the 
economic system, their voices were small and weak and drowned out by the vested 
interests of bureaucrats, politicians and businesses which had an oligopoly on the closed 
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market. 119  Moreover, as the post-war Japanese economic system had created a 
relatively equal distribution of wealth for ordinary Japanese people, most ordinary 
Japanese people benefited from the system, and so it was difficult to reach a national 
consensus to adopt neoliberal reforms in the post-war Japanese economy system.120 
Thus, Japan’s roll-back neoliberal reforms took place amongst negative attitudes 
towards liberalization.  
Pressure for Neoliberal Reform 
The initial face of Japan’s neoliberal reforms, the roll-back neoliberal reforms, 
started during the same period when Reagan and Thatcher implemented neoliberal 
reforms in their countries in the 1980s.121 Similar to Reagan’s and Thatcher’s reforms, 
financial liberalisation and deregulation reforms were introduced and labour unions, 
especially unions in the public sector, were attacked in Japan. However, unlike Reagan’s 
and Thatcher’s reforms, in which roll-back neoliberalisation was used to change every 
aspect of society to acquire new ‘benefits’ from international financial markets, Japan’s 
roll-back neoliberalisation only affected a small part of society. This was the result of 
the particular struggle among and between domestic and international interests that 
generated the reforms in Japan. 
The Connection to the Financial Market 
The Japanese government clearly recognised the importance of the international 
financial market and continued to do so as it expanded. Even though the 1980s marked 
a boom in international trade, “the flow of goods and services was outclassed by the 
volume of rapidly expanding capital flow”.122 From the late 1970s a number of 
Japanese corporations expanded their businesses overseas, and these companies were 
willing to fundraise overseas rather than in Japan. Japanese export companies also 
“wanted to borrow foreign funds to hedge the risk of foreign exchange fluctuations”.123 
In order to respond to these demands, the liberalization of Japan’s financial markets was 
promoted. In addition, by the mid 1980s Japan became the largest creditor country, and 
Japanese financial capital was looking for overseas investment destinations, because 
according to Gilpin, domestic investments were already saturated.124 Therefore, to 
invest overseas, liberalization was promoted. However, this financial liberalization was 
curbed or modified by domestic and international interests.  
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As mentioned earlier, the post-war financial system was created by the 
separation of the domestic financial market from the external market and by 
credit-control through bank-loans. Inside the so-called convoy system, Japanese banks 
were organized in a hierarchical manner and the MoF played a central role in the 
supervision of this ‘convoy’. Although liberalization and deregulation were considered 
to be an advantage in the newly emerged global financial market, the MoF was afraid 
that liberalization and deregulation might undermine the basis of Japan’s domestic 
financial system and the dominant position of the MoF as a supervision agency.125 
Therefore, the MoF was not willing to liberalize the financial market. Instead, it 
protected its position in the system.  
In the mean time, there were some factors promoting financial liberalisation. 
Owing to relatively slow growth in the 1970s, the Japanese government implemented a 
series of fiscal stimulus packages through public construction, and also interest rates 
were reduced several times.126 However, without resolving the fundamental limitations 
of the Japanese post-war economic system, the expansion of public expenditure only 
resulted in fiscal deficits, and therefore the Japanese government needed to increase 
government bond issues.127 Throughout the post-war period under the balanced budget 
policy of the Japanese central government, which was passed to prevent any fall in 
government bond prices, “the bulk of government bond issues had been underwritten by 
a syndicate of many city and regional banks and reabsorbed a year later in a buying 
operation by the Bank of Japan”.128 The massive increase in the issues of government 
bonds made it impossible to continue with this traditional operation, and it eventually 
led to the liberalisation of the bonds market and the creation of government 
bonds-related financial products, like medium-term government bond funds and bond 
investment trusts in the 1980s.129  
Also in the 1980s, Japan came under increasing pressure from the US to 
liberalise exchange and capital controls. The US, which was suffering from current 
account and trade deficits, began to demand liberalisation and deregulation in several 
bilateral talks between the US and Japan in the 1980s. Although the Bretton Woods 
system had ended and the fixed exchange rate between the dollar and yen had been 
lifted by 1974, the US implemented a number of protectionist policies, including import 
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duties on Japanese light trucks under the Carter administration, because the trade 
imbalance between the US and Japan continued to grow throughout the 1970s and 
1980s.130 This trade imbalance with Japan seriously hurt the US’s prolonged current 
account deficit. Eventually, in 1987 the US piled up a record deficit of $ 160 billion, 
while at the same time Japan accumulated a surplus of over $ 96 billion.131 As Petifore 
argues, for the US to compensate for this deficit and maintain its seigniorage position in 
the international financial market, money had to be transferred from creditor countries 
(specifically Japan and West Germany) in various forms, including loans.132 However, 
each creditor country’s capital or exchange controls remained. For the US, these 
controls meant fundamental obstacles. Therefore, from the early 1980s the US with the 
UK, another indebted country, started a continuous campaign to lift capital and 
exchange controls internationally.133  
In its relationship with Japan, the US used ‘bilateral’ talks to lift capital and 
exchange controls in Japan. The US created a Japan-US Committee on the Yen and the 
Dollar at the end of 1983, in which the deregulation of capital and exchange controls 
was demanded by the US alongside the internationalisation of the yen.134 Moreover, 
bilateral negotiations took place between the US Treasury and the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) to ‘negotiate’ the devaluation of the yen against the dollar in 1984.135 
Then, the Reagan administration introduced a new set of Market-Oriented 
Sector-Specific (MOSS) talks in 1985.136 In the following Bush administration, MOSS 
talks were further developed and led to the Social Impediment Initiative (SII talk) in 
1989, and the US demanded over 200 reforms and deregulations in these SII talks.137  
Being affected by increasing fiscal deficits caused by massive bond issues in 
the latter half of the 1970s and by the strong pressure from the US government 
demanding liberalisation and deregulation, negative attitudes towards liberalisation and 
fiscal reforms in the public sector in Japan had changed by the early 1980s. So as to 
respond to the changing domestic and international environments, the Japanese 
government set up the Economic Reform Council to argue for liberalisation and 
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deregulation of the Japanese economic system for the first time under Prime Minister 
Suzuki Zenko in the early 1980s. 138  Their arguments were fully based on 
market-oriented reforms, and the following Nakasone administration issued the famous 
Maekawa report, which championed a number of liberalisations, deregulations and 
privatisations.139 Scholars and economists also started advocating the necessity to 
relocate unprofitable manufacturing industries overseas and stressed the importance of 
Japan’s shift from an export-oriented economy towards an expansion of domestic 
consumption. Thus, to expand domestic consumption “the structural impediments that 
had reinforced the savings bias and anti-consumption environment needed to be 
changed”.140 However, in Japan’s roll-back neoliberalisation, there was a struggle 
between domestic interest groups and international pressures. This resulted in only 
partial neoliberalisation, in which liberalization in the financial sector took place, but 
the post-war Japanese economic system was left intact. Next, it is necessary to see what 
the actual reforms were in greater detail. 
 
Reforms  
Liberalization in the Financial Sector 
Although the internationalization of the Japanese financial market through its 
liberalisation and deregulation policies started gradually after the end of Bretton Woods 
fixed exchange rate in 1974, most of the roll-back neoliberal financial reforms were 
implemented during the early 1980s. As a first step to the internationalisation of the 
Japanese financial market, a partial amendment to the Foreign Exchange and Control 
Law of 1947 in December 1980 ensured and facilitated the movement of foreign and 
domestic capital into and out of Japan in the form of Impact Loans and deposits in 
foreign currency.141 At the same time, “Japanese banks’ loans to non-residents and 
Japanese financial institutions’ investments in foreign securities were also 
deregulated”.142  
Further liberalisation and deregulation took place under the Nakasone 
administration in 1984, following the agreement of the Japan-US Committee on the Yen 
and the Dollar in the previous year. Three major regulations (the ‘real demand’ rule, the 
yen conversion limits, and regulations on foreign exchange dealing between banks), 
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which restricted and regulated the quantity of money flow and foreign exchange, were 
abolished.143 Moreover, as part of the process of securitisation the regulations on the 
issue of Euro-yen bonds in the Eurocurrency market by residents in Japan were also 
lifted in June 1984. After that, “the residents in Japan have been able to borrow the 
Euro-yen from abroad”.144 This international financial trade further expanded after the 
creation of the Japan Offshore Market at the end of 1986.145 As an example of this 
expansion, direct foreign investments in Japan increased from $299 million in 1980 to 
$2.6 billion in 1988.146  
In the meantime, the Japanese domestic financial market was stimulated by the 
creation of new money and security markets. First of all, various call markets, including 
call money markets, discount bill markets and call dollar markets were liberalized. For 
instance, by 1985 as the liberalization of the money market took place, rate regulations 
were abolished, and participants were expanded to city banks, security companies and 
foreign banks.147 Similar reforms and liberalizations were implemented in the bill 
discount market, and an amendment to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control 
Act expanded trade in the call dollar markets, in which the US dollar is dominantly 
traded.148 The open market was also extended by the creation of new markets and the 
deregulation of existing markets. All negotiating Certificates of Deposit markets opened 
in May 1979, and a series of deregulation reforms were implemented in the 1980s. The 
Treasury Bonds market was created in 1985 and trade in Commercial Papers began in 
1986. 149  Furthermore, alongside this deregulation and liberalization, bond price 
formation was deregulated, and soon the rate of government bonds was set at the same 
level as long-term interest rates.150 Eventually, new financially related products, like 
medium-term government bond funds, were created and under low interest rates banks 
were required to compete with these new products.151 Several new financial products, 
including certificates of deposits, maturity-designated deposits and money-market 
certificates were developed by banks. In this regard, banks became involved with 
unregulated markets in order to raise funds.152      
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Privatization  
Privatization played an important role in the roll-back phase of Japanese 
neoliberal administrative reforms. There were two main objectives for privatisation, 
namely to reduce the size and role of the government and to weaken the labour unions 
in the public sector.153 Under the Nakasone administration, “The state-run Nippon 
Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) and Japan National Railways (JNR) were returned to 
the private sector in 1985 and 1987 respectively”.154 The privatization of JNR had a 
significant impact on both objectives, because JNR had piled up over $2.1 billion in 
debts, and its labour union was the largest in Japan. NTT also had a monopoly in the 
communications sector.155 JNR and other public-sector unions were the bases of the 
General Council of Trade Union (Sohyo), which was one of the strong national 
left-wing labour organizations in the post-war period.156 The inevitable result of the 
privatisation of JNR was the ‘emasculation’ of the labour unions in the public sector.157 
In 1989 Sohyo merged with Domei (the Japanese Confederation of Labour), which was 
more closely aligned with the political centre.158 Moreover, by the early 1980s the 
membership of labour unions and their disputes had already decreased significantly. 
“The number of workers involved in such disputes fell from nearly 3 million in 1975 to 
less than 100,000 in 1989, while days lost to work fell from 8 million to 220,000 during 
the same period”.159  
To sum up, during the 1980s partial liberalisations and deregulations were 
implemented mainly in the financial sector, while the other sectors also experienced 
several changes, specifically labour relations. This indicates that Japan was less willing 
to carry out liberalisation at the time of roll-back neoliberalisation, compared to the 
roll-back neoliberalisation occurring in the US and UK, in which the whole society was 
changed to gain “benefits” from international financial markets. Japan still maintained 
three non neoliberal approaches to continue its steady economic growth, namely 
expansion of the construction industry, building the welfare state and shifting key 
industries to information-oriented technologies, although the second approach was less 
popular. This was the distinct characteristic of Japan’s roll-back neoliberalisation. 
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Neoliberalisation was not the most ideal way of acquiring benefits and reforming the 
economy system in the time of roll-back neoliberalisation in Japan, but because of 
strong international pressures, Japan liberalized and deregulated its financial sector, in 
which the US and the UK had strong interests.   
 
The Result of Roll-Back Neoliberalisation 
Japan became a part of the US Money Recycling system  
Japan’s roll-back neoliberal reforms influenced the nation both internationally 
and domestically. Internationally, first of all, as a result of the deregulation and 
liberalisation of international financial transactions Japan became involved more deeply 
in the US money recycling system. Used as a mechanism for recycling the petrol dollar 
in the early 1970s, the US constructed a money recycling system with its major trade 
partners (chiefly Japan and West Germany in the early 1980s). In the money recycling 
system, these countries loaned back trade surpluses by purchasing treasury bonds, 
securities and asset investments to compensate for the dual deficit of the US.160 In order 
to attract these countries’ investments, after the end of the 1970s US interest rates were 
kept higher than Japan’s and other countries’. 161 In 1984, Japan abolished the real 
demand doctrine. After this, the US attracted Japanese private finance, such as Japanese 
banks, insurance companies and securities companies as portfolio investments. Even 
after West Germany rejected the role of supporter, Japan’s financial institutions 
continued their investments in the US.162 The massive flow of ‘Japan money’ helped to 
compensate not only for the trade deficits but also for the fiscal deficits of the US 
government, which had been created by Reagan’s economic and political policies and 
symbolized by the stance of the strong US dollar and the arms race with the USSR.163  
However, the rapid appreciation of the yen against US dollar (from 240 yen per 
US dollar in 1985 to 150 yen in 1987) made it no longer safe to invest in the US.164 For 
instance, according to Murphy, “between 1985 and 1988, the top five Japanese 
insurance firms had lost more than $25 billion on their US investment”.165 Although 
some Japanese private portfolio investments changed direction from the US to Europe, 
specifically Luxemburg, Japan’s private financial sector, including Japanese insurance 
companies and banks, continued to invest in the US.166 These irrational investments by 
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the private financial sector were, according to Kikkawa, ‘forced’ by the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) to prevent a further devaluation of the US dollar. This is 
because most of Japan’s trade surplus with the US was paid with the US dollar and the 
further appreciation of yen not only hurt Japan’s exports, but also hurt invested Japanese 
assets in the US.167  
Instead of striving to internationalise its own currency, Japan chose to support 
US dollar and the US’s seigniorage position. This choice resulted in the further 
dollarization of Japan’s assets. Eventually, the only alternative for Japan was to maintain 
its own interests, such as its export industry and foreign investment in the US, by 
loaning dollars back to the U.S. as long as the two US deficits continued to grow. This is 
because the U.S. had been the most valuable export market for Japan (at the turn of the 
new millennium, China’s importance as a trade partner increased, however), and a large 
amount of Japan’s trade surplus had already been reinvested into the US as Treasury 
bonds, securities, and real estate.168 The US borrowed its own currency from Japan. 
The scale and significance of this situation were unprecedented in international finance. 
Gilpin describes:  
For the first time a debtor nation stands to benefit both on its capital account 
and on its trading account from devaluing its currency. With the devaluation 
of the dollar the United States would in effect expropriate and wipe out a 
substantial fraction of its debt, for instance the drop of the dollar between 
March 1985 and March 1986, in fact, may have reduced the debt by as 
much as one third. Simultaneously, the devaluation of the dollar would 
regain market that the United States had lost because of the greatly 
overvalued dollar. 169  
 
The Relocation of the Manufacturing Sector to Overseas Production 
Neoliberal financial reforms provided a path for the non-financial sector to 
operate its business overseas through foreign direct investments (FDI).170 These FDIs 
increased sharply in the latter half of the 1980s from just over $ 10 billion in 1984 to 
67.5 billion in 1989. 171 The rapid increase in FDIs in the manufacturing sector 
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encouraged the relocation of bases of production to the US and low-wage countries in 
Asia. This relocation undermined the position of domestic production. For instance, by 
1990 “the ratio of overseas production against domestic production (measured in sales) 
had grown to 6.4 per cent from 3.9 per cent in 1985”.172 Imports from foreign affiliates 
of Japanese manufacturing in both North America and Asia also increased by over 
$ 3000 million in one year from $ 4432 million in 1986 to $ 7538 million in 1987.173 
Moreover, faced with the high valued yen, the old leading industries, including steel, 
mining and shipbuilding downsized their production scale.174 Eventually over 2 million 
jobs in the production sector were lost during the 1980s.175       
 
The Creation of a Bubble Economy  
The series of neoliberal financial reforms caused friction with the post-war 
Japanese financial system and created an environment that led to the creation of a 
bubble economy in the late 1980s. In the Plaza Accord in 1985 Japan and West 
Germany agreed to keep their Official Discount Rate (ODR) lower than the US’s, and 
even after West Germany refused its cooperation in 1987 Japan made a further reduction 
of its ODR to 2.5 percent.176 This low rate was kept until May 1989. This low ODR 
coupled with the Bank of Japan’s intervention into the currency market to prevent 
further appreciation of the yen caused excess credit creation, and the excess money was 
absorbed by real estate and stock markets.177 This massive flow of liquidity into real 
estate and stock markets created a boom in both markets. 
The financial liberalization and deregulation also contributed to the bubble 
economy. This financial liberalisation and deregulation provided other opportunities for 
large corporations to raise funds through equity finance in both domestic and foreign 
capital markets, including issuing shares, convertible bonds and other securities.178 
While Japanese banks were expanding their business into foreign markets by acquiring 
bank deposits, domestically they had lost their traditional customers (large 
manufacturing corporations), and so they were required to find other customers.179 
Then, banks began to lend to medium and small firms, real estate agencies and 
construction companies, although their credit status was much lower than large 
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corporations.180 Once the boom started in real estate and on stock markets, not only 
financial companies, but also manufacturing companies engaged in speculative 
activities.181 Both large corporations and small and medium firms were involved in 
speculative activities. From the January 1985 to December 1989 “stocks rose 240 
percent and land prices 245 percent”.182 The market value of the garden surrounding 
the Imperial Palace in central Tokyo rose to be the equivalent of the total land value of 
the entire state of California.183            
However, during the bubble period not all of the money was used for 
speculative activities in stock and real estate markets. Between 1985 and 1989 over 2.5 
trillion US dollars were invested in new factories overseas and in Japan as well as 
buildings of the headquarters of leading corporations in the Tokyo business district.184 
The labour market also boomed, and the unemployment rate reached a record low of 2 
percent in March 1990.185 Strong demand in the labour market raised personal incomes 
and so, consumer expenditure increased significantly as well.186 “Hence nominal GDP, 
which consists of consumption, investment in plant and equipment, government 
spending, and net exports, was pushed up to a growth rate of 5.5 percent on average 
from 1986 to 1990, and factories operated at maximum capacity utilization”. 187 
Therefore, eventually the bubble economy worked as a buffer or mask for the 
limitations of the post-war Japanese economic system, which had been argued about 
since the latter half of the 1970s.  
 
4.3. Roll-out Neoliberalisation 
4.3.1. The Causes of and Reasons for the Reforms  
Although the actual implementation of roll-out neoliberal economic reforms 
started in the latter half of the 1990s, the origin of Japan’s roll-out neoliberal reforms 
can be traced back to the Economic Reform Council under Prime Minister Suzuki 
Zenko in the early 1980s.188 The council was set up to search for and provide a way to 
overcome a potential declining growth rate caused by the limitations of the Japanese 
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post-war economy system, which Japan faced by the end of 1970s. However, as noted 
above, implementing neoliberal reforms was merely one of the alternatives considered 
for reforming the post-war economy system. There were in fact three non neoliberal 
approaches. Although the Japanese government failed to reach consensus on any of the 
three approaches, by the mid 1980s the third model, the information society, was treated 
and argued as the best possible alternative for reforming the post-growth-oriented 
Japanese economic system.189 What this meant was that non neoliberal approaches 
existed alongside neoliberal approaches.  
However, the Japanese government’s attitude changed after the collapse of the 
bubble economy and the failure of its recovery policies. The collapse of the bubble 
economy occurred in early 1990, and Japan’s economy was hurt severely by it. A 
number of fiscal stimulus packages and policies were implemented soon after the 
collapse, but Japan did not fully recover from the aftermath of the bubble economy. 
Japan began to implement roll-out neoliberal reforms for the economy system from the 
latter half of 1990s. Thus, when Japan began roll-out neoliberal economic reforms, it 
was already in the middle of a prolonged recession, and neoliberal reforms were 
implemented as the ‘ultimate solution’ for the recession. The failure of the economic 
recovery policies was recognized by the elites as the ‘end’ of the Japanese post-war 
economic system. Moreover, the US’s economic recovery and boom from the mid 
1990s legitimized its neoliberal reforms. However, the bubble economy itself was not a 
sign that indicated the end of the post-war Japanese economy system.190 Rather, the 
bubble economy was the result of friction between the partial liberalization of the 
Japanese financial sector and the post-war Japanese economy system. Moreover, the 
collapse of the bubble economy and its aftermath were not actually caused by the 
limitations of the post-war Japanese economy system. Therefore, before observing what 
roll-out Japanese neoliberal reforms were, it is important to examine the causes and 
results of the collapse of the bubble economy. 
The Causes and Results of the Collapse of the Bubble Economy 
There are a number of important causes of the collapse of the bubble economy. 
First, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) increased the official discount rate (ODR) at the end of 
the 1980s and the Ministry of Finance implemented restrictive laws and regulations for 
land transactions to cool down the already overheated economy.191 Half a year later 
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from these implementations, banks suddenly stopped loans to companies in mid 
1989.192 In 1990, the Nikkei 225 index dropped more than 30 percent. Land prices also 
decreased significantly, for instance “some highly speculative plots of land in 
commercial districts saw their ‘market value’ drop by 80 percent or more”.193   
The significant drops in both stock and land prices hurt the Japanese financial 
system severely. Firstly, from 1992 banks were required to adhere to the equity capital 
regulation of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS capital regulations 
required banks to hold equity capital of at least 8 percent for international operations 
and 4 percent for domestic operations.194 Since in the BIS regulations the value of 
stocks held by banks was counted as a part of a bank’s equity capital and Japanese 
banks were trying to meet the regulations by issuing new stocks, the abrupt drop in 
stock value in 1990 caused a serious credit crunch in Japan. Therefore, after the collapse 
of the bubble economy Japanese banks began to reduce the size of their loans to meet 
the BIS regulations.195 In the mean time, the severe decrease in land prices and the 
collapse of the real estate market “brought about a crisis for the whole financial system” 
of Japan.196 In the Japanese financial system, real estate was often used as collateral for 
bank loans, and most bank loans were secured by real estate.197 Since almost all bank 
loans for small and medium-sized companies were secured by real estate, the 
plummeting land prices caused small and medium-sized companies to lose “their main 
source of collateral, substantially reducing their creditworthiness and loan access in the 
early 1990s”.198        
The impact of the credit crunch and loss in creditworthiness of small and 
medium-sized companies was significant and immediate, because nearly 70 percent of 
total employment was shared by these companies, and small and medium-sized 
companies were not profitable enough to provide “the luxury of lifetime employment 
and seniority pay”.199 These companies soon started to reduce bonuses and pay, and 
even started to reduce the number of their employees.200 Owners of small companies 
began to spend less and save more.201 Domestic demand also shrank, but production 
                                                                                                                                                  
Delayed Policy Actions and Some Explanations, in Ryoichi Mikitani and Adam S. Posen ed., Japan’s 
Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to U.S. Experience (Washington, DC, September 2000), p. 132. 
192 Werner 2003, p. 98. 
193 Werner 2003, p. 98. 
194 Shimizu, p. 71.  
195 Kikkawa 1998, pp. 105-110, Shimizu, p.71.  
196 Shimizu, p. 74. 
197 Shimizu, p. 73.   
198 Shimizu, p. 73.   
199 Werner 2003, p. 99.  
200 Werner 2003, p. 99. 
201 Werner 2003, p. 99. 
 75 
capacities increased through investment during the bubble period, so soon producers 
piled up unsold goods.202 Even the large firms had to start cost-cutting measures. 
Labour markets worsened further. In short, Japan was in a full-blown recession.203 The 
unemployment rate reached a post-war record, and an estimate showed that over five 
million jobs were lost in that period.204   
In dealing with the recession, in 1995 the Japanese government implemented a 
series of fiscal stimulus packages. A massive amount of money was injected into public 
construction (over $1.3 trillion).205 There was no serious concern over the massive 
spending on public construction, because since the latter half of the 1960s, fiscal 
stimulus packages through public construction had been a standard prescription for any 
economic recession in Japan. Moreover, in the SII talks Japan also accepted the 
expansion of public spending that the US demanded at the end of 1989 as a way of 
expanding domestic demands (approximately $3 trillion, initial demand from the US 
was $3.4 trillion).206  
However, the BoJ’s failed monetary policy neutralized the effect of the already 
less than effective Japanese government economic stimulus packages and actually 
worsened the recession. As a number of scholars agree, BoJ failed to implement 
adequate easy money policies.207 In the 1990s the Bank of Japan continuously lowered 
the official discount rate (ODR) ten times208 and by September 1993 the ODR was 
reduced to 1.75 percent from the original ODR at 6 percent in July 1991 to stimulate 
credit creation among private banks. Despite the practice, with the downturn of the 
stock and real estate markets, for private banks that were struggling to meet the BIS 
regulations, there was no chance to expand their loans. Thus, what the BoJ aimed 
through the lowering of the ODR was not achieved.209  
What was necessary and sufficient to do in order to recover from the recession 
was to create new purchasing power, because the creation of more purchasing power 
expands net transactions and makes the whole economic pie bigger.210 Since the only 
way to expand purchasing power is through credit creation of the banking system or the 
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central bank, the mandate for the Bank of Japan should have been to expand its credit 
creation to address Japan’s recession during the 1990s when private banks’ credit 
creation failed. If the BoJ had done so, the recession would have had a different result in 
that Japan’s economy could have recovered much earlier.211 However, the BoJ did not 
create any credit until 1998. Thus, without any further credit creation the 
implementation of the series of economic stimulus packages by the government could 
not stimulate the total economic pie, and only resulted in the reduction of the amount of 
purchasing power available in the private sector and the further worsening of the 
account balances of the government.212 Moreover, the BoJ’s actions caused further 
appreciation of the yen against the dollar, and the yen reached a record high against the 
dollar in 1995.       
Although the BoJ’s monetary policy should have been blamed as one of the 
main causes of the Japanese recession in the 1990s, the failure of the economic recovery 
policies was blamed on the fundamental limitations of Japanese economic system by 
not only scholars and economists, but also politicians, business people and 
bureaucrats.213 As represented by Krugman’s argument of liquidity trap,214 scholars 
and economists began to argue that the Japanese economic structure led to the low 
domestic demand and the recession, thus the only remaining solution to the recession 
was to introduce fundamental structural changes, including deregulation and the 
opening of markets. 215 
4.3.2. Reforms of Roll-out neoliberalisation in Japan   
In the Japanese Big-Bang, similar to the British Big-Bang financial reform in the 
1980s, earlier neoliberal financial liberalisation was deepened and extended; capital 
flow that went into and out of Japan was liberalised; different types of financial 
institutions were blurred; the financial sector was also opened to non-financial sectors; 
and a number of new markets for financial products were introduced. Alongside this 
financial liberalisation, the roles of regulatory ministries, including the Ministry of 
Finance and the Bank of Japan were also modified in a neoliberal manner. The strong 
and central role of the MoF in the post-war Japanese economic system was weakened, 
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and the Bank of Japan became independent from the MoF in 1998. Neoliberal reforms 
were also implemented in non-financial sectors; holding companies were legalised in 
1998; market value accounting was implemented in 2001; commercial law was 
amended and the American way of corporate governance was introduced; moreover, 
non-cash M&A (using securities and stocks to take over) was allowed in 2006. Other 
markets were also deregulated and liberalised. For instance, a number of laws related to 
the labour market were amended in a more liberal way. Liberalisation promoted more 
competition, and entrepreneurship was encouraged.  
Anti-competitive practices were targeted in a number of ways. “Public 
prosecutors [became] tough on corporate racketeers, construction dango (informal 
collusive agreements), and other practices that the war system had brought with it”.216 
By 1998, over one thousand legal cartels, which were granted exemptions from the 
Anti-Monopoly Law throughout the post-war ear, were deregulated and the number was 
reduced to almost zero.217 The Fair Trade Commission (FTC) was strengthened by a 
revision of the anti-monopoly laws in 1999 and 2000.218 Legal prosecutions by the Fair 
Trade Commission increased after 1990, and “the real value of fines in the case of 
unreasonable restraint of trade increased dramatically after 1990”.219 Alongside the 
reductions in the number of official cartels and the strengthening of the FTC, the 
revision of a number of special laws that were designed to create barriers against new 
entry into many industries took place. 220 Liberalisation in the telecommunications 
sector in 1993 resulted in a boom in the manufacture of mobile phones, which created 
more employment opportunities in the information services sector. 221 In 1996, the 
Electric Enterprise Law was liberalised, and the petrol retailing law was also 
liberalised.222 The large-scale retail law, which previously ensured small retailers’ 
benefits, was revised in 1999.223 After the revision of the Large-scale Retail Law, 
consumer-oriented large shops brought discounting activities into the Japanese retail 
market.224 
The strong yen caused a further relocation of Japanese manufacturing bases of 
production into neighbouring Asian countries, including China and Southeast Asia 
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during the 1990s.225 Coupled with the strong yen the increase in overseas production 
for Japanese manufacturers (for instance in the fiscal year of 1995, Japan produced 
more abroad than it exported from its shores) led to a rise in imports.226 Although a 
large number of these imports consisted of re-imports from Japanese factories overseas, 
imports from European countries and North America also increased.227 The percentage 
of manufactured goods among the imports to Japan soared from 26 percent in 1980 to 
64 percent in 2000, which was a “figure rapidly approaching the levels seen in Germany 
or the United States”.228 
Most roll-out neoliberal reforms were introduced by the Hashimoto 
administration between 1997 and 1999 and by the Koizumi administration from 2001 to 
2006. Hashimoto reformed the organization of the Postal Services. Previously, the 
Postal Service, which incorporated postal savings and postal life insurance, had been 
under the control of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, but after 2003, these 
postal services were managed by a public agency, Japan Post.229 However, private 
banks kept insisting that postal savings and insurances were squeezing opportunities of 
profit from the private financial sector.230 In terms of the postal service, the carrier 
industry, especially Yamato Unyu, that is the largest home delivery service in Japan, 
criticised the fact that the Postal Service was squeezing opportunities from private 
interests.231       
Once Koizumi Junichiro, who was a strong advocate for postal privatisation, 
became Prime Minister on 26th of April 2001, the privatisation of Japan Post became the 
central part of his ‘structural reforms with no sacred cows’, which included the 
privatisation of Japan Highway.232 As Koizumi’s slogan of kan kara min he (from 
bureaucrats to the private sector) showed, his reform plans for Japan Highway and 
Japan Post were wholesale changes from the public sector to the private. For instance, 
although eventually the structural reform of Japan Highway was settled through partial 
privatisation to repay its piled up debts (over 40 trillion yen), the original plan for the 
reform of Japan Highway was to sell off all its assets, including roads and service areas 
to the private sector by issuing equities.233 In contrast, the postal reform eventually 
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resulted in the full privatisation of Japan Post. From October 2007 Japan Post was 
reorganised into a holding company with four joint-stock companies; banking, life 
insurance, mail delivery and post office management.234 Among the four joint-stock 
companies, postal banking and insurance companies will be subjected to private sector 
control until 2017, and the process will be completed through selling their shares by 
2017.235   
4.3.3. How the Post-War Japanese Economic System Changed: The 
Emergence of the Japanese Neoliberal Economy and Its Performance  
This section evaluates how the five distinctive features of the post-war Japanese 
economic system were transformed as a result of the roll-out neoliberal reforms. 
 
The Financial System: the financial system was organized around the main banks in 
the post-war Japanese Economic System 
Big-Bang                                                                             
 As one of the key Big-Bang financial reforms, the revision of the Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law took effect on April 1, 1998. Previously only 
licensed foreign exchange banks could deal in foreign currencies, but now foreign 
exchange transactions were open to anybody. There was no restriction on capital flow 
that went into and out of Japan.236 Cross-border securities transactions and foreign 
deposits were also liberalised, and now “the range of investment and borrowing 
opportunities open to both companies and individuals increased dramatically”.237 Stock 
broking commissions were liberalized, the distinctions between different types of 
financial institutions were blurred, and the financial sector was opened to players from 
overseas as well as other institutions inside Japan (such as retailer Ito-Yokado, Sony, 
and foreign banks, especially from the US).238 The Securities market was expanded by 
the legalisation of asset backed securities (ABS) and special purpose companies 
(SPCs). 239  Now more and more assets, including not only financial assets, like 
mortgages, but also non-financial assets (land, building and even patents) could be sold 
as securities on the market. The ban on derivative transactions (previously regarded as 
gambling) was also lifted.240 Derivative transactions provided another way of risk 
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hedging for intermediaries and of business risk hedging and “risk/return spectrum of 
choice” for investors.241 This financial liberalisation, eventually, brought about severe 
competition between global financial and non-financial companies and institutions 
within the Japanese domestic market, and all financial and non-financial, foreign and 
domestic companies diversified their financial business activities, including foreign 
exchange business, securities related activities, bonds and commercial paper 
businesses.242 
 
Regulatory Reform in the Financial Sector  
The highlights of the Big Bang governmental regulatory reform were the end of 
the post-war ‘convoy’ system, and the loss of power of the MoF in the financial sector. 
By 1998, the MoF lost its two power bases, namely the licensing system, and the 
supervision over the banking system.243 These tasks were handed over to the newly 
created Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA), and the MoF’s banking bureau and 
security bureau were dismantled.244 Two pivotal banks of the post-war financial system, 
Japan Long-Term Credit Bank and Japan Credit Bank were closed.245 More importantly 
the Bank of Japan became fully independent from the Ministry of Finance in terms of its 
monetary polices.246 For the first time in the post war era the Bank of Japan Law was 
revised in June 1997 and the new law became effective in April 1998.247         
Neoliberal financial liberalisation and deregulation restructured the post-war 
Japanese financial system completely. The window guidance (madoguchi shido), the 
central feature of credit control and allocation was abolished abruptly in July 1991, 
shortly after the collapse of the bubble economy.248 Moreover, through neoliberal 
deregulation and administrative reforms, the Ministry of Finance lost its power over 
bank supervision. Therefore, the MoF’s post-war ‘convoy system’, which was 
characterised by allowing no banks to fail and keeping up heavy barriers to entry into 
corporate finance, was seriously damaged. As mentioned before, two long-term-credit 
banks went bankrupt and were bought by private companies (Long-Term Credit Bank of 
Japan was taken over by the Ripplewood Holdings Co. of the US and Japan Credit Bank 
was taken over by the Softbank group in Japan). Although there was only one case (the 
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Hokkaido Takushoku Bank) of a major bank going bankrupt after the Big Bang 
financial reform, a number of smaller banks, including local banks, mutual savings, loan 
banks and credit associations went bankrupt or merged under the ‘market oriented’ 
stance of the newly created Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA).249 The deterioration 
of the convoy system also promoted mergers of the big banks.250 In the convoy system, 
banks were based on keiretsu industrial groups, but after the Big Bang reform, mergers 
of these banks took place beyond their keiretsu relationship.251 Today there are three 
‘mega’ banks (Mitsubishi-UFJ financial group, Mizuho financial group, and 
Mitsui-Sumitomo group) in Japan, and their total assets are now over 100 trillion yen 
which is “more than 50 percent of the total assets of all banks in Japan”.252         
In addition, the amendments to both the Foreign Exchange and the Foreign 
Trade Control Law and the deregulation and liberalisation of the entry into different 
financial services made the banks’ hierarchies meaningless. So, Japan’s financial system 
shifted from one which was bank-oriented to one which was equity oriented. The entry 
of foreign financial companies brought about not only high competition in the Japanese 
financial market, but also led to takeovers of Japanese financial companies.253 In 
addition to the example of Japan long-term credit bank mentioned above, “Merrill 
Lynch took over the bankrupt Yamaichi Securities, and the Travelers Group bought a 
quarter of Nikko Securities”.254 The liberalisation of stock-broking commissions and 
entry between different types of finance allowed non-bank businesses (like retailers and 
manufacturing companies) to engage in banking, and the number of non-bank entries 
has been increasing ever since.255 The mega Banks began to engage in all three fields 
of banking (investment, retail, and regional banking), and it made their traditional 
differences in the convoy system blur.256 Moreover, although large corporations already 
had changed the way they raised funds from bank loans to equity finance in the late 
1980s, after the Big Bang restructuring of restructuring the financial system, more and 
more small and medium size companies were also required to raise funds on the equity 
market through securities. This is because the main banks became more careful about 
providing new loans to small and medium size companies. Therefore, banks began to 
select companies and make the criteria for providing loans stricter than before.257       
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The Influence of Shareholders: influences of shareholders on corporate decisions 
were weak  
Reforms in Corporate Governance   
US-style corporate governance, including the US-style system of a board of 
directors and stock options, was introduced by the 2002 revision of the Commercial 
Code and Related laws.258 Despite strong pressures from foreign investors and the 
Corporate Governance Forum of Japan, only a few companies such as Sony have 
implemented a US-style board of directors (only 97 listed companies among the over 
3800 listed companies by 2004).259 Most of the leading companies only reduced the 
number of directors to speed up their decision making.260 In 1997 when the stock 
option was legalized, only a few companies, like Toyota, introduced it, but in 2006, the 
number of companies that introduced the stock option skyrocketed to 1574 companies, 
about 41% of listed companies on the major stock markets in Japan.261    
Through neoliberal reforms, the influence of shareholders was strengthened 
considerably. There are two important reasons for the strengthening of shareholders’ 
influences. Firstly, there was an increase in the number of foreign shareholders, and 
these shareholders brought their shareholder-oriented corporate culture to Japan. During 
the 1990s, the percentage of foreign ownership of Japanese shares tripled from 4.2 per 
cent in 1990 to 13.2 per cent in 2000. 262 The main reason for the increase in foreign 
investors in Japan was because neoliberal financial reforms opened up the Japanese 
financial market to foreign investors.263 Liberalisation of foreign exchange lifted the 
restrictions on capital flow into Japan, and deregulation of stock broking commissions 
enabled foreign investors – especially institutional investors, including not only foreign 
banks and securities companies, but also various fund companies, like pension funds 
and hedge funds – to buy Japanese shares.264 Moreover, Japanese financial companies 
and institutions sold their holding shares to meet the BIS regulations because they had 
been suffering from non-performing loans in the downturn of the stock and real estate 
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markets.265 Japanese banks also sold their shares to compensate for non-performing 
loans and in order to meet the BIS regulations, and since Japanese insurance companies 
were the major holders of bank shares, banks’ losses directly reflected their 
profitability.266 The implementation of market value accounting worsened their asset 
condition and accelerated a further selling-off of shares held by financial companies and 
institutions.267 Eventually, while foreign ownership of shares was increasing, “the 
percentage of shares in listed companies held by Japanese financial institutions (mainly 
banks) decreased from 45.2 percent in 1990 to 37 percent in 2000, whereas the 
percentage held by business companies decreased from 25.2 to 22.3 percent of list 
shares”.268  
The influence of foreign shareholders is shown in two ways. First, except for 
1998, during the 1990s foreign investors were the net buyers of stock, and “foreigners 
had an inordinate influence on share prices because they were much more active in 
buying and selling shares than Japanese investors, and Japanese investors often 
followed their moves in and out of stocks”.269 The percentage of foreign ownership 
reached over 20 percent among listed companies on the Tokyo stock exchange. Over 50 
percent of daily transactions on the Tokyo stock exchange was also carried out by 
foreign investors.270 The excessive influence of foreign investors ‘dominated’ the stock 
market, and Japanese investors often followed the trends created by foreign investors.271 
Second, foreign investors also used their influence as share holders. Japanese managers 
had to be more and more careful about foreign investors’ requirements, especially 
higher dividends. Consequently, traditional low dividends for Japanese shares have 
increased from 5 percent to over 10 percent in recent years.272 
Secondly the influence of shareholders can also be seen on the pattern of 
corporations’ fundraising and mergers and acquisitions. From the beginning of the 
1980s, companies, especially large corporations, shifted their fundraising processes 
from traditional indirect finance, notably banks’ loans, to direct finance like 
“equity-linked finance such as convertible bonds and bonds with warrants” in 
international and domestic financial markets.273 Although equity-linked finance had 
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slowed down in the 1990s, companies continued other forms of finance, which were 
linked to the capital markets, including commercial papers, so the price of their shares 
still played a main role in their fundraising processes.274 Moreover, takeovers through 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) became a strong concern for Japanese managers. 
“Although hostile takeovers were still rare, there was nevertheless a concern that 
Japanese firms would soon find themselves on the receiving end of hostile bid”. 275 The 
number of M&As increased rapidly, climbing from only 219 in 1986 to 1366 in 1999. In 
2005 Japanese corporations were involved in 2308 M&As.276 Furthermore, non-cash 
M&As, including exchange shares, were allowed from 2007; thereafter, a great fear of 
foreign takeovers through non-cash M&As was created because the price of Japanese 
corporations’ stock was relatively low, compared to the US and other countries’ 
markets.277    
  
Business Culture: exclusive business culture and tripartite (business, politician and 
bureaucrats) cooperation in the economy  
During the 1990s, the keiretsu system that was created through cross 
shareholding was dissolved rapidly and to a significant extent. “According to one survey, 
cross-shareholding ratios of all 2,472 listed firms in Japan fell from about 17 percent in 
the first half of the 1990s to 10.5 percent in 2000”.278 This is partly because Japanese 
banks dissolved their cross shareholdings by selling shares to compensate for 
non-performing loans to meet the BIS regulations as mentioned earlier.279 Eventually, 
Japanese banks no longer played the role as the ultimate guarantor for the members of 
the keiretsu companies by providing “unlimited amounts of cheap capital” as their main 
bank.280 In the mean time, Japanese corporations began to rely on financial markets to 
raise funds rather than relying on traditional bank loans.    
There is another factor that affected the dissolution of the keiretsu system. 
Although during the 1980s the keiretsu system had been regarded as one of the strong 
institutional bases of long-term cooperation and international competitiveness, the 
long-term relationship between firms provided by the keiretsu system became 
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problematic when it came to global competition.281 During the latter half of the 1980s 
Japanese manufactures faced the endaka (strong yen) 282, and they “suffered from a 
sharp decline in their average profitability over this period”.283 The endaka accelerated 
the shifting of many manufacturing bases into Asia, and thus the keiretsu long-term 
relationships with these corporations dissolved rapidly. Specifically, among the keiretsu 
companies small and medium suppliers of the larger multinationals were affected 
negatively by the shift, in that these firms’ share of contracted out work  decreased 
significantly from 55 percent in 1986 to 37 percent in 1996, because Japanese 
multinationals hired more local (overseas) suppliers.284     
Domestically, the dissolution of the keiretsu system worked to recreate a 
relationship between the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and their suppliers 
in order to cut costs. According to Kwon, “the portion of subcontracting firms declined 
from 65.5 percent in 1981 to 51.6 percent in 1996 and 47.9 percent in 1998”. 
Subcontractors’ dependence on a main customer also dropped rapidly in the same period, 
and the ratio declined from 71 percent to 53 percent between 1987 and 1996.285 
Moreover, OEMs began to rely on suppliers beyond the traditional keiretsu, and this 
trend can be seen in the Japanese automobile industry today. For instance, Nissan and 
Mitubishi use Toyota and Honda suppliers.286  
According to Kwon, the dissolution of the traditional keiretsu system, 
“illustrates neither convergence toward the neoclassical market of spot transactions nor 
the persistence of traditional keiretsu-centred transactions”. 287  Although Japanese 
OEMs in general have begun to select their suppliers more and more on the open market, 
they have also maintained a close and tight relationship with some of the selected direct 
suppliers. For instance, car manufacturers Nissan and Mitsubishi are in the process of 
trying to build more open-market relations with their suppliers, while Toyota is focusing 
on “tightening keiretsu governance with a few suppliers”.288 Thus, Japanese inter-firm 
relationships are in a transitional phase from strong keiretsu system to a new model, 
which incorporates a hybridisation of keiretsu relationships and the open market.      
The strong influence of the MITI in the manufacturing industry was also 
reduced significantly by the series of neoliberal reforms. During the post-war period the 
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MITI enjoyed a wide authority which allowed it to intervene in business activities 
directly and indirectly289 Directly, the MITI had the autonomy to control business 
activities through “import quotas and managing foreign capital flows during the 
high-growth era”.290 Indirectly, the MITI could control corporations by giving them 
subsidies and administrative guidance.291 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, each industry 
was protected by official cartels and special laws, and these cartels allowed the MITI to 
practice these direct and indirect policies.292  
The strong influence of the MITI declined in the process of neoliberal reforms. 
Firstly, financial liberalisation deprived the MITI of the authority to manage foreign 
capital flows. This financial liberalisation coupled with the endaka (high valued yen) 
caused Japanese manufacturers to accelerate their plans to shift their production bases to 
Asian countries.293 Secondly, the imports of manufactured goods, which had been 
lowered by the regulations of the MITI, more than doubled from “a low 26 percent in 
1980 to 64 percent in 2000”.294 With the increase in foreign direct investment into 
Japan, the number of foreign companies increased in Japan, and since the main target of 
the MITI’s policies had been Japanese companies, the increase in the number of foreign 
companies in Japan “reduced the strength of these policy instruments”.295 Moreover, 
the “MITI’s ability to coordinate industry behaviour” deteriorated through a decrease in 
the number of official cartels (decreased from 1,079 in 1966 to zero in 1998), by the 
abolishing of a special regulated law and by the strengthening of the Japanese Fair 
Trade Commission. 296  Furthermore, “as part of a wider reform of government 
departments the MITI was reorganised in 2001 into the new Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI)”.297 
 
Its Employment Practice: specifically the lifetime-employment, the seniority wage, 
and in-house labour unions, which are typically observed in large organizations  
Labour Market Reforms 
The liberalisation and deregulation of the labour market accelerated during this 
period through legislative action. There were three major laws guaranteeing the recent 
newly emerged flexible labour market, namely the Workers Dispatched Law, the 
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Employment Security Law and the Labour Standards Law. A series of amendments to 
the Workers Dispatched Law in 1999, 2000 and 2004 opened the path for firms to 
employ temporary and non-regular workers for professional and manufacturing jobs 
(from 2004 amendment).298 The revision of the 2000 Workers Dispatched Law allowed 
firms to establish a ‘Temp to Perm Service (shokai yotei haken)’, so that firms could 
select their employees before fully employing them.299 The new Employment Security 
Law of 1999 deregulated the operation of fee-charging and free employment placement 
agencies to a large extent, but “now, running these employment placement agencies is 
opened up as side business to a food and drink service establishment, an inn, a loan 
company or a second business”.300 Finally, the Labour Standards Law of 2003 revised 
its ceiling for the employment period for dispatched and temporary workers from a 
maximum of one year to a maximum of three years (a maximum of 5 years for 
specialized knowledge, skills and experienced workers).301 
The liberalisation and deregulation of the labour market allowed corporations to 
implement the cost cutting measures of employing more part-time and dispatched 
temporary workers. 302  During the recession Japanese companies, especially 
manufacturing companies and financial companies, struggled to improve their Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) by lowering their Break Even Point. 303  The Japanese 
manufacturing sector, which was suffering from the high yen, faced severe difficulties 
in global competition up to 2002 when the Japanese economy began to show a slow but 
steady recovery from the prolonged recession.304 Their main solution was to cut labour 
costs by shifting their factories overseas, which meant laying off workers, and 
outsourcing and employing more part-timers and dispatched temporary workers.305 
However, there was no strong social or labour movement from employees, because 
labour unions were already weakened by the roll-back reforms of the 1980s. According 
to Ito, during the last fifteen years Japan’s total break-even point declined by 81 trillion 
yen from 332 trillion yen in 1992 to 251 trillion yen in 2004.306 Moreover, the excess 
work force from the high TFP sectors was absorbed by the low TFP sectors, specifically 
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the service industry, which were liberalised in the process of neoliberal reforms, 
including retailers, and transportation (including the taxi industry).307   
Eventually, lifetime employment was severely affected by the liberalisation of 
the labour market, and corporations’ cost cutting measures led to “more unstable and 
atypical or non-regular employment”.308 In 1990, non-regular employees constituted 
20.2 percent of the Japanese work force, but the percentage of non-regular employees 
increased at a rapid pace and reached 31.5 percent (over 15 million people) in 2004.309 
Moreover, the seniority wage was also undermined during the 1990s. By the latter half 
of the 1980s the seniority wage system had become already problematic to maintain, 
because in the rapidly aging society the number of young workers had decreased 
significantly.310 Thus, with the collapse of the bubble economy and the following 
recession, in order to boost their productivity, more and more companies now “have 
switched from the lockstep seniority system to merit-base pay that could have large 
rewards for creative individuals”, and they have also introduced a flexible year-round 
hiring.311       
 
The Taxation System: income and corporate tax were the main sources, and a strong 
central government allocated and distributed the tax revenues 
Tax Reform  
Neoliberal taxation reform was implemented in Japan in the same way as in the 
US. Firstly, corporate tax was reduced from 43.3 percent in 1985 to 30 percent in 2006, 
and industry continues to demand that the Japanese government reduce the rate even 
further.312 Secondly, income tax was reduced four times (in 1987, 1988, 1995 and 
1999), and the rate of maximum income tax was lowered from 75 percent in 1983 to 37 
percent in 1999.313 Consumer tax was introduced under the Takeshita administration in 
April 1989, and the rate was increased from 3 percent to 5 percent under the Hashimoto 
administration in 1997.314 From these tax reforms, revenue from income and corporate 
tax decreased from 44.4 trillion yen in 1990 to 23.3 trillion yen in 2004, and in the same 
period, tax revenue from consumer tax more than doubled from 4.6 trillion yen to 9.6 
trillion yen.315   
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Contrary to the other distinctive features of the post-war Japanese economic 
system, which were changed significantly by neoliberalisation, taxation did not change 
to a large extent. Specifically, the distribution and reallocation of tax revenue did not 
fundamentally change, although the taxation system was reformed in a neoliberal way 
by lowering the maximum income tax rate and the corporate tax rate in general.316 
Distribution was still based on regions rather than social classes, and the dependence of 
local government on the central government remained strong.317 The distribution of 
revenue through public construction also still dominated the allocation of tax 
revenue.318  
During this period, government debts (including central and local 
governments) kept growing and had already reached 130 percent of GDP in the early 
2000s, which was “over twice what it was in 1992 and the highest in the industrialized 
world”.319 Debts were accumulated by ineffective public stimulus packages during the 
1990s and an historical scale of government intervention into the foreign exchange 
market to prevent further appreciation of the yen against the US dollar in early 2000.320 
A rapidly ageing society also led to an expansion of social services, and this became the 
central issue for government fiscal reforms.321  
However, these neoliberal fiscal reforms did not provide a fundamental 
solution for these problems. Firstly, government revenue decreased because of a series 
of reductions in the income and corporate tax rates, while the implementation of 
consumer tax compensated for only a small portion of the amount of reduced corporate 
and income tax. For instance, in 2004 national tax revenue declined by over 20 trillion 
yen through the reduction of corporate and income tax, while revenue from consumer 
tax increased 4 trillion yen. 322 Moreover, in the rapid aging society government 
spending on social service has been increasing, and Japanese government is required to 
find new sources of tax revenue, such as another increase in consumer tax.323 
Secondly, surprisingly, the scale of Japanese bureaucracy, in terms of the 
number and costs of personnel, was and still is much smaller than those in other 
developed countries. 324 The number of civil servants (including central and local 
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governments’ officers and workers in special corporations) per 1000 people in Japan 
was 38 people compared to 79 of the US and 97 in France in the end of 2003.325 In 
terms of GDP in 1997, “only 7 percent of Japan’s total employment was in the public 
sector, compared with 31.8 percent in France, 17.1 percent in Germany, 14.4 percent in 
the USA and (in 1993) 19.5 percent in the UK”.326 Thus, in today’s society a further 
reduction in the number of personnel involved in bureaucracy might result in the 
deterioration of the public sector service rather than the improvement of the fiscal 
deficit. Thirdly, the proposed privatisation of postal savings will worsen the situation of 
the government’s fiscal deficit, because postal savings have been used to maintain the 
price of government bonds. Among these government bonds, 569.9 trillion yen in total, 
postal savings and insurance constituted over 130 trillion yen (84.5 trillion yen by postal 
savings and 52.3 trillion yen by postal insurance).327 Therefore, as Noguchi argues, if 
privatised postal savings and insurance refuse to support government funding, it will 
cause a crash in the price of government bonds, which will mean government 
bankruptcy and a further deterioration of the Japanese economy.328  
4.3.4. Results of the Roll-Out Neoliberalisation 
Although the Japanese economy recovered from the prolonged recession in 2002, 
a series of radical financial reforms since the Japanese Big Bang aimed to put the 
financial system under a market mechanism to make it more stable and efficient. 
However, these neoliberal reforms made the Japanese financial system in fact more 
fragile and unstable. Through further integration in the global financial markets, Japan 
became easily affected by other countries’ financial market results, especially the US 
and Asian. Soon after the Big Bang reform, an Asian financial crisis during the summer 
of 1997 triggered an unprecedented financial crisis in Japan.329 Once Japan’s financial 
crisis became obvious, Japan was targeted by hedge funds and other institutions for their 
speculative activities.330 “In October, net selling of Japanese stocks by foreigners 
amounted to 591.4 billion and ballooned to 754.4 billion in November”.331 Since 
foreign investors dominated the Japanese stock market, stock prices dropped abruptly 
and banks were severely hurt by the drop, because they were required to meet the BIS 
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regulations while resolving NPL problems.332 In late November 1997, in international 
inter-bank lending the Japan premium reached 1 percent and “the US and European 
banks also gradually reduced their credit lines to Japanese banks”.333 Thereafter, 
Japanese banks “faced difficulties in procuring funds in international markets”.334   
 
Inconsistency between the Neoliberal Assertions and Actual Events 
Roll-out neoliberal financial reforms made the Japanese financial system more 
fragile, and coupled with international regulations, like the BIS regulations, Japanese 
banks, financial companies and institutions faced a number of problems. To deal with 
the problematic Japanese banks, the Japanese government was hesitant about the 
injection of public funds, because the US had been demanding that Japan apply a 
‘market oriented’ solution to the problem, such as “the liquidation of insolvent banks 
and the expeditious downsizing and restructuring of viable banks”.335 Even when the 
spread of the Asian financial crisis to Japan in 1997 worsened Japan’s domestic 
financial problems up to September in 1998, the US continued to demand that Japan 
resolve its crisis in a market oriented way.336 However, once the crisis spread to Russia, 
Brazil and other Latin American countries and finally to Wall Street, the US’s stance on 
Japan’s solution changed dramatically, allowing what the US initially prevented Japan 
from doing, and that is, using a ‘visible hand’ as a solution. This is partly because the 
US recognized that the collapse of the Japanese financial system would cause a 
“meltdown of Wall Street and the global economy”.337 Another reason for the change in 
the US’s stance is that to solve the problem of ailing Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM),338 the US Federal Reserve organized a cartel-like bailout for the LTCM “by 
leaning on Wall Street and international banks to contribute funds so that it could roll 
over its liabilities”.339 It was what the US and the IMF did not want Japan and other 
Asian countries to do in order to solve their crisis, which they described as ‘Asian 
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Cronyism’.340 Therefore, in the end, the Japanese financial crisis was ironically settled 
by the ‘visible hand’ of the Japanese government.  
In October 1998 under the Obuchi administration the Japanese Diet passed two 
pieces of legislation to construct a mechanism that would inject public funds into ailing 
banks and to help the nationalisation of failed banks.341 The Financial Reconstruction 
Commission (FRC) founded in June 1998 was assigned the task under the Financial 
Supervisory Agency (FSA).342 Eventually, “by 1 April 1999, 7.5 trillion yen in new 
capital had been injected into all but one of the top 15 banks and all the important 
regional banks”.343 The injection of public funds settled the financial crisis, and it also 
worked to dissolve the Japan premium in inter bank lending at least temporarily 
between October 1998 and April 1999.344      
Although the injection of public funds and the mechanism used to nationalize 
failed banks eased Japan’s financial problems temporarily, under asset deflation and 
unusually low interest rates, the implementation of further neoliberal reforms, including 
market value accounting, caused a further deterioration of the Japanese financial 
system.345 After the turn of the millennium, Japanese companies and banks dissolved 
cross shareholding and kept selling these shares to prevent latent capital loss.346 The net 
sales of shares were over 2 trillion yen both in 2000 and 2001, thus, coupled with hedge 
funds’ and other institutions’ speculation, mainly shorting operations, the Nikkei 225 
index dropped.347 The downturn of the stock market continued. Although the Japanese 
economy started to recover in early 2002, the Nikkei 225 index reached 7600 yen, 
which was the lowest price post-bubble, in April 2003.348 It was under the mark of 
8400 yen, where all insurance companies, except Nihon Insurance, experienced a latent 
loss in their stock investment. Moreover, it was close to the borderline where large 
banks could not maintain 8 percent of capital requirement according the BIS 
regulations.349 Although Japanese stock prices improved from April 2003 and the 
Nikkei 225 index reached over 11000 yen, the domination of foreign institutional 
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investors continued, and as a result Japanese stock markets remain fundamentally 
unstable.350      
 
Results of adopting Neoliberalisation: increase of Governmental Intervention 
In the mean time, the Japanese government intervened in the currency market to 
prevent the appreciation of the yen on an historic scale.351 Previously the largest 
amount of money used in the intervention was 7.9 trillion yen in 1999, but this time the 
total amount of money used in the interventions in both 2003 and 2004 by buying US 
treasury bonds was 25.3 trillion yen, and the intervention sustained 40 percent of the 
current account deficit of the US. 352  Despite the historical amount of currency 
intervention, the yen rose against the dollar from 120 yen per dollar in February 2003 to 
107 yen at the end of 2003.353 Japan’s current account surplus with the US in the same 
period was 10.5 trillion yen, and it is possible to say that Japan spent more than double 
that amount on its currency interventions to achieve the surplus.354 Moreover, as a part 
of the easy money policy, the Japanese government used excessive credit creation as 
intervention until 2006. Therefore, the outstanding balance of the BoJ’s current-account 
deposits was kept at over 30 trillion yen.355 However, the massive amount of yen 
capital was not used by Japanese banks for credit creation, because they kept their 
lending tight to meet the BIS regulations and to solve the NPLs.356 Under the zero 
interest rate policy, this abundant yen capital was used by hedge funds and other 
financial institutions (mainly from the US) to carry-out so-called global carry trade, in 
which they borrowed yen funds at almost no-interest to gain profits by investing in the 
US and other countries.357    
4.4. Summary 
To sum up, the most distinctive features of the post-war Japanese economic 
system changed or were largely altered. The central features of the post-war Japanese 
financial system, namely the credit control and convoy system disappeared. Corporate 
finance shifted from bank loans to equity finance, and the role of the Ministry of 
Finance was undermined significantly. Through neoliberal financial reforms, the power 
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of shareholders was strengthened and the importance of equity finance increased 
dramatically. Although the keiretsu business group was still the central feature of 
Japanese corporate relationships, their relationship changed and began to show new 
features. Industrial regulatory ministries, such as the MITI and the JFTC, also changed 
their role from guarantor of a closed market to the guardians of neoliberal rules. In 
terms of employment practices, the lifetime-employment and seniority wages had 
already become an historical phenomenon of the Japanese economic system. Moreover, 
the neoliberal tax reforms caused a decline in tax revenue, and the privatization of 
postal savings and insurance led to the question of who will support the heavily 
indebted central government. That was another problem. Roll-out neoliberal financial 
reforms, which were supposed to make the financial system more stable and efficient, 
made the Japanese financial system in fact more fragile and unstable. Through further 
integration in the global financial markets, Japan became easily affected by other 
countries’ financial market results, especially those of the US’s and its Asian 
neighbours.  
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Chapter 5: Case Study of Japan: the relationship between 
neoliberalism and nationalism 
In this chapter I discuss the role of political parties as intermediaries in Japan 
and the changes to this system during the period of neoliberalisation. Then I discuss the 
social changes brought about by neoliberalisation and the different ways, in which 
nationalism has (or has not) been employed by political parties in response to these 
changes.  
 
5.1. Political Parties as Intermediate group 
Gourevitch explains how different interests among the societal actors can be 
presented for the political and economic policies and regulations with his concept of 
parties as intermediate groups. According to Gourevitch’s “intermediate associations 
explanation”, the different interests among the societal actors are often presented 
through intermediate associations, specifically political parties in order to reflect their 
interests in political and economic policies and regulations. 1 In other wards, the 
political system that politicians and political parties follow is crucial for the societal 
actors. Therefore, it is important here to observe the Japanese political system, because 
it can be clearly seen how different interests among the societal actors can be presented 
before and after the transnationalized societal actors appeared. 
5.1.1. The 1955 System: the mechanism of reallocation of benefit 
The merger between Hatoyama’s Democrats and Yoshida’s Liberals in 
November 1955 strengthened conservative rule, and the Liberal Democratic Party (jiyu 
minshu tou the LDP) was created.2 With the creation of the LDP, Japanese politics was 
transformed “from the unstable multi-party system of the early post-war year into a 
quasi two party system”. This is called the 1955 system.3 While the LDP enjoyed its 
dominant position in the government, opposition parties were fragmented (the Socialist 
Party again split in 1959, and a new party, the Komeito (backed by a religious group, 
Soka Gakai) emerged in 1964).4  
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In the 1955 system politics was subordinate to economic growth, and politics 
existed merely to represent the interests of various sector groups including agriculture 
and construction, to distribute the gains from economic growth.5 The LDP consisted of 
various groups of delegates, who represented interests of specific sectors and ministries. 
These delegates were ‘policy tribes known as zoku.6 Zoku Diet members belonged to a 
specific division (bukai) of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), the 
party’s policy organ.7 Each division had strong ties with a ministry and interest group. 
Since there were strong ties with a specific PARC division (bukai), each ministry and 
interest group influenced its allocation of the national budget. Moreover, laws and 
policies could not be presented in the Diet without approval from PARC, so most laws 
and policies represented the interests of each ministry and interest group.8  
The LDP maintained its powerbase by keeping strong connections with various 
interest groups and ministries, and its main function was to settle conflicts between 
competing interests, although often the LDP itself was “immobilized by its competing 
commitments”.9 Moreover, the political system was geared towards eliminating the 
economic gaps created between large and small industries and between urban and rural 
areas, so the LDP’s policies often favoured protectionists: “closed market for 
agricultural goods; regulatory barriers protecting uncompetitive firms; and bidding rules 
protecting the construction market, for example”.10 When it was necessary to resolve a 
problem or crisis in policymaking (for instance, protectionist uncompetitive sectors 
caused inefficiencies in the overall economy, and increased tensions with Japan’s trade 
partners), LDP leaders often used the explanation of gaiatsu (outside pressure) as an 
excuse, otherwise zoku politicians would simply veto any reform proposals.11 Schoppa 
describes the situation: 
The 1955 system was able to continue because of the multimember district electoral 
system.… In Japan’s multimember-district electoral system, a party seeking the majority in 
the Diet needed to have more than one candidate in most districts (ranging from one to six 
per district). Votes were not transferable.12  
Therefore, it was unfavorable to political parties which represented only particular 
interests, like the interests of labour unions, to have more than one candidate in each 
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district and achieve a majority in the Diet. In order to have more than one candidate and 
achieve a majority in the Diet, the LDP allowed their candidates to access government 
resources to collect support from various interest groups. In other words, every LDP 
candidate in the same electoral district tolerated each other by representing different 
interest groups, although they were still members of the LDP.13 Moreover, in the 
multimember electoral system, rural areas were overrepresented, and when they were 
most overrepresented, rural candidates could be elected with one-third fewer votes than 
those in urban areas.14 This over-representation in rural areas worked to promote the 
interests of non-leading industries and rural areas in the Diet. 
5.1.2. Changes in Intermediate Groups: Transformation of Electoral System 
and Political Parties    
The transformation of societal actors brought changes in politics to represent 
their interests. As the relationships between conventional societal actors became tense, 
to represent the interests of transnationalized groups, the LDP formed a special 
commission for neoliberal structural reforms under Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko in 
1981.15 Successive prime ministers, including Nakasone, Hashimoto and Koizumi, 
continued to use their own economic reform councils under their direct leadership. The 
members of these councils were mainly chosen from transnationalized societal actors. 
For instance, the president of the economic council under the Nakasone administration 
was Maekawa Haruo, who was the former governor of the Bank of Japan. Under Prime 
Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro the MITI was strongly involved in the council’s reform 
plans. The following Prime Minister, Obuchi Keizo, also formed a special council and 
filled it with economists and leaders of business executive groups, although Obuchi 
himself was from the Keiseikai (the former Tanaka faction), the LDP’s largest faction, 
which had a strong connection with conventional interest groups.16 The ‘reformer’ 
Koizumi also set up economic councils to push through his reforms, and not only did 
Koizumi assign business executives as the members of each economic council, but he 
also chose Takenaka Heizo, who was a leading neoliberal economist, to be Minister of 
Economic Reform.17 Moreover, in the same period, the US upgraded their bilateral 
negotiations with Japan into an agreement on reform initiatives, in which the US and 
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Japan would ‘exchange’ submissions and recommendations for structural reform 
annually.    
While transnationalized groups and the US created a close and direct channel to 
represent their interests in politics and the conventional interests groups lost their 
influence, urban regions where more of the fragmented and atomized public lived came 
to have more influence on politics through the electoral reform of 1993. The collapse of 
the bubble economy, and the LDP’s failed solutions to the recession and a series of 
scandals involving LDP members and civil servants, resulted in the loss of the LDP’s 
ruling position for the first time since 1955. 18  Their successor, the Hosokawa 
government, formed by a coalition of seven parties, introduced the electoral reform bill 
in November 1993, and the bill was passed the following January (it came into effect in 
1995).19 With the introduction of the new electoral law, the multimember constituency 
system was abolished in the lower house election. Instead, single-seat constituencies 
were divided into 300 small districts based on population, and at least 200 
constituencies came to be selected “according to the parties’ proportional share of the 
vote in 11 regional blocs (voters would cast two ballots, one for an individual 
representative and the other for a political party)”.20  
This situation is similar to processes Brenner calls reterritorialisation and 
glocalisation21:  The transnationalized state attempts to distinguish strategic urban and 
regional growth centres from others in terms of a political economy inside the national 
territory.22 In Japan where over 80 percent of population live in urban areas, the new 
electoral system was based on population, so less populated rural areas lost a number of 
their representatives in the Lower Diet. This led the decline of the influence of 
non-transnationalised sectors, including agriculture and construction, which had 
previously benefited by public spending. In both rural and urban areas the collapse of 
the prolonged recession and abrupt neoliberal financial liberalisation in the latter half of 
the 1990s damaged small and medium size companies (S&Ms) severely. The number of 
S&Ms that failed remained around 14,000 annually between 1992 and 1995, but then 
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reached 19,000 in 2000.23 Furthermore, the number of labour unions also started 
decreasing from the early 1980s. This was partly because Japanese workers became 
wealthier, and also because of neoliberal attacks on labour unions in the 1980s as well 
as the privatisation of Japan National Railway, which possessed the largest labour union. 
These factors accelerated the decrease in the membership of labour unions. This 
promotes not only uneven development in Japan, but also inequality or unfairness 
between transnationalized and non-transnationalized interest groups and regions. 
Neoliberal reforms have been implemented that are congruent with the interests of 
transnationalised groups, and transnationalised sectors (financial sectors, and large 
manufacturers, like Toyota) and strategic regions (Tokyo as financial centre, and 
Nagoya as headquarters of Toyota) have benefited from the economic recovery since 
2002. In the meantime, non-transnationalised sectors (S&Ms and increasing non-regular 
workers) were hit by the negative influences of neoliberal reforms severely, agrarian 
rural areas lost their financial benefit of public spending, and urban areas like Osaka, 
where huge number of S&Ms are located, did not participate in the economic recovery.    
 
5.2. Economic Growth and the Social Gap in the Neoliberal Era  
5.2.1. Uneven Growth and Development 
From 2002, Japan’s GDP growth rate began to show a positive sign, and since 
then, the Japanese economy has been growing at over 2 percent annually.24 GDP 
growth from 2002 was achieved through Japan’s conventional route, that is, the 
expansion of its export trade, helped in a large part by China’s rapid economic 
expansion.25 Japan’s percentage of GDP from exports increased from 10 % to 12 % 
between 2001 and 2005, and specifically China’s rapid economic growth contributed to 
Japan’s economic recovery. This GDP growth was largely due to the manufacturing 
sector, especially large corporations, which promoted TFP growth by lowering their 
break-even points.26 However, there is a certain gap in economic recovery between 
large corporations and S&M companies. As Matsubara estimates only 20 percent of 
corporations, specifically large and export-oriented corporations, experienced economic 
recovery from 2002.27 In the mean time, small and medium sized companies were 
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excluded from the recovery.28 A short-term economic survey of enterprises in Japan by 
the Bank of Japan clearly shows the difference among the actual performance of 
corporations (see Graph 1). While the actual performance of large and semi-large 
corporations began to show positive signs from the beginning of 2004, the number of 
managers in S&M companies who said that the performance of their business had 
improved compared to last month, remained negative, although it recovered from -46 at 
the beginning of 2002 to nearly zero at the end of 2006.            
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Graph 1: From Short-term of economic survey of enterprises in Japan by Bank of 
Japan, Judgement survey Diffusion index of favourable minus unfavourable 
Percent29  
 
The graph of the unemployment rate in all ten regions (graph 2), also shows a 
gap in the recovery between each region. In general, urban regions where high-tech 
industries were located, such as North Kanto (northern part of Tokyo) and Hokuriku 
(famous for pharmaceutical companies) had lower unemployment rates. Notably the 
unemployment rate of the Tokai region, where Toyota has its headquarters, showed a 
lower unemployment rate than those of other regions in Japan. It was at least 1 percent 
                                                  
28 Matsubara, p. 31. 
29 http://www.boj.or.jp/theme/research/stat/tk/index.htm. 
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lower than the rates in the other regions from 1998 to 2002. In the mean time, rural 
areas such as Hokkaido and Kyushu had higher unemployment rates. Moreover, Kinki 
(a region consisting of Osaka, Kobe and Kyoto) had a high unemployment rate even 
though Kinki was one of the three major highly populated areas.  
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Graph 2: Created from the Labour Force Survey 2007 of Statistic Bureau of 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications30 
 
5.2.2. The Social Gap  
In the process of economic recovery, the interests of households were largely 
sacrificed and undermined. First, in order to promote TFP, corporations carried out any 
reforms necessary that would cut costs, specifically labour costs.31 Internationally, 
companies shifted their factories overseas, and domestically they laid off workers, 
outsourced labour and employed more part-timers.32 Among the corporations, the 
manufacturing sector achieved a high TFP growth, and they were helped by the 
economic growth of Asia, especially China, because these companies could expand their 
                                                  
30 http://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/longtime/zuhyou/lt08-02.xls. 
31 Kikkawa 2005, pp. 128-9, Matsubara, pp. 19-21. 
32 Matsubara, pp. 19-21. 
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exports to their Asian neighbours.33 In the mean time, the unemployment rate remained 
high at over 5 %, and the unemployment rate of the youth between 15 years old and 24 
years old soared to an historical high, which was nearly 10% in 2004.34 In 2004, one 
out of every two new graduates could not find a regular job.35 Since the economic 
recovery resulted largely from cutting costs, corporations today are not willing to 
resume previous employment practices even after the fact that economy has 
recovered.36 Moreover, corporations are now required to respond to shareholders’ 
demands, such as for high dividends, and so workers’ interests have been sacrificed in 
this regard.37 
Although the record low interest rates have provided a great advantage for banks 
to resolve NPLs and for corporations to promote TFP by borrowing low cost bank loans, 
households have been severely hurt, because the low interest rates technically relocate 
deposit interests from households and individuals to overseas investments, banking and 
corporate sectors.38 Since bank deposits make up nearly half of individual savings in 
Japan, low interest rates undermine private consumption, which is one of the important 
elements of GDP growth.39 Moreover, the households have become unable to manage 
expenses, including consumption, mortgage repayments and light and heating expenses 
with their income. Now more and more people use their savings to compensate.40 This 
fact is reflected in the Bank of Japan’s Flow-of-funds table, which shows that the 
balance of household capital (balance of total assets of household sector) has become 
negative in 2004 for the first time since research started in 1990. 41 
As Tachibanaki argues, first of all, Japanese income inequality has increased 
dramatically during the past fifteen years. Japanese Gini coefficients reached their 
lowest point of 0.313 in 1981 but after Japan experienced neoliberal reforms it reached 
its highest point of 0.381 in 1999 and 2002. It increased by 0.067, and this was an 
alarming increase, according to Tachibanaki.42 The OECD’s calculations also show 
Japan’s high unequal income distribution amongst neoliberal reformed countries, such 
as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.43 The total population of 
                                                  
33 Matsubara, pp. 19-21. 
34 Matsubara, p. 34. 
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40 Kikkawa 2005, p. 132. 
41 Kikkawa 2005, p. 133. 
42 Toshiki Tachibanaki, Confronting Income Inequality in Japan, Combridge, Massachusetts, The MIT 
Press, 2005 pp. 4-16.  
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non-regular workers, including part-time, dispatched temporary workers and contract 
workers, reached 15.64 million in 2004 from less than 10 million in 1993, and it was 
nearly 30% of the total population of workers, which was 53.72 million in 2004.44 The 
number of non-regular workers increased, especially after amendment to the Labour 
Dispatched Law. This created a significant income gap between regular and non-regular 
workers. The average annual income of regular workers is around 4.54 million yen 
compared to 2.5 million for contract workers, 2.04 million for dispatched workers, and 
1.1 million for part-time workers.45    
As noted above, in 2004 the unemployment rate of the youth between 15 years 
old and 24 years old increased to nearly 10%, and one out of every two new graduates 
could not find regular job.46 Among the youth the number of furita47increased from 1.9 
million in 2002 to 2.13 million in 2004, and the number would have increased to 4.0 
million if it had included the number of expected-furita.48 Furthermore, the number of 
NEET (not in employment education or training) became a serious social issue, and the 
estimated number provided by MHWL showed that over 3 million youth NEET existed 
in Japan.49 The number of households that were paid social security increased from the 
latter half of the 1990s, and the number increased by over 400,000 from 600,000 in 
1996 to 1.04 million in 2005.50 The suicide rate also soared in the latter half of the 
1990s, and the number has remained stable at over 30,000 annually from 2000 to the 
present day.51 It is noteworthy that among the reasons for suicide, economic reasons 
more than doubled from 3025 to 6838 in 2000, 7947 in 2004 and 7756 in 2005.52 
Moreover, the number of crimes increased by over 1 million from 2.46 million in 1996 
to 3.42 million in 2004, and the number is increasing at an unprecedented pace.53 
To sum up, Japan was able to increase exports, cut costs, and employ 
non-regular workers through the neoliberal reforms. As a result, GDP growth from 2002 
was achieved. However, the uneven economic growth and the income gap became 
clearer and clearer. There is the certain gap in economic recovery from 2002 between 
                                                  
44 Matsubara, p. 33, Uchibashi, pp. 12-3. 
45 Uchibashi, p. 10.  
46 Matsubara, p. 34, Kikkawa 2005, p. 129.  
47 Furita was originally used to describe youth who were job hoppers, the fast labour of fast capitalism, 
and a hip lifestyle to these insecure and inconstant workers in media during bubble economy. Nowadays 
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48 Kelly and White, Matsubara, p, 34. 
49 Kikkawa 2005, p, 331. 
50 Uchibashi, p. 15. 
51 Uchibashi, p. 17.  
52 Uchibashi, p. 17. 
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large corporations and S&M companies, because small and medium sized companies 
were excluded from the recovery. After its neoliberal reforms, it became possible for 
corporations to cut costs, specifically labour costs, by shifting their factories overseas, 
laying off workers and employing more part-timers. Now companies need to care more 
about shareholders’ requests, such as high dividends, and so workers’ interests have 
been sacrificed in this regard. Moreover, by the record low interest rates, households 
have been severely hurt, because the low interest rates technically relocate deposit 
interests from households and individuals to overseas investments, banking and 
corporate sectors. Now more and more people use their savings to compensate, because 
the households have become unable to manage expenses with their income. This is 
reflected in the increase from the latter half of the 1990s in the number of households 
which were paid social security. After amendment to the Labour Dispatched Law, the 
number of non-regular workers increased, and as a result of the increase, the income gap 
between regular and non-regular workers became significant. Therefore, Japanese 
society seems to be bipolarized as a result of the implementation of neoliberal reforms, 
and public peace and order in Japanese society has been eroding as seen in the increases 
at an unprecedented pace in the suicide rate and in the number of crimes.  
Even though neoliberal reforms caused a variety of social problems and 
bipolarized Japanese society, Japan’s neoliberalisation still continues today. How is it 
possible in an electoral democracy to continue with neoliberal reforms despite these 
negative impacts on a large part of the population? The remainder of this chapter 
outlines the role that nationalism has played in enabling neoliberal reforms to go ahead. 
5.3. Economic Nationalism  
As discussed in chapter three, economic nationalism is an ideology and movement, 
which is strongly congruent with elements of neoliberalism, including market 
liberalisation, deregulation and individual responsibility. Economic nationalism recalls 
and reinforces the sentiment of belonging to a nation by providing a view for members 
to identify with the nation’s peculiar economic feature and situation. Economic 
nationalism also creates a narrative of a future of the nation, and promotes 
implementing neoliberal reforms as the will of the people. Cultural nationalism is an 
ideology and movement, which reinforces the sentiment of belonging to a nation, in 
which members identify with the nation’s peculiar culture, set of symbols, beliefs and 
history, and the will of the people to decide upon their common cultural and political 
destiny. To understand the role of economic nationalism seen in neoliberalisation, it is 
vital to study the sentiments among Japanese people first. 
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5.3.1. Background of Japanese Sentiments in the Early Post-War Period and 
in The 1980s. 
The US Occupation  
Initially the US implemented radical liberalisation and democratisation. First, 
the US introduced a new constitution which assured liberal democracy, and also banned 
Japan from possessing their own military in Article 9, which was known as the Peace 
Clause and “which renounced war and the threat of force as a means of settling 
international disputes, as well as prohibiting the development of land, sea and air 
forces.”54 Secondly, when occupation land reforms were achieved, the percentage of 
land cultivated by its owners increased by more than thirty percent from 55.7 in 1947 to 
88.9 in 1949.55 Eventually, these land reforms helped conservative politicians to gain 
new support.56 Thirdly, workers’ rights were ensured and expanded. The enforcement 
of the Trade Union Law (1945) guaranteed workers’ rights to strike and engage in 
collective bargaining, and the following Labour Standards Law (1947) regulated 
minimum standards for working hours and working conditions, including safety and 
accident compensation.57 Coupled with Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
SCAP’s New Deal stance toward labour unions, these labour laws led to a significant 
increase in the membership of labour unions from 7 percent to 50 percent between 1946 
and 1948.58 The political left, socialists and communists, played important roles in the 
labour movement, and in the first half of 1946 over 150,000 workers were involved in 
the seizure of over 240 factories.59 Moreover, their movement escalated into more 
radical movements, in which “these radical workers challenged both authoritarian order 
and the fundamental notion of private property.”60 
 
The End of the US Occupation and Rapid Economic Growth 
The end of the US occupation brought serious conflicts between conservatives 
and progressives (kakushin), especially over the amendment to the constitution, the 
existence of the SDF and the security treaty with the US. While the Conservative camp 
tried to amend the constitution and keep the bilateral security treaty with the US, the 
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 106 
progressives opposed both the constitutional amendment and the Security Treaty.61 
However, once conservatives faced strong opposition from progressives against an 
amendment to the bilateral security treaty with the US., from the early 1960s the main 
focus of the dominant conservatives became “rapid, often wrenching economic growth” 
to maintain social stability and their strong base for election, although the bilateral 
security treaty with the US was still a central issue surrounding security in Japan.62    
Even after the GDP-centric policy was adopted by the LDP, up to the end of the 
1970s the influence of radicals and the political left remained significant. As an example 
of the leftist movement, anti-Vietnam War protests started in the same month as when 
the US bombed North Vietnam in February 1965. The first large scale protest was 
organized in June 1965, and more than 100,000 Japanese people participated in it. The 
Citizens’ Federation for Peace in Vietnam (Beheiren), the central piece of the 
anti-Vietnam War movement, was formed by writers (including the famous Oda 
Makoto), artists and scholars in 1965. Beiheiren was organized under a loose structure 
and was not based on any political party, but organized with self-supporting local 
branches. After that, citizens’ movements in the late 1960s and the early 1970s were 
modeled on the structure of Beiheiren.63 Throughout the next few years, Beheiren 
organized a number of anti-war movements, collaborating with anti-war movements 
overseas, and “it sponsored huge peaceful demonstrations such as the one in June 1969 
in which 70,000 people participated”.64  
Another example of the strong influence of the progressive camp was the 
citizens’ movement against the failures of the government’s economic policies. At the 
end of the 1960s the government’s ‘Gross National Product (GNP)-first’ policy for rapid 
economic growth caused a number of problems, including widespread pollution, 
increased land costs and poor welfare facilities. In terms of total GNP, Japan became 
world number two in 1969, but Japan’s GNP/population was only 22nd among capitalist 
economies.65 Statistics showed that considerable numbers of people still lived under the 
poverty line.66 The disillusion with the government’s economic policies among citizens 
accelerated and led to a nationwide protest movement. These grassroots movements 
were organized independently by members, and they protested against “established 
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authority in connection with local issues.”67 These protest movements involved not 
only political activism, but also lawsuits against powerful economic interests (often 
collaboration of bureaucrats, politicians, and businesses).68  
By 1973 around 3,000 groups were organized with 60,000-90,000 activists and 
“more than one million rank and file participants” to protest against the negative results, 
including pollution, of the government’s ‘GNP-first’ economic policies. 69  The 
government was also concerned about these issues. For instance, in 1969 three 
government white papers mentioned environmental problems and the low quality of life 
as negative effects of its ‘GNP-first’ economic development.70 As a result, in 1970 in 
the Diet, or as it was known popularly the ‘Pollution Diet’, a large number of laws 
concerned with environmental protection and the standard of living were passed.71 The 
problems which stemmed from a growth-centric economy were gradually solved in the 
1970s, which coincided with the emergence of a bourgeoisie and consumerism in 
Japan.72  
By the end of the 1970s the radical left had little to protest about as many of 
what once were concerns for the Japanese public had been addressed by the government. 
For instance, the People’s Organization for Peace in Vietnam (Beheiren), which 
consisted of many of the Marxist and non-Marxist protest groups, lost its charismatic 
influence from 1965 to 1973 and finally disbanded in January 1974.73 Internationally, 
in the 1970s Japan appeared as an economic power, and domestically consumerism was 
widely apparent among the public. ‘My Home-ism and My Car-ism’ took over the 
position of Marxism. The extreme wing of the leftist groups engaged more and more in 
inward factional conflicts and violence (uchigeba).74  
In Japan until the 1980s, the identity among ordinary Japanese people was 
formed largely from the American occupation and its reforms. Through the US’s initial 
policies of liberalisation and demilitarization, the identity of the Japanese people 
represented by state-oriented ‘authoritarianism’ (specifically during the wartime) was 
altered to pacifism and a cultural-centric identity. After the end of the US occupation, 
re-militarization caused social conflicts because of the contradictions between the 
‘peace’ constitution and the existence of the Japanese Self-Defence Force (JSDF) and 
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the security treaty with the US. Social discourses over these issues were one of the 
central features in the post-war social movement in Japan. 
By the mid 1980s Japanese society was homogeneous (nearly 90% of its 
population recognized themselves as middle class people).75 This was partly because of 
Japan’s universal and uniform education, and its secular social order as Stronach argues, 
but it was also largely due to economic development and emerging consumerism.76 
Although the influence of the left decreased significantly compared to the 1960s and the 
1970s, pacifism and ‘peace-mindedness’ remained as part of ‘national character and 
ideology’ shared by the postwar Japanese. Sasada summarised this as follows:   
The public favours economic strength, peaceful diplomacy, and a low-key consensus approach; 
it does not feel seriously threatened by the Soviet Union or Russia; it does not think very highly 
of the Self-Defence Forces; and it overwhelmingly supports Article 9 of the Constitution.77  
This widely shared sentiment among the public reflected the popularity of leftist parties, 
such as the Japan Social Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP), and the left 
still had a strong influence on education and academia, through the Japanese Teacher’s 
Union (Nikkyoso), and progressive intellectuals (shinpo bunkajin).78  
5.3.2. Roll-back neoliberalisation without Nationalism 
Therefore, although Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro tried to revive cultural 
nationalism at the same time as implementing a series of neoliberal reforms, Nakasone’s 
nationalism only attracted conservatives who were more concerned about the remaining 
influence of the left. Once Nakasone was elected Prime Minister in 1982, he made 
reference to the “final settlement of post-war politics (sengoseijino sokessan)”, and 
wished that Japan would take more responsibility in international society, while 
domestically he attempted to revitalize Japan’s national pride by bringing to an end to 
widely shared feelings of war guilt and by a conclusive “reassessment of the occupation 
reform”, especially the constitutional amendment. 79   Despite his initial strenuous 
declaration, Nakasone’s attempts to promote national pride were not as successful as he 
would have liked. For instance, Nakasone resumed the prime minister’s official visit to 
Yasukuni Shrine on the symbolic date of 15 August.80 However, soon Nakasone faced 
serious criticism from the mass media and leftists, specifically over the 
                                                  
75 Bruce Stronach, Beyond the rising sun (nationalism in contemporary Japan) (London, 1995), p.64.  
76 Stronach, p. 70.   
77 Hironori Sasada, Youth and Nationalism in Japan, SAIS Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, 2006,  p. 110.  
78 Sasada, p. 110.  
79 Bailey, p.141. 
80 Daiki Shibuichi, The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why all the Fuss?, 
Asian Survey, Vol. 45, Issue 2, 2005 pp. 206-9. 
 109 
“unconstitutionality of the prime minister’s official visit. 81  Nakasone also faced 
criticism from China, and the Chinese Foreign Minister expressed his official 
displeasure.82 Once Nakasone faced severe criticism from inside and outside of Japan, 
he cancelled another visit to Yasukuni in October 1985.83    
The roll-back neoliberal reforms were attempted when Japan’s economy was 
stable and Japan became the largest creditor country by 1985, therefore, strong national 
consensus toward neoliberal economic reform did not emerge. 84  Rather, in the 
expansion and internationalisation of Japan’s economy people paid more attention to the 
relations of Japan’s cultural ‘uniqueness’ to both its economic success and 
internationalisation.85 For instance, so-call nihonjinron boom, a number of books and 
articles arguing about the connection between economic success and cultural uniqueness 
were published during this period.86 According to Yoshino, these nihonjinron books 
and arguments were mostly consumed by people who engaged in business with foreign 
countries and by teachers who used them to compare Japanese culture with other 
cultures to understand where Japan belonged rather than to gain ‘pride’ or boast about 
the cultural and economical ‘uniqueness’ of Japan.87 Furthermore, as Vogel points out, 
against standard economic theory, throughout the post-war era Japanese consumers 
were opponents of liberalization.88 For instance, a survey carried out by the Yomiuri 
Shinbun newspaper showed that 57.1 percent supported agricultural protection, while 
59.4 percent opposed agricultural liberalization.89 This was because they recognized 
that consumers were simultaneously workers, producers and distributors.90 Moreover, 
consumer groups opposed retail deregulation, because they feared that deregulation 
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would destroy neighbourhood-shopping districts.91  
This resulted in only partial neoliberalisation at the time of roll-back 
neoliberalisation in Japan. In Japan’s roll-back neoliberalisation, there was a struggle 
between domestic interest groups and international pressures and so, liberalization in 
the financial sector took place, but the post-war Japanese economic system was left 
intact. At this point, the both economic and cultural nationalism are not seen because it 
did not recall nor reinforce the sentiment attached to a nation with the nation’s peculiar 
economic future and situation. Therefore, implementing neoliberal reforms was not 
promoted as the will of the people. 
 
5.4. Nationalism in the Roll-Out Neoliberal era from 1990 until Koizumi 
Administration  
5.4.1. Creating a National Consensus towards Neoliberal Reform  
The situation fundamentally changed with the collapse of the bubble economy and the 
following recession. In the early 1990s, not only most of the elites, including politicians, 
scholars, bureaucrats and business executives, but also ordinary Japanese people 
thought that the recession would not be prolonged and the Japanese economy would 
recover soon. 92  However, despite the series of economic stimulus policies by 
government, the Japanese economy did not show the signs of full economic recovery. 
First, this caused an identity crisis among Japanese people, because the strong national 
economy seemed collapsed and the Japanese style of economy turned out to be an 
obstacle to the economic recovery. 93  Then, the populations of Japan, including 
politicians, bureaucrats and ordinary people, began to think that some kinds of 
fundamental economic reforms would be necessary for its economic recovery.94 At this 
time, the suggested ideas and views for its economic recovery were all drawn from 
neoliberal approaches. From the latter half of the 1990s the Japanese mass media 
became cheerleaders of the structural reforms. Newspapers and TV were filled with 
economists’ and reformists’ ‘mantra’, like ‘consumer sovereignty’, ‘equality of 
opportunity not of outcomes’ and ‘global standards’.95 The voice of the mass media 
was largely dominated by pro-neoliberal reformers. The media continued to publish “the 
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slogans and the signal flags of reformers”, such as ‘deregulation’, ‘competition,’ and 
‘consumer sovereignty’, ‘small government’, under the name of global standards.96 
Dore summarized the arguments of reformers, including economists, scholars, and 
businessmen who work abroad into four arguments: 
 
1. the principles according to which the typical neoclassical economics textbook  
says the economy ought to work are a priori correct principles; 
2. those principles are best exemplified in the American economy; 
3. the rightness of those principles is further confirmed by American success; and  
4. Japan’s present plight is not just a cyclical phenomenon and a debt-deflation 
hangover from the bubble97 
 
Scholars, economists and commentators continued to point out the necessity of 
structural reforms and the importance of liberalisation for Japan’s economic recovery 
after the collapse of the bubble economy. Moreover, once the SII talks started after 1989, 
the US began to appeal directly to Japanese consumers that they could benefit through 
liberalization, and from the latter half of the 1990s the mass media supported the US 
appeals and filled newspapers and the TV with words such as ‘consumer benefits’ and 
‘consumer sovereignty’.98 
 For instance, Japan’s leading economic news agency, Nihonkeizai Shinbunsha, 
changed its tone over the Japanese economy after the collapse of the bubble economy. 
Up to 1989 newspapers of Nikkei Shinbun praised Japan’s economic system and its 
economic success, but after the collapse of the bubble economy and following failure of 
economic recovery policies, these newspapers began to produce articles attacking 
Japan’s economic system and demanding liberalisation and deregulation.99 The number 
of these newspapers’ articles about the Japanese economic system and management 
increased from 126 articles in 1985 to 200 in 1989.100 The number dropped to 148 in 
1990 (the year the Japanese stock market crashed), but soon increased again to 194 in 
1992 and hit a peak of 228 in 1993.101 The articles before the collapse of the bubble 
economy were praising the Japanese economic system and management, but after the 
collapse of the bubble economy the tone of articles became dubious about the relation 
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between the system and its success.102 Finally, from the opinion of the editorial board 
of Nihonkeizai Shinbunsha in 29 February 1992 these newspapers began to attack the 
Japanese economic system and management and started to demand structural reforms 
for the economic recovery.103        
Domestically, “by 1998 a broad consensus had emerged in favour of a historic 
structural transformation”.104 In terms of politics, for instance, because of a number of 
scandals involving politicians and bureaucrats that followed the collapse of the bubble 
economy, the leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost in the election of the lower 
house of the Diet in 1993. 105  As already noted their successor, the Hosokawa 
administration, changed the election system from a multimember system according  
greater weighting on the rural vote to a single member district system with respect to 
population.106 Therefore, after 1993 not only did the LDP lose its traditional political 
bases in rural agrarian areas, but also other political parties needed to pay much more 
attention to city voters who favoured economic structural reforms and who tended to 
have no fixed loyalty to any particular party.107 Eventually, by the late 1990s both the 
LDP and opposition parties were transformed into ‘reformist’ parties (although some 
minority parties, like the Social Democratic Parties and the Communist Party of Japan 
still opposed the economic reforms). They became the basis for reformist 
administrations, such as the Hashimoto administration in 1997 and the Koizumi 
administration in 2001. 
Although bureaucrats’ sectionalist mind and behaviour and differences in each 
ministry’s own interests prevented them from showing their aggregated will, a number 
of ministries and governmental agencies, including the Management and Coordination 
Agency (MCA), the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) and the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), showed a strong leaning towards economic structural 
reforms for their own sake.108 The FTC, for example, had tried to “take advantage of 
the reformist mood of the 1990s to strengthen antitrust policy”, and showed a strong 
initiative in a number of issues, such as the “breaking up of Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone (NTT) and lifting the ban on holding companies”.109 More importantly, the 
MITI showed strong support for liberalization, although the MITI “represented 
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constituencies on both sides: the beneficiaries and the victims of protection and 
regulation”.110 In the economic structural reforms under Prime Minister Hashimoto, a 
former MITI minister, MITI was deeply engaged in reform plans, and in fact, many 
analysts hold the view that MITI bureaucrats wrote the proposals for the reforms, “such 
as those regarding the reorganization of the central government ministries”.111     
Three major business associations, namely the Federal Economic Organization 
(Keidanren), the Employer Association (Nikeiren) which merged with Keidanren, and 
the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai) showed strong support 
for economic structural reforms. 112  Keizai Doyukai had shown support for 
liberalization already in the 1970s.113 Although Keidanren made some compromise 
with the oil industry “to drop oil from its widely publicized deregulation proposal of 
November 1994”, Keidanren showed strong support for the structural reforms in general, 
including liberal and fiscal reforms, agricultural liberalization and deregulation.114 The 
Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, “which tends to represent smaller 
business”, was in a different situation: “the most members [were] less than enthusiastic 
about liberalization, but a few are active proponents”.115 
Internationally, the US’s recovery from the recession and its economic boom 
during the 1990s legitimized liberalisation and deregulation in a neoliberal manner as 
the right path for Japan’s economic recovery.116 The US continued bilateral talks with 
Japan under the Clinton administration.117 Clinton strengthened the former SII talks, 
and the US and Japan ‘agreed to exchange’ annual reform recommendations with each 
other under the agreement of the Framework for New Economic Partnership in July 
1993.118 These bilateral negotiations, which focused on exchanging annual submissions 
(later changed to an annual recommendation), have continued since the first annual 
submissions were exchanged in 1994. The influence of the US is also seen in the Japan 
Investment Commission (JIC) (directly under the cabinet office) where deregulation and 
liberalisation of the Japanese financial market are argued.119 Both JIC and the Annual 
Recommendation from the US have been important and influential guides for the 
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current ongoing Japanese neoliberal reforms.120   
These international and domestic factors all worked together to change the 
negative attitudes towards liberalisation. The reformers’ claims achieved profound 
support from the public who had previously witnessed the failure of the government’s 
fiscal stimulus policies and the corruption of many politicians, bureaucrats and 
corporations.121 Moreover, the US’s economic recovery and boom from the mid 1990s 
legitimized its neoliberal reforms. Among the public, a widespread consensus emerged. 
It was seen as necessary to adopt economic and structural reforms in a neoliberal 
manner to overcome the ongoing national economic difficulties of Japan.122 In the 
election of the House of Representative in October 1996 all political parties declared 
administrative reforms as the central issue. 123 Among them, the two largest parties, 
namely the LDP and New Progressing Party (NPP), showed their plans of not only 
administrative reforms, but also a number of neoliberal structural reforms, including 
financial liberalisation. 124 The election resulted in the victory of the LDP which 
succeeded in showing a stronger reformer stance than NPP.125 The LDP gained 239 
seats, close to a majority of the House of Representative, and the NPP also collected 
large support (NPP achieved 156 seats).126        
This suggests that economic nationalism comes into play at the time of roll-out 
neoliberalisation in Japan. Proposed neoliberal reforms, including market liberalisation, 
deregulation and individual responsibility, stimulate and encourage the sentiments 
attached to a nation among the people by offering a future for the nation, that is, Japan’s 
economic recovery. Economic nationalism unites the people into being supportive of 
neoliberal reforms and provides the legitimacy for implementation of neoliberal 
reforms.  
5.4.2. The Hashimoto Administration and Neoliberal Reforms 
Backed by the strong support from the public, Hashimoto gained strong impetus 
to implement the Six Big reforms. Among the reform plans, Hashimoto focused on 
administrative reforms and financial liberalisation. He used the special economic 
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council to come up with a framework for these reforms, and he carried out a number of 
reforms, including radical financial liberalisation, consolidations of ministries of central 
government and introduction of sales tax.127 These reforms were welcomed by almost 
all of the mass media and economists, and the majority of the public showed a 
supportive stance. 128  According to Opinion polls by Asahishinbun newspaper, 
Hashimoto initially achieved a high approval rate (55 percent), and he maintained over 
40 percent of approval rates constantly.129 The high public support made it difficult for 
the traditional interest groups inside the LDP to oppose Hashimoto’s reform. 130 
However, once the increase in the sales tax slowed down economic recovery, and the 
radical financial reforms induced the financial crisis, a question, whether the neoliberal 
reforms should be continued, was raised among the public.131 The financial crisis led 
the public to think that first it was necessary for Japan to recover from the crisis rather 
than continue neoliberal reforms. Hashimoto’s public approval ratings dropped abruptly 
from over 40 % average in 1997 to 23 % in 1998.132 Hashimoto’s disapproval ratings 
kept higher than approval ratings until the end of his administration.133 Eventually, 
despite the fact that Hashimoto showed strong initiative with his neoliberal reforms, and 
achieved a number of economic and structural reforms, he lost the upper house election 
in 1998 and resigned.  
This situation illustrates the main characteristic of politics in a neoliberal era, in 
that politicians need to pay attention to the public while representing the interests of 
transnationalized groups, because the nation-state is still supposed to be the 
representative of the will of the people. More importantly, in Japan, there is an 
economic council, which represented the interests of the transnationalized groups, but 
for the public, there is no special organization to represent their interests in politics; 
only politicians could represent their interests. However, in a democracy, support from 
the public is vital and necessary for politicians to legitimise their decisions and to be 
elected. Therefore, if one wants to represent the interests of transnationalized groups by 
implementing neoliberal reforms, it is necessary to gain support from the public in order 
to implement and continue neoliberal reforms. In the case of economic nationalism by 
Prime Minister Hashimoto, it can be said that because the financial crisis was 
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significant and was caused by the abrupt neoliberal reforms, it was then difficult to 
create a narrative of the nation’s future (economic recovery) through an ideology of 
economic nationalism akin to neoliberalism; economic nationalism could not 
simultaneously facilitate neoliberalisation and reinforce the sentiment of belonging to 
the nation. Therefore, the unification of the people into being supportive for the 
continuation of the neoliberal reforms was not achieved. 
5.5. Economic Nationalism and Cultural Nationalism Under Koizumi 
5.5.1. Changes in Attitudes toward Security and Pacifism before Koizumi 
was Elected 
During the latter half of 1990s, there were noticeable changes in attitudes toward 
security and pacifism among Japanese people. Territorial disputes with China over 
Senkaku Island since the 1970s and with Korea over Takeshima since the early 1950s 
had stalled, and China’s natural gas production in territorially disputed waters near 
Japan from the early 1990s brought another territorial dispute.134 Historical disputes, 
specifically about Japan’s aggression during World War II, had come out continuously 
in different forms, including disputes about history textbooks, and about the prime 
minister’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine.135 Security issues were revived by North 
Korea’s missile tests, and the abduction of Japanese citizens, China’s double digit 
expansion and the modernization of its military.136 Domestically, the government’s lack 
of ability to solve emergencies was seen in “the sarin gas attacks on major cities by the 
religious terrorist group of Aum Shinrikyo and the devastating 1995 earthquake in 
Kobe”.137 These incidents also helped to reinforce the importance of security among 
Japanese people.  
 Moreover, while Japan was suffering from a prolonged economic recession, 
China, into which Japan was pumping huge sums of money, enjoyed double digit GDP 
growth, and continued to spend money on massive military expansion and 
modernization.138 This created a fear and then resentment against China, and then 
opposition to the Japanese government’s pacifism stance among Japanese people. In 
particular, the youth began to show ‘xenophobic’ attitudes.139 As Ishihara complained: 
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"We pour money into China so they can continue work on developing a hydrogen 
bomb."140 Many Japanese people began to feel that Japan had apologized enough for 
the past and “Tokyo should start asserting itself”.141 In the meantime, a number of 
Japanese people began to regard Article 9 of the constitution, the ‘peace’ clause, as 
unnatural for a country with Japan’s international stature and believed that the country 
should have a professional army.142 These attitudes were strong, especially among the 
youth, the generation which had been most affected by the negative effects of the 
prolonged recession.143 The public opinion polls about JSDF and security held by the 
Cabinet Office of Japanese government showed that during the same period the public 
approval over JSDF and acknowledgement of the necessity of Japan’s security alliance 
with the US nearly doubled from 40.7 percent in 1972 to 76.2 percent in 2006.144  
 
5.5.2. The Decline of the Left and the Popularity of the Right as Evidence of 
Nationalistic Sentiment among Japanese People 
The decline of post-war pacifism reflected the unpopularity of Leftist parities 
(JSP and JCP), which had played a central role in mobilizing the youth in pacifist and 
anti-war movements. One of the important reasons why these Leftist parties lost their 
support was “their unwillingness to adapt to the post-Cold War environment”. 145 
Despite the fact that conflicts and disputes with neighbouring countries came to be 
recognized by ordinary Japanese people, these parties stubbornly clung to their idealistic 
pacifism, and showed blind sympathy to China, Korea, and even to North Korea. In the 
meantime, they continued to criticize the US as militarist. Eventually, during the 1990s, 
their pacifism and anti-war sentiment were seen as double standards.146 Moreover, the 
fact that the JSP kept denying the North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens until 
Kim-Jong Il admitted North Korea’s involvement critically hurt the Leftist parties’ 
popularity. They consequently lost most of their seats in the Diet. For instance, in the 
2003 election the SDPJ (SDP) won only six seats and the JCP lost two seats from eleven 
seats out of 480 seats in the lower Diet.147                      
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During the same period, the political right and conservatives gradually gained 
popularity. As McCormack points out, from the mid 1990s nationalistic sentiments have 
been promoted by ‘newcomers,’ including groups of scholars, and individuals. 148 
Throughout the post-war period, nationalistic sentiments in Japan had been promoted by 
traditional rightwing groups and organisations, including the National Shrine 
Association (Jinja Shincho), and the War Bereaved Families Association (Nihon 
izokukai), but also by academic scholars and intellectuals, many of whom belonged to 
rightwing groups in the mid-1990s. For instance, the Liberal View of History Study 
Group and the Society for the Making of New School Text-books in History were 
established in 1995 and 1996.149 Over two years from the spring of 1997, between 80 
and 100 books were published by members of these groups on matters of modern 
history and textbook questions, and the most famous books were a series of books 
entitled “On War” written by the cartoonist Kobayashi Yosinori (Sensoron).150              
Hall and other IPE scholars point out that the collapse of the bubble economy 
and the following recession weakened Japan’s pride in its economy and its cultural and 
social ‘uniqueness’, and caused a serious identity crisis among the Japanese. 151 
However, this identity crisis was not only caused by the economic collapse, but also by 
other political and social issues. Through out the 1990s, post-war Japanese traditions, 
such as pacifism and ‘peaceful mindedness,’ gradually disappeared, and the feelings and 
attitudes shared by the Japanese also changed. The Japanese public began to regard 
certain issues such as rearmament, constitutional revision, and patriotism as not 
taboo. 152  Conservative intellectuals and media commentators began to express 
nationalistic sentiments, and people, especially the youth, started to argue publicly about 
topics which had been previously treated as taboos. 153  
For instance, the Yomiuri Shinbun, Japan’s largest subscription paper, 
continuously provided arguments for constitutional revision, and its editorial board 
stated that it is the right time to create a new constitution. According to their argument, 
the majority of voters now share a common view over the necessity of amending the 
‘peace’ clause to match up with the historic changes in the international situation and 
Japan’s national security needs in the post-Cold War international order.154 Moreover, a 
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number of newspapers and magazines, including Bungeishunjyū, Seiron and Shokun!, 
provided a place for conservative intellectuals to express their nationalist messages.155 
While these magazines increased their number of monthly copies (Bungeishunjyū: 
626,750 copies, Seiron: 93,271 copies and Shokun!: 81,667 copies in 2006), left-wing 
newspapers and magazines decreased their monthly sales (Sekai: decreased from over 
200,000 copies monthly to 70,000 copies monthly in 1990s and Ronza: sold only 19,125 
copies in 2006).156   
Therefore, it can be argued that in Japan, from the latter half of the 1990s, there 
was increasing support for the idea that some kind of profound reform was required not 
only to pull Japan’s economy up as Hall argues, but also with regard to the nation and 
state as a whole, including its security, constitutional amendment, and its own history, 
starting with Yasukuni and the war dead. This was the newly emerged attitude and 
identity toward the Japanese nation among the public. Therefore, reformers, including 
Koizumi, were required to pay attention to this change in order to build a national 
consensus for the implementation and continuation of neoliberal reforms under a new 
electoral system, which reflected the changeable and fluctuating opinions of the public. 
 
5.5.3. Koizumi’s Populism, Economic Nationalism and Cultural Nationalism 
in Japan since 2001 
Hashimoto’s successor Obuchi Keizo reversed Hashimoto’s structural reforms 
with ‘Obuchinomics’, that is, traditional Keynesian economic stimulus policies.157 
Helped by the ‘petit-IT’ boom, Obuchinomics achieved a temporary economic recovery. 
However, the expansion of public spending piled up an alarming level of public debt, 
and the eventual collapse of information technology (IT) market slowed economic 
recovery.158 Among the public, a pessimistic view of Japan’s economy dominated, and 
once again the public started to demand economic and structural reforms.159 In such a 
situation, in April 2001 Koizumi Junichiro was elected as Prime Minister with over 80 
percent support.  
Koizumi was different from previous prime ministers from the LDP, including 
the reformers Nakasone and Hashimoto, in a number of ways. First of all, Koizumi did 
not have his own faction, although he belonged to former Prime Minister Mori’s 
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faction. 160  Koizumi also did not belong to any interest groups (zoku), such as 
construction, postal, and agricultural groups, so he was freed from the LDP post-war 
‘tradition’ of “distributing benefits among special interests”.161 When he was elected 
prime minister, he did not have special support as Nakasone and Hashimoto had from 
particular factional and interest groups. Thus, for Koizumi the weight and importance of 
public popularity was heavier than for other prime ministers, and so during his 
administration Koizumi was required to keep a careful eye on his popularity among the 
public. This is why scholars and commentators regard Koizumi’s style of politics as 
populism.162              
 
Koizumi’s Politics: The Will of the People and Economic Nationalism  
Initially Koizumi created a narrative of the necessity of neoliberal structural 
reforms for economic recovery, and he appealed with this narrative to the public. 
Koizumi declared “structural reforms with no sacred cows”, and promised radical 
neoliberal governmental and economic reforms.163 Koizumi announced a number of his 
reform plans, including the reduction of new government debt, pushing banks “into 
disposing of their bad loans within two or three years” and “cut[ting] off the life-support 
system that has allowed weak firms and inefficient sectors to avoid painful 
restructuring”.164 During his more than six years in office, Koizumi continued to use a 
number of symbolic slogans to appeal to the public for progressing neoliberal reform. 
For instance, to appeal to the public and justify the necessity of neoliberal economic 
reforms Koizumi used this following slogan on numerous occasions: ‘without reform no 
economic development’ (kaikaku nakushite seicho nashi).165 Koizumi also used the 
slogan, ‘without pain, no reform’ (itaminakushite kaikakunashi), to try to convince 
people implicitly that although some people would lose their current financial benefits 
in the short term (for some people permanently), these pains were unavoidable if the 
country was to benefit financially in the long term from his neoliberal reforms.166 
Another important slogan used by Koizumi was ‘Our enemies are the vested interest 
groups within’ (teiko-seiryoku). While Koizumi used special economic councils to 
represent the interests of transnationalized groups and foreign countries, especially the 
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US, Koizumi used his slogans as mobilising rhetoric and political performance, in order 
to pit ordinary citizens against old interest groups inside the LDP.167  
Performance of Koizumi Administration’s Economic Reform   
For economic and structural reforms, Koizumi used several special councils 
directly under his cabinet. For financial reform and liberalisation, the Japan Investment 
Commission (JIC) chaired by Koizumi was used to promote his reforms.168 The JIC 
consisted not only of Japanese economists and scholars, but also American economists, 
scholars and business executives.169 The JIC argued for and provided various plans for 
reforms related to finance in areas from law to accounting and the tax system, and the 
JIC played the role of ‘commander’ of related ministries, including the Ministry of Law, 
the Ministry of Finance and the Agency of Financial Affairs.170    
In terms of structural reforms, Koizumi strengthened the Economic and 
Financial Prudential Council (EFPC) with four experts from the private sector, namely 
Jiro Ushio from Japan’s Association of Business Executive (keizaidoyukai), Okuda who 
was the president of Japan’s Business Association and former chief executive officer 
(CEO) of Toyota (Keidanren), Masaaki Honma (University of Osaka), and Hiroshi 
Yoshikawa (University of Tokyo).171 Koizumi appointed Heizo Takenaka, an adherent 
of the neoliberal economy who had been Koizumi’s friend for ten years, to be the 
minister in charge of the EFPC, and in the first meeting of the EFPC Koizumi stated 
that he would take strong initiative himself.172 The EFPC had a variety of public and 
private structural reforms in its initial plan, namely the stabilization of the financial 
system through market-oriented reforms, the limiting of new issuance of government 
bonds under 30 trillion yen, public spending reform, social security reform, and the 
decentralization of some of the functions of the government.173 Although Koizumi took 
a strong stance in both the JIC and EFPC, Koizumi did not have a blueprint for the 
entire reforms except for the privatisation of the postal office.174 Therefore, under 
strong international pressure (mainly from the US), financial reforms and liberalisation 
were implemented, thoroughly, but on the other hand a number of public sector reforms 
often resulted in a compromise between vested interest groups, groups that he was 
supposed to be against inside the LDP.175   
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  That is, in terms of political bargaining over economic and structural reforms, 
Koizumi worked on the framework of LDP faction politics. Although Koizumi declared 
that he would crack LDP and its factional politics, he never tried to create a new party 
or undermine factions. Instead, Koizumi’s political bargaining was often described as 
‘performance’ (Koizumi gekijyo), and his ‘performance’ was organized on the LDP’s 
factional vs. faction framework rather than on competition with opposition parties, 
specifically the Democratic Party of Japan, over political and economic policies.176 For 
instance, his landslide victory in the Lower House election in 2005 was brought about 
not only by Koizumi’s simplification of electoral issues relating to the privatization of 
the postal office, but also by Koizumi’s ‘strategy’ to show his ‘reformist’ image by 
attacking vested interest groups inside the LDP, specifically the largest faction loyal to 
former Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutarō.177   
 
Diplomacy and Politics and Koizumi’s Cultural Nationalism    
In terms of diplomacy, Koizumi originally only pursued ‘traditional’ diplomatic 
issues concerning Japan or the LDP, including the normalization of relationships with 
North Korea, gaining a permanent seat for Japan on the UN Security Council, and 
issues involving the East Asian community.178  In dealing with these issues Koizumi 
ostensibly showed a strong initiative. For instance, he visited Pyongyang twice, made a 
speech at the UN declaring Japan’s determination to gain a permanent seat, and 
accelerated FTA with ASEAN countries. However, Koizumi’s actions were more 
geared towards promoting his popularity among the public as Koizumi knew that he did 
not have a strong factional base inside his party. For example, Koizumi declared that he 
would visit the Yasukuni shrine as part of his platform as the LDP candidate for the 
residency. One of the most important reasons for his yearly visits to the Yasukuni shrine 
was to gain the Japan Association of Bereaved Families (JABF’s) support for the 
election of prime minister, but another reason was that there was strong public support 
(initially public support reached 80 percent and public support continued at an average 
of just over 40 percent).179 Although Koizumi visited the Yasukuni shrine once a year 
during his administration, there was no strong opposition from the public, “only leftist 
mass media and intellectuals were vocal in denouncing Koizumi”.180 Although the 
Asahishinbun Newspaper’s opinion poll on April 2004 showed mixed feelings among 
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the public (42 percent supported and 39 percent opposed the visit), every opinion poll 
just after the final visit of Koizumi on the 15th of August, the controversial day, in 2006 
showed that a majority of Japanese people supported Koizumi’s visit.181 Moreover, the 
opinion poll held by a NHK TV program showed that over 72 percent of young 
respondents (20s and 30s) supported Koizumi’s visit.182 There was a significant rise in 
anti-Japanese demonstration in China and Korea, like the heckling of the Japanese 
soccer team and its supporters during Asian Cup matches in China, and anti-Japan 
demonstrations in China’s major cities in 2005.183 In reaction to these anti-Japanese 
demonstrations, the Japanese public, especially the Japanese youth, first felt worried 
and fearful, but then began to exhibit hostility towards those two countries.184 For 
example, in the Yomiurishinbun newspaper’s opinion poll on the 10th of August 2006, 
67 percent of people answered that they cannot trust China.185            
As far as dealing with North Korean issues was concerned, Koizumi changed his 
initial plan to adhere to public opinions. For a long time normalising relationship with 
North Korea was one of the most important political challenges facing LDP and JSD 
politicians.186 Initially Koizumi followed the tradition. Koizumi visited North Korea, 
and signed the Japan-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Pyongyang 
Declaration to normalise Japan’s relationship with North Korea. However, once Kim 
Jong-il admitted North Korea’s involvement in the abduction of Japanese citizens, 
Japanese people resented North Korea and began to oppose the normalisation of Japan’s 
relationship with North Korea. Faced with strong anger and resentment from Japanese 
constituents, Koizumi ostensibly shifted his stance towards North Korea from the soft to 
hard line.187 Koizumi assigned Shinzō Abe, who consistently took a hard stance against 
North Korea to Secretary-General of the LDP in the Cabinet reshuffle on September 
2003.188 However, Koizumi kept an indecisive stance towards North Korean issues, 
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such as abduction and nuclear bombs.189 Koizumi kept seeking a way of normalising 
the relationship with North Korea during his administration, and Koizumi never 
implemented economic sanctions against North Korea, although the Diet passed two 
bills that enabled government to implement economic sanctions against North Korea, 
and National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea 
(NRKN) formed by the family members of the abductees continuously demanded that 
Koizumi implement economic sanctions.190  
 In terms of security and defence, after the attacks against the US on September 
11, 2001, Japan experienced a number of changes in its defence and also in its overseas 
deployment of SDFJ under the Koizumi administration. Although there was some 
criticism that Koizumi was eager to strengthen “Japan’s alliance with the US 
symbolized by his close personal relations with President Bush”,191 unlike the strong 
controversy over the bilateral security treaty with the US during the post-war period and 
also the SDFJ’s peace keeping mission in the early 1990s, the Japanese showed a more 
supportive stance towards the SDFJ and the amendment to the bilateral security treaty 
with the US This was largely due to the actual security concerns posed by Japan’s 
neighbours, specifically China’s rapid expansion of its military, and a series of North 
Korean missile tests.192       
 
Koizumi’s Popularity and Economic and Cultural Nationalism  
It is even clearer how Koizumi collected support from the public or maintain 
relatively high level of approval ratings when one compares his public approval ratings 
with what he did under his administration. In general, the public approval rate of 
Koizumi administration stands out among prime ministers who took their office after 
1990. As the table 1 shows, Koizumi administration marked the highest approval rate 
among them. Koizumi’s average approval rate was second to the Hosokawa 
administration (48.8 percent for Koizumi, 59 percent for Hosokawa), but Koizumi was 
in office 5 times longer than Hosokawa. 
 
 
                                                  
189 You Uchiyama, Koizumiseiken (Koizumi Administration) )(Tokyo, 2007), p. 158. 
190 Uchiyama, p. 155, National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea 
(NRKN)http://www.sukuukai.jp/houkoku/log/200508/20050824.htm.  
191 Hiwatari, p. 52. 
192 One survey found a significant increase in the Japanese people’s threat perception, in 1975, 43.6 
percent of respondents believed that Japan faced some risk of war, while 34.3 percent said Japan faced no 
such risk. By 2005, 77.6 percent said they perceived some risk of war, while only 16.5 percent said they 
did not. (Sasada, p. 115). 
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Kaifu Administration (10.1989-11.1991)  Miyazawa Administration (11.1991-08.1993) 
  approval  disapproval not sure    approval disapproval not sure 
Average 43.1 31.6 25.3  Average 25.6 52.6 21.8 
Lowest 27.5 20 19.7  Lowest 10.3 21.2 13.8 
Highest 54.2 39.7 38.6  Highest 47.6 75.8 31.2 
Hosokawa Administration (08.1993-04.1994)  Murayama Administration (06.1994-01.1996) 
  approval  disapproval not sure    approval disapproval not sure 
Average 59 19.9 21.1  Average 34.9 39.2 25.9 
Lowest 46.2 11.1 19.7  Lowest 28.1 30.4 23.1 
Highest 67.4 33.2 26.1  Highest 41.9 48 31 
Hashimoto Administration (01.1996-07.1998)  Obuchi Administration (07.1998-04.2000) 
  approval  disapproval not sure    approval disapproval not sure 
Average 38.1 37.3 24.6  Average 33.2 39.2 27.6 
Lowest 23.4 20.3 19.9  Lowest 19.4 26.5 22.7 
Highest 46.8 56.7 32.9  Highest 47.6 54.7 31.1 
Mori Administration (04.2000-04.2001)  Koizumi Administration (04.2001-) 
  approval  disapproval not sure    approval disapproval not sure 
Average 19.8 56.1 24.1  Average 48.8 30.9 20.3 
Lowest 9.6 20.1 14.1  Lowest 34 6 15.5 
Highest 33.3 74.7 46.6  Highest 78.4 45.2 23.8 
Table 1: Approval Rate of Japanese Administrations from 1989193   
 
Graph 3 below shows Koizumi’s approval rates during his administration. This 
information of the approval rates was collected by Jiji Press, and the approval rate is 
mainly used with other newspapers’ opinion polls about Koizumi administration for 
evaluation of support for Koizumi’s economic and cultural nationalism in this thesis.  
                                                  
193 Created from Maeda, p. 5. Approval rate of Tsutomu Hata was omitted, because his administration 
continued only two month.  
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Koizumi's Approval Rate
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Graph 3: Public Approval Rate of Koizumi Administration194 
 
The Koizumi administration started with record high public support, nearly 80% 
in opinion polls, on the 26th of April 2001. During 2001 public support remained stable 
at around 70%. This high support rate in 2001 was maintained by continuous high 
expectations shared among the Japanese population and by Koizumi’s willingness for 
fiscal reform in the public sector, including the privatization of Japan Highway. 
However, his record high support dropped abruptly in the opinion polls in February 
2002. This was mainly caused by Tanaka Makiko’s (popular Minister of Foreign Affairs) 
dismissal. Her dismissal was as the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to 
take responsibility for a political scandal over the misappropriation of a secret fund of 
the MFA and its illegal use by Suzuki Muneo (a member of the lower Diet), one of the 
rare spokespeople for an interest group in Foreign Affairs.195 The popularity of the 
administration was 67.8 % in the opinion polls in January 2002, but then decreased by 
over 20 % to reach 46.5 % in the following month (marked 47 % in the opinion poll 
held by Yomiuri Newspaper soon after Tanaka’s dismissal).  
Koizumi’s popularity kept decreasing until his sudden and surprise visit to North 
Korea on the 17th of September 2002.196 An opinion poll soon after his visit showed a 
significant increase in support. Public support jumped from 37.9 % in August 2002 to 
45.4 % in September 2002. Koizumi assigned Takenaka to the post of financial 
supervisory minister in his cabinet reshuffle two weeks after his surprise visit to North 
Korea in September 2002. As a ‘specific remedy’ for the prolonged banking crisis 
                                                  
194 Created from Kyodo news agencies opinion polls, and from Maeda.  
195 Otake 2006, p. 261. 
196 Otake 2006, p. 262. 
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Takenaka attempted to implement a ‘market oriented’ policy, a ‘hard landing’ solution, 
including a abrupt reduction of NPL, and a closure of unprofitable banks.197 Between 
October and December 2002, Koizumi’s support rate stayed constant at just over 50 %. 
The return of five abductees from North Korea in October 2002 also worked positively. 
Coupled with Takenaka’s hard-handed policy, market value accounting was 
implemented from March 2003.  
As a result of the introduction of the market value accounting, Japanese banks 
suffered from a downturn in the stock market to meet BIS regulations.198 Takenaka’s 
tough stance towards banks actually worsened the banking crisis, and a serious credit 
crunch hit Japanese industries. 199  Economic conditions were badly damaged (the 
Nikkei index reached its lowest price in the post Bubble Economy, 7607 yen on the 28th 
of April for instance), and Koizumi’s popularity also decreased from the beginning of 
2003. Koizumi’s popularity dropped by more than 15 % from 55.9 in November 2002 
to reach 40 % in March 2003, and then remained at under 45% until May 2003. In May 
2003, a further deterioration of the banking sector was expected to become a crisis, but 
was prevented by the provision of public funds to the banks.200 Koizumi’s support 
temporarily increased in May and June 2003. The opinion poll by Yomiurishinbun in 
May 2003 showed that 65.8 percent of people disapproved of Koizumi’s economic 
policy.201 The opinion poll in September in 2003 showed that 54.7 percent of the 
people thought that Koizumi should change his economic policy.202 
In the previous analysis and discussion in this thesis, it is argued that the cultural 
nationalism could work to mask the social problems created by the implementation of 
neoliberal reforms, and to “glue” social differences created by the implementation of 
neoliberal reforms. However, although Koizumi visited North Korea for a second time 
and more of the abductees returned to Japan in May 2004, his support rate continued to 
decrease. His support decreased steadily from 49.6% in an opinion poll of September 
2003 to 35.6 % in December 2004, and then at the turn of 2005, his support rate 
remained at around 40 %.  In an opinion poll in March 2004, 84 percent of the people 
answered that they did not feel Japan’s economy was recovering, and 60 percent of the 
people answered that Koizumi’s reforms were not effective.203 Between July 2004 and 
May 2005 more people disapproved of his performance than those who approved of his 
                                                  
197 Hiwatari, p. 45. 
198 Kikkawa 2005, chapter 2. 
199 Kikkawa 2005, p. 143. 
200 Kikkawa 2005, p. 143. 
201 Yomiurishinbun News paper, 13th May 2003. 
202 Yomiurishinbun News paper, 24th September 2003.  
203 Yomiurishinbun News paper, 23rd March 2004. 
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performance. Moreover, Koizumi’s public support went down in the election of the 
lower Diet in September 2005.  
Part of the explanation for this lies in the fact that, while Japan’s GDP growth 
steadily recovered from 2002, unlike previous economic recoveries under the post-war 
economic system, ordinary Japanese people did not financially benefit. 204  As 
mentioned in the previous section on Japan’s neoliberal reform, the economic recovery 
from 2002 was achieved by the export growth in the manufacturing sector and 
cost-cutting, especially labour costs with little help of neoliberalisation. Thus, it was 
different from reformers’ affirmations that liberalisation and deregulation promoted the 
shift from uncompetitive manufacturing sectors to competitive sectors, including 
finance and service industries. Rather, the conventional manufacturing sector increased 
its competitiveness in the global market and played a central role in the economic 
recovery from 2002. In the meantime, the interests and benefits of ordinary people were 
sacrificed for economic recovery. As a number of scholars show, the gap between the 
rich and poor has been increasing at an unprecedented pace ever since.205 Therefore, a 
main cause of the steady decrease in Koizumi’s popularity can be considered as due to 
Koizumi’s economic ‘mismanagement’, especially in regard to the prolonged banking 
crisis, and the steady decrease in his popularity indicates that cultural nationalism 
cannot be always workable to mask the social problems caused by the implementation 
of neoliberal reforms. 
However, after this social and economic gap became a main topic of public 
debate, Koizumi and his supporters changed their rhetoric, insisting that this increasing 
gap was an issue of ‘self-responsibility’. For instance, although research shows that 56 
percent of respondents acknowledged that Koizumi’s reform was the main cause of the 
social gap, in the Diet Koizumi stated continuously that there were no fixed social strata 
(upper and lower), and what was the important fruit of the reform was that every 
individual had an equal opportunity. 206  Koizumi deployed the elements of 
neoliberalism again to insist on the importance of the continuation of neoliberal reforms 
and recall the narrative that the implementation of neoliberal reforms is the right path to 
economic recovery. Koizumi continued with his privatisation of the Post Office. In 
September 2004, coinciding with Takenaka’s appointment as minister overseeing the 
                                                  
204 Matsubara, pp. 35-45. Kikkawa 2005, pp. 132-8. 
205 Yoshio Higuchi, Nihonnoshotokukakusato Syakaikaisou (Income gap and Social Strata in Japan) 
(Tokyo, 2002), Masahiro Ymada, Kiboukakusasyakai (Society of Expectation Gap) (Tokyo, 2004), 
Atsushi Miura, Karyushyakai Aratanakaisousyudanno shyutugen (Society of Lower Strata, Emergence of 
New Scocial Class) (Tokyo, 2005).  
206 Yomiurishinbun News paper, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/news/20060313it13.htm. 
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Post Office privatisation, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) “released 
a long-awaited report that served as the basis for legislation” for the privatisation.207 In 
the New Year’s address in 2005, Koizumi declared that he would submit his 
privatisation bill during this term of the Diet.208 Despite his strong appeals to the public, 
“in a public opinion survey conducted in spring 2005, only 2-7% of the respondents 
agreed that privatization should be at the top of the government agenda, and an earlier 
poll revealed that only 3 % of the respondents agreed with the bill.209   
However, after the privatisation bill was defeated by 125 to 108 in the Upper 
House on 9 August 2005, Koizumi responded by calling the election of the Lower 
House. That night Koizumi likened himself to Galileo and claimed that just as the 
heliocentric theory of Galileo was not believed at first, neoliberal reforms seemed to be 
not necessary and important, but actually they were necessary for economic recovery.210 
He directly appealed to Japanese constituents regarding the importance of the 
privatisation.211 In order to make the privatisation realised, first Koizumi did not 
nominate the LDP members who opposed the privatisation bill as the LDP’s candidates, 
and sent the LDP candidates who supported the bill to those opponents’ electoral 
districts as ‘assassins’ to defeat the privatisation bill’s opponents within the LDP.212 
Then, Koizumi assigned Hiroshige Seko, a LDP member of the House of Council, who 
studied mass communication in the US, to be press officer.213 Seko succeeded to make 
privatisation the central issue of this election and to create a reformer image of Koizumi, 
in which opponents were treated as ‘villains’.214 The tone of the mass media was 
favourable to the LDP, and their TV reports of the LDP’s election campaign achieved 
high audience rates.215 As a consequence, Koizumi’s support rate rose abruptly from 
36.6 % in August 2005 to 53.5 % in September 2005. Moreover, “a Kyodo New’s 
                                                  
207 Patricia L. Maclachilan, Storming the Castle: The Battle for Postal Reform in Japan, Social Science 
Japan  Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2006, p. 12. The CEFP report advocated the breakup of Japan Post into 
four joint-stock companies, one each for postal savings, insurance, mail collection and delivery and postal 
network operations. All four entities were to be overseen by a government holding company. The holding 
company would then gradually subject the postal savings, and insurance companies to private sector 
control by selling its shares by 2017; its stake in the mail collection and delivery and network operations 
company would be maintained (CEEP 2004; 6)  sited in Maclachilan, p. 12.  
208 Otake 2006, p. 267. 
209 The Japan Times, 7 and 12 March 2005, Maclachilan, p. 13. 
210 Takenaka, p. 232. 
211 Takenaka, p. 232.  
212 Takenaka, p. 232; Maclachilan, p. 14. Koizumi mainly nominated young ladies as ‘assassins’. For 
instance, Yuriko Koike, former Minister of Environment was sent to No. 10 electoral district in Tokyo, 
base of Kouki Kobayashi who was the main member of opposition group in the LDP.     
213 Takenaka, p. 235.  
214 Takenaka, p. 235. 
215 Otake 2006, ch. 2.  
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survey conducted immediately after Koizumi dissolved the Lower House of the Diet 
revealed that 51.6 % of eligible voters supported Koizumi’s proposal for postal 
privatization”.216               
Although in the election on 11 September 2005, the LDP/Komeito (a coalition 
party) captured a combined total of 327 seats, as Maclachlan and Otake argue, it was 
quite doubtful whether ordinary Japanese understood the reasons for and necessity of 
the privatisation of the post office. Koizumi’s ‘theatre’ politics attracted constituents by 
using populist techniques. For instance, Koizumi started an inter-party dispute between 
reformers (Koizumi side) and opponents (interest groups), so that the public focused on 
the dispute, rather than on the privatisation of the post office.217 Opponents were 
disciplined from the LDP, and candidates who had voted against Koizumi were refused 
the LDP’s official electoral endorsement. The media, including national news papers 
and TV stations reported Koizumi’s drama-like politics every day, and their comments 
on postal privatisation supported Koizumi rather than ask meaningful questions about 
privatisation, such as why and how.218   
 The changes in Koizumi’s popularity and support for his policies taken together 
with cultural shifts reflected in the media and opinion polls are consistent with the 
argument that cultural nationalism helped maintain support for a government 
implementing neoliberalisation. The sentiments attached to the nation, including 
feelings of the importance of Japanese culture and security, were successfully mobilised 
by Koizumi. In this way, cultural nationalism could provide the ‘glue’ that can 
counteract the increase in social insecurity and inequality generated by neoliberalisation. 
However, Koizumi has also used his political performance style to revise what is meant 
by Japanese culture, in a way that is congruent with neoliberalisation, when he asserted 
that the increased social and income gap was a question of self-responsibility. To the 
degree that the idea of self-responsibility (as opposed to social solidarity or support) 
comes to be seen as part of, or compatible with, Japanese culture, the ability to mobilise 
cultural nationalism to continue to enable neoliberalisation against the economic 
interests of much of the population will be strengthened.
                                                  
216 The Japan Times, 10 August 2005. 
217 Otake, pp. 138-148.  
218 Otake 2006, pp. 138-148.  
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion 
6.1. Summary    
It has been argued that neoliberal financial reform and financialisation are the 
most fundamental and consequential aspects of neoliberalisation. One set of effects is 
political: they generate a set of transnationalised societal actors who benefit from and 
support further neoliberalisation. However, neoliberal reforms are not in the interests of 
others whose support politicians need if they are to stay in power and implement further 
neoliberalisation. Economic and cultural nationalism thus become important 
instruments to maintain legitimacy in this situation and can be expected to be actively 
fostered by neoliberalising politicians. Since nationalism can be expressed as the will of 
the people, nationalism can provide the legitimizing goal and “glue” that can counteract 
the increase in social insecurity and inequality generated by neoliberalisation. 
Neoliberalism’s negative effects are also more likely to be politically accepted if it can 
be linked to economic nationalism, in the sense of people’s commitment to the 
economic survival or pride of the nation. The paradox of this is that neoliberalisation at 
the same time decreases national economic autonomy.  
 We observed the case of Japan to see whether it can be actually suggested that 
economic and cultural nationalisms were seen in neoliberalisation in Japan. Neoliberal 
reforms were implemented in Japan from the latter half of the 1980s. In the early 1990s 
Japan experienced various difficulties and crisis. The collapse of the bubble economy 
occurred in early 1990, and Japan’s economy was hurt severely by it. A number of fiscal 
stimulus packages and policies were implemented soon after the collapse, but Japan did 
not fully recover from the aftermath of the bubble economy. The failure of the economic 
recovery policies was recognized by the elites as the ‘end’ of the Japanese post-war 
economic system. The collapse of the bubble economy and its aftermath also created an 
identity crisis among the Japanese. Then, the Japanese population started to seek more 
seriously a way of recovering from the collapse of the bubble economy. With this 
nationalistic sentiment among the Japanese public, the Japanese population was united 
by the economic nationalism. Mass media were filled with the reformers’ opinions, in 
which the Japanese post-war economic system was treated as an obstacle to the 
recovery and neoliberal economic reforms were required for Japan’s economic recovery.  
There was a feeling among the Japanese public that neoliberal reforms were 
crucial for Japan’s economic recovery and its bright future. A variety of the people 
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expressed their opinions and feelings that the implementation of neoliberal reforms was 
necessary and the opinions and feelings became accepted as the will of the people. This 
can be seen through high public approval rates of reformer’s party. From the latter half 
of the 1990s, most of the political parties, including conservative LDP, proclaimed the 
importance of neoliberal reforms and their plan of the reforms. In the general election of 
House of Representative in 1996, the LDP which declared neoliberal administrative and 
structural reforms as platform of the election, collected nearly the majority of the House 
of Representative, and the second largest party, NPP, also collected over 150 members. 
This strong support backed reformer Hashimoto, and he implemented a number of 
neoliberal reforms, including radical financial reform. However, once neoliberal 
reforms slowed down the economic recovery and brought financial crisis, economic 
nationalism could not function in the same way. This was reflected in the public 
approval ratings of Hashimoto as well. Despite his strong initiative for neoliberal 
reforms and a number of achievements, Hashimoto lost public support and his reform 
was thwarted. The Japanese people began to demand a conventional economic stimulus 
package. It can be said that the ideology of the economic nationalism could not 
stimulate the sentiment of belonging to a nation that would work to unite the people to 
be supportive for the neoliberal reforms.   
Hashimoto’s successor Obchi implemented traditional Keynesian economic 
stimulus policies. Obuchi’s approval rates increased steadily alongside of economic 
recovery, but he failed to bring Japan’s economy to recovery. Again, Obuchi’s failure in 
economic policy coupled with other issues, including historical disputes with 
neighboring countries and domestic and international security issues, created a 
widespread national consensus, in which the people became to believe that fundamental 
reforms were necessary to salvage Japanese nation. In terms of the economy, they 
started to seek radical and fundamental reforms for Japan’s future. In terms of security 
and Japan’s relationship with neighbouring countries, a national attitude and feelings 
were formed through the experience of disputes with these countries, and in the process 
comments and ideology of conservatives achieved popularity. This sentiment among the 
Japanese public seemed further stimulated and reinforced with economic and cultural 
nationalisms. The opinions and feelings stimulated by economic and cultural 
nationalisms can be observed through the initial high expectation for Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi, who declared the implementation of neoliberal reforms and the visit 
to the Yasukuni shrine, one of the central figures of diplomatic dispute and national 
pride. Koizumi achieved a record high approval rate, over 80 percent support, from the 
public. Koizumi continued with neoliberal reforms riding on a wave of increased 
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nationalistic sentiment among the population in economic and non-economic issues. 
Koizumi continuously used his several slogans, like “kaikakunakushite seichounashi” 
(without reform, no economic development), to formulate economic nationalistic 
sentiment that could work to unite the people. In the process of Koizumi’s neoliberal 
reform, the social and income gap was widened, although Japan’s economy showed a 
steady recovery from 2002. However, unlike Hashimoto, Koizumi continued to enjoy 
public support. Koizumi’s ‘skillful’ uses of cultural nationalism, including two times 
surprise visits to North Korea, annual visit to the Yasukuni shrine, worked to unite the 
people or at least to show a different target while implementing neoliberal reforms. 
Koizumi succeeded in implementing neoliberal reforms by uniting people with mixed 
implementation of economic and cultural nationalism, although Japan’s economic 
recovery produced significant social and income gaps among the population.  
 
6.2. Contributions to literature on the subject 
In the previous arguments over neoliberalism and neoliberalisation, reasons 
why neoliberal economic reforms were widely accepted by the people in a nation-state 
were not well explained. This thesis, by focusing on the role of nationalism, provides a 
possible explanation for the question why not only non-transnationalised interest groups, 
but also ordinary people became willing to implement neoliberal reforms, although the 
implementation might undermine their economic interest.  
The previous arguments over neoliberalism and neoliberalisation did not 
provide a clear explanation of possible causes and reasons why neoliberal reforms were 
implemented into nation-states globally. Therefore, neoliberalisation is often understood 
and argued as the activities and outcomes of the implementation of neoliberal ideologies 
into economic, social and political human activities. However, as recent scholars, 
including Harvey, Tickell and Peck, point out, there are some inconsistencies in 
neoliberal theories and their applications. In this thesis I focused on this point, and 
found out a possible cause and origin of current ongoing neoliberalisation, that is, the 
emergence and operation of the global financial markets. Neoliberal theories are often 
used to justify the creation of the global financial market, but the operation of these 
financial markets creates pressures for the neoliberal reforms in other sectors.  
This thesis also explored how neoliberal reforms were implemented in a 
nation-state. Unlike neoliberal theories and economists’ arguments that tend to 
underestimate states’ role and the influence of the globalised economy, states still play a 
central role in neoliberalisation. However, with neoliberalisation the role of state 
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changed significantly. As Robinson argues, the emergence of a transnational class made 
the situation more complicated. Some industries in nation-states, like the financial 
sector and large manufacturers, shifted their capital accumulation process from a 
national to a global base. States themselves are no longer free from the influence of 
transnational institutions and groups, including the WTO, and their domestic policies 
became an object of the influences of these transnational groups and institutions. In a 
nation-state, some interests groups remained domestically based, so the state became the 
battleground of contested interests of both transnationalised and non-transnationalised 
groups. Previous arguments of neoliberalisation did not pay much attention to the 
mechanisms of the implementation of neoliberal reforms while national interests are 
contested. Therefore, this thesis can contribute to the understanding of the politics of 
implementing neoliberal reforms.  
Finally, this thesis used Japan as case study. Although a number of studies have 
been produced of neoliberalisation in the West, including the US, the UK and EU, there 
are few of them about Japan. In this thesis, first, I explored the way in which the 
Japanese economy was organised during the post-war period, and then how the post-war 
Japanese economic system was changed and modified by neoliberalisation. Another 
important point of the case study is the detailed analysis of the post-war Japanese 
nationalism. Again, few studies have evaluated post-war Japanese nationalism, 
especially the nationalism since the implementation of neoliberal reforms during the 
early 1980s. The thesis provided an account of Japanese nationalism since 1980s, while 
also substantiating the argument concerning its role as a political support for 
neoliberalisation.  
 
6.3. Indications for further research  
Among the areas covered in the thesis, the section of the analysis of Japanese 
nationalism especially the analysis over recent nationalism in Japan is bit weak. Since I 
was not in Japan when I analysed the past nationalism of Japan, most of the materials 
used in this thesis are secondly resources. To analyse nationalism in the 1980s and the 
1990s I rely on scholars’ arguments. To evaluate more recent nationalism under the 
Koizumi administration, I also rely on scholars’ arguments and newspapers’ opinion 
polls rather than analysing and evaluating first resources, including taking surveys by 
myself and analysing TV programmes, their audience ratings, Medias’ commercials and 
advertisements. Therefore, for the improvement of this section, it is possible to conduct 
the research over first materials to provide more accurate details that can make the 
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relationships between cultural and economic nationalism and neoliberalisation in Japan 
clearer.  
Moreover, there are some other possible ways to explain the high political 
support for Koizumi’s reforms from the public. For instance, Japanese people might 
have supported Koizumi, because there was no alternative for them to chose, they felt 
that Koizumi was the person who can be trusted or simply they kept high expectation 
for Koizumi. To find out whether this thesis or the other explanations are correct, it is 
important to examine first materials, especially surveys. 
For a Ph.D. or book-length study of this topic, it is possible to expand the 
argument section by section. The section of neoliberalisation can be improved by 
focusing more on global financial market, especially the mechanism of credit creation 
and nature of financial market, and it is possible to expand the research into the more 
detailed analyses of neoliberalisation in the U.K., the U.S. and Japan. If there is much 
more time, a greater number of scholars’ arguments over nation and nationalism, and 
over neoliberalisation and nationalism can be reviewed and analysed. In the section of 
neoliberalisation in Japan, the post-war Japanese economic system can be argued in 
more detail, and the modification of the Japanese financial market and its effect on the 
economy whole can be described in more detail. Finally, in the section of the 
relationship between nationalism and neoliberalisation in Japan it is important to 
evaluate the first resources as mentioned above. Moreover, it would be useful and 
interesting if different countries are compared, including the U.K., the U.S. and Japan. 
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